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INTRODUCTION 
Many issues, especially potential environmental catastrophes 
caused by climate change, affect not just the living, but also future 
generations. I Indeed, climate change is likely to have greater 
1. Neil H. Buchanan, twlat Do We Owe Future Generations?: Framing the Issues, with an 
Application to Budget Policy 1-7, 56-57 & passim (The George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 351, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1014042 (discussing impact of fiscal 
policies on future generations); Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and 
Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 289, 290 ("[l]ong-term issues seem increasingly 
common in environmental law."); Jon Owens, Comparative Law and Standing to Sue: A Petition 
for Redress for the Environment, 7 ENVTL. L. 321, 339 (2001) ("[h]arms to the environment are 
unique due to their propensity to create diffuse, collective injuries over a long period of time 
and due to their tendency to harm those not protected by the political branches of 
government, such as future generations."). In primitive, pre-industrial societies, a generation 
was considered to last approximately twenty years. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICfIONARY 945 (1981) ("[a]mong primitive peoples twenty years may make a 
[generation]."). Some dictionaries now define a generation as thirty years because of the 
longer life spans in modern societies. WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 763 (2d 
ed. 1979). Currently, however, an average American woman has her first child at 
approximately age twenty-five, while in 1970 the average age of first birth was closer to 21. 
Joyce A. Martin et aI., Births: Final Datafor 2005, in National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol 56 No 
6. (Nat'l Ctr for Health Statistics, Hyattsville, Md.), Dec. 5, 2007, at 2, available at. 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_06.pdf ("The mean or average age at 
first birth for U.S. women was 25.2 years in 2005, unchanged since 2003. The mean age at 
first birth has risen nearly 4 years since 1970."). College-educated women on average have 
their first child at age 30. Ian Shapira, Twentysomethings Feel Alienated From Peers, Older Parents, 
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impacts on those living fIfty or one hundred years from now than 
those alive today. 2 Many commentators have observed that the 
American political system does not adequately protect the interests 
of future generations. 3 Because the unborn cannot vote in today's 
elections, elected officials, including the President and Congress, 
normally focus on the short-term interests of current voters and 
largely ignore long-term problems that will arise after they have left 
office or died. 4 The bias in our political system against addressing 
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 200S, available at 2008 WLNR 821477 ("New data from the National 
Center for Health Statistics also show that college-educated mothers are usually about 30 
when they deliver their first child."). 
2. Richard B. Alley et aI., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH AsSESSMENT 
REpORT OF THE INTERGOVER<"IMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 13, 13-17 (Susan Solomon 
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://ipcc-
wgl.ucar.edu/wgl/Report/ AR4WGI_PrincSPM.pdf [hereinafter Climate Change 2007] 
(reporting that based on several computer models of greenhouse gases and climate change 
that majority of scientists predict that by 2100 there will be significant increases in surface 
temperatures, more severe weather, including hurricanes and typhoons, more heavy 
precipitation, more heat waves, rising sea levels, less snow cover, and melting polar ice); 
Farber, supra note I, at 290 ("[a]ccording to one model, the annual benefit of reducing 
carbon emissions by a thousand tons today rises to the $500 level only after a delay of fifty 
years. The benefit peaks in fifty additional years at over $1,000 year, and then gradually tails 
back to the $500 level over the next three centuries. Thus, the major benefits of current 
control measures will take hold only after a fifty-year delay, but will then extend over several 
centuries."); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 
El'.'VTL. L. I, 15-16 (2005) [herinafter Mank, Global Warming] (reporting that majority of 
climatologists believe that by 2100 increasing levels of greenhouse gases will lead to 
significant increases in surface temperatures, more severe weather, more flooding, more 
droughts, rising sea levels, less snow melt, melting polar ice and more disease). 
3. John Edward Davidson, Tomorrow's Standing Today: How the EquitableJurisdiction Clause of 
Article Ill, Section 2 Confl?1's Standing Upon Future GenI?1'ations, 2S COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 185, IS8-
91 (2003); Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the GenI?1'ations, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1465, 1465 (1989); 
Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Genl?1'ations: A Praposal for a "Republican" 
Supl?1'agency, 5 N.Y.V. ENVrL. LJ. 444, 445-4S, 455-72 (1996) [herinafter Mank, Future 
Genl?1'ations]; Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting Biodiversity for Future Genl?1'ations: An Argument fOT 
a Constitutional Amendment, S TuL. ENVTL. LJ. lSI, IS2, 219 (1994); R. George Wright, The 
Intl?1'ests of Postmty in the Constitutional Scheme, 59 V. Cin. L. Rev. 113, 113, 122 (1990). 
4. Davidson, supra note 3, at 190; Epstein, supra note 3, at 1465 ("Democratic processes 
with universal suffrage cannot register the preferences of the unborn, and dialogue between 
generations is frustrated when future generations, or at least some future generations, are of 
necessity silent."); Shi.Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. V. L. 
REv. 433, 444-45 (200S) ("It has never been a secret that future generations are frequently 
and systematically shortchanged in a wide variety of public policies. We demand income tax 
cuts that drive budgets into deficit and mortgage our children's future, so that we have 
higher current disposable income."); Mank, Future Genl?1'ations, supra note 3, at 445-46, 455-
65; Schlickeisen, supra note 3, at 182, 219 ("[N]ormal legislative processes are systemically 
biased in favor of current benefits as opposed to the long-term future .... Elected officials 
align themselves with beggar-the-children policies... to provide immediate economic 
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the interests of future generations poses serious obstacles in solving 
long-term environmental problems such as global warming. 5 For 
instance, there is mounting evidence that our generation's carbon 
dioxide emissions will increase global temperatures for hundreds 
or even thousands of years. 6 
An important question is whether anyone has standing to sue on 
behalf of future generations in the federal courts. 7 Because future 
generations cannot vote, unelected federal judges are more suited 
to protect their interests than the political branches. 8 The 
Supreme Court, however, has interpreted Article III of the 
Constitution to impose a standing test usually requiring plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that they have personally suffered an injury that is 
"actual and imminent," and not merely "conjectural or 
benefits for constituents who vote now to the detriment of future generations who cannot."); 
Wright, supra note 3, at 113, 122 ("Once a society chooses, consciously or not, to take 
advantage of future generations, the democratic process of electoral competition tends to 
facilitate, rather than inhibit such a choice."); J.A. Doeleman, On the Social Rate of Discount: 
The Case for Macroenvironmental Policy, 2 ENVTL. ETHICS 45, 51 (1980) ("Most persons, 
including politicians, are caught up in the myopic demands of their work, making grass-roots 
decisions, compromising the environment when it seems optimal to do so under the 
immediate pressure of scarcity."). 
5. Davidson, supra note 3, at 186--90; Hsu, supra note 5, at 446 ("There is no sharper 
illustration of the human propensity to dramatically discount the welfare of future 
generations than the world's abject failure to deal with the problem of climate change."); 
Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 445-46,450-72,506--16; Schlickeisen, supra note 3, 
at 182, 219. 
6. Juliet Eilperin, Carbon Output Must Near Zero To Avert Danger, New Studies Say, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 10, 2008, at Al ("While natural cycles remove roughly half of human-emitted 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere within a hundred years, a significant portion persists 
for thousands of years. Some of this carbon triggers deep-sea warming, which keeps raising 
the global average temperature even after emissions halt."). 
7. Owens, supra note I, at 326 ("In this last century, the United States Supreme Court has 
changed standing to sue from a highly liberalized requirement to a serious constitutional 
obstacle to public interest litigants. Modem standing requirements pose an especially high 
barrier to citizen suits that seek to enforce environmental laws through bringing suit on 
behalf of natural resources, future generations and other entities that are otherwise 
underrepresented in the political process and voiceless in the judicial system."), 376--77 
(observing that the Supreme Court's restrictive standing test probably prevents suits on 
behalf offuture generations and arguing for liberalized standing). 
8. See id. at 340 ("Because future generations cannot vote, the judiciary should provide 
broad standing to protect such special classes. In fact, active judicial involvement in the 
interests of these non-voting classes may be said to be consistent with Justice Scalia's vision of 
the court's role as a protector against the impositions of the majority."). Conversely, there is 
an argument that federal judges are sometimes too isolated from the democratic process. See 
Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 469 ("While Congress is often overly responsive to 
interest group political pressures, federal judges, who normally serve for life, are frequently 
overly insulated from popular values."). 
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hypothetical."g This "actual and imminent" requirement can make 
it difficult for federal courts to hear cases addressing the interests 
of future generations. The "actual and imminent" requirement is 
inherently biased against suits that seek to prevent future harm 
since it is nearly impossible to show with certainty that such harm 
will occur. 10 
The Supreme Court has generally rejected standing based on the 
legal rights or interests of third parties. 11 In Sierra Club v. Morton, 12 
the Court held that the Sierra Club did not have standing to seek 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the granting of permits for 
commercial exploitation of Mineral King Valley, a national game 
refuge adjacent to Sequoia National Park, because it did not allege 
that any of its members used the park or would be injured by the 
proposed development. 13 The Court rejected the Sierra Club's 
argument that it was entitled to standing as the representative of 
the public, the environment or future generations without proof 
that its members would be injured by the government's proposed 
actions. 14 Accordingly, federal courts are likely to deny standing to 
9. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 563-64 (1992) (stating standing test 
under Article III of the Constitution); Davidson, supra note 3, at 212 (acknowledging 
imminence requirement in standing may bar suits on behalf of future generations); Ted 
Allen, Note, The Philippine Children s Case: Recogniz.ing Legal Standing for Future Generations, 6 
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 713, 732 (1994) ("Scalia's language requiring that an injury be 
'actual and imminent' ... could be read strictly by the Court to deny standing for those 
unborn. While a representative of future generations could prove that a particular agency 
action would produce some future harm, persuading the Court that the harm is 
particularized, actual, and imminent and not 'conjectural or hypothetical' would be 
difficult."); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, A Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come: Standing to Sue For 
Future Generations, 1].L. & TECH. 67, 104 (1986) ("The root of the problem in posterity suits 
is that the injury is, by definition, not imminent. The ancient structure of the injunction rule 
must be refurbished in twenty-first century decor if the posterity suit is to survive."); see 
generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 
91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992) [herinafter Sunstein, Whats Standing?] (criticizing standing 
requirement that plaintiff must prove an injury is "imminent"). 
10. Hsu, supra note 4, at 467-68. 
11. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-499 (1975). 
12. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
13. Id. at 734-35. 
14. Id. at 734-40 (noting that "the complaint alleged that the development 'would 
destroy or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and histone objects and wildlife of 
the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for future generations'" and that 
Sierra Club sought standing as a representative of the public without proof that any member 
of the Club was injured). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that "bona 
fida" environmental public interest organizations should be able to file suit on behalf of the 
public at large. Id. at 757-60 (Blackmun,]., dissenting). 
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a plaintiff who seeks only to protect the rights or interests of future 
generations. 
In some circumstances, a non-governmental party might be able 
to sue on behalf of both its own interests and those of future 
generations. The federal National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) requires agencies to examine the long-term environmental 
impacts of their proposed projects. 15 NEPA, however, provides no 
substantive protection to future' generations because it is a purely 
procedural statute that does not mandate that agencies actually 
protect either present or future generations. 16 
Courts have divided whether and when probabilistic risks justify 
standing. 17 Notably, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit has required plaintiffs to demonstrate that there 
is a "substantial probability" that a challenged government action 
will harm them, but other circuits have applied a more lenient 
test. 18 Despite the differences among lower courts, however, the 
15. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006). In 
particular, NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental assessment of 
proposed federal actions that addresses "the environmental impact of the proposed action." 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (i); see generally infra notes 92, 95-97, 172-73, 283, 285-312 and 
accompanying text (discussing to what extent federal agencies must address environmental 
impacts pursuant to NEPA). 
16. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra note 18 and accompanying text. 
18. Compare Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(applying strict four-part test for standing in procedural rights case, including requiring a 
procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury, that "a particularized 
environmental interest of theirs that will suffer demonstrably increased risk" and that it is 
"substantially probable" that the agency action will cause the demonstrable injury alleged by 
the plaintiff) with Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972-75 
(9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Florida Audubon's standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and 
stating that such plaintiffs "need only establish the reasonable probability of the challenged 
action's threat to [their] concrete interest" (quotation marks omitted»; Comm. to Save the 
Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (lOth Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with Florida 
Audubon's "substantial probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a 
test that plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse environmental consequences" 
from the alleged failure to follow NEPA); Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of 
Imposing a Standing Threshold 2-5 (Feb. 27, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1099108 (arguing 
D.C. Circuit's threshold test of substantial harm in standing cases is inappropriate); Mank, 
Future Generations, supra note 3, at 445-63 (discussing split in circuits about how to apply 
footnote seven standing test in NEPA cases); Bradford C. Mank, Should States Have Greater 
Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 
WM. & MARy L. REv. 1701, 1720 n.91 (2008) [herinafter Mank, States Standing]; Blake R. 
Bertagna, Comment, "Standing" Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs To Establish Legal 
Standing To Redress Injuries Caused fry Global Warming, 2006 B.Y.U.L. REv. 415, 461-64 (2006) 
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courts of appeals have generally required non-government 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they will likely be injured during their 
lifetimes to have sufficient injury for standing and, therefore, non-
government plaintiffs may not be able to sue to prevent future 
harms that are unlikely to affect them during their lifetimes. 19 
In Massachusetts v. EPA,20 the Supreme Court held that 
Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA's refusal to 
regulate carbon dioxide (CO,) and other greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) emitted by new motor vehicles, in part because states are 
entitled to more lenient standing criteria than ordinary citizens. 21 
The Court concluded that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts' 
allegation that increasing levels of GHGs from vehicles were 
causing sea levels to rise and damage its coastline was sufficient 
injury to meet standing requirements. 22 The Court considered 
evidence from computer models that climate change caused by 
gases such as GHGs through the year 2100 would result in ever 
rising sea levels and damage to Massachusetts coastline, despite 
Chief Justice Roberts' argument in his dissenting opinion that 
these models were too uncertain to justify standing. 23 
The Court's consideration of future harm to Massachusetts 
through the year 2100 arguably supports giving standing to other 
plaintiffs who seek to protect future generations, but the Court 
recognized standing for Massachusetts as a state and specifically 
announced that states are entitled to special consideration in 
standing analysis. 24 Additionally, the Court stressed that 
(discussing split between Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on causation portion of 
standing test). 
19. See infra notes 275-80 and accompanying text. 
20. 549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
21. Id. at 1452-58; Jonathan H. Adler, Essay, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 
VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 63 (2007), available at 
http://www.virginiaiawreview.org/inbrief/2007 /05/21/adler.pdf; Dru Stevenson, SPecial 
Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. I, 2, 4-5 (2007); 
Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?, supra note 19, at 
1705-08, 1727-29; Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking 
New Ground on Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY I, 2 (2007), 
available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy /2007/17 /LRCo1l2007nl7Watts.pdf. 
22. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1452-58. 
23. Id. at 1456 n.20; but see id. at 1467-68 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting) (criticizing 
Massachusetts' use of estimates of sea level rise through 2100); see Adler, supra note 21, at 65; 
Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1731, 1741, 1786. 
24. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55; Adler, supra note 21, at 66-70; Robin Kundis 
Craig, Removing "The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry ": Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private 
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Massachusetts was currently experiencing harms from climate 
change and rising sea levels. 25 It is not clear whether the Court 
would have recognized standing if all alleged harms were to occur 
in the future. 
Ideally from the perspective of future generations, the Supreme 
Court should eliminate the "actual and imminent" requirement for 
Article III standing because it is inherently biased against suits that 
seek to prevent future harm. 26 The Court likely did not consider 
the interests of future generations when it established the "actual 
and imminent" requirement for standing. Nevertheless, the Court 
is unlikely to change its standing test in the near future. 
Despite the "actual and imminent" requirement limitation of 
suits on behalf of future generations, the Massachusetts decision 
supports the protection of future generations in some 
circumstances. The Court recognized that states have a quasi-
sovereign interest in protecting the health and safety interests of 
their citizens pursuant to the long established parens patriae 
doctrine. 27 
There is a good argument that states have a quasi-sovereign 
interest in not just their current citizens but also their future 
citizens. 28 Furthermore, the modern public trust doctrine and 
several state laws recognize that states have a duty to protect natural 
resources for future generations. 29 Because both federal and state 
law recognizes the important role of states in protecting natural 
resources for future generations, federal courts should apply a 
liberal approach to standing issues when states bring parens patriae 
or public trust suits to protect those resources for the state's future 
citizens. 
Part I examines philosophical reasons for protecting future 
generations. Part II explores how international law and foreign law 
addresses the issue. Part III shows that federal law in several 
instances encourages or requires government agencies to consider 
Risk in the lnjury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 194-96 (2007); Mank, supra note 
22, at 170(H)S, 1727-29; Jonathan Remy Nash, Essay, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 
lOS COLUM. L. REv. 494, 513-14 (200S). 
25. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455-1456; Craig, supra note 24, at 195-96; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note IS, at 1731. 
26. Hsu, supra note 4, at 466--69. 
27. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 
237 (1907); Mank, States Standing, supra note IS, at 1727-29. 
2S. See infra Part VII. 
29. See infra notes 396, 419, 464-79 and accompanying text. 
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harms to or preserve resources for future generations. Part IV 
explains why current standing requirements including the 
requirement of "imminent" injury raise substantial obstacles for 
petitioners seeking to protect future generations. Part V discusses 
the ability of non-government plaintiffs to sue pursuant to NEPA or 
a substantive statute. Part VI examines Massachusetts and its 
possible implications for suits seeking standing for future 
generations. Part VII argues that both the parens patriae doctrine 
and the public trust doctrine support giving states the opportunity 
to protect future generations. 
I. To WHAT DEGREE SHOULD PRESENT GENERATIONS PROTECT 
FUTURE GENERATIONS? 
Some argue that the present generation has a fiduciary 
responsibility to see that future generations enjoy resources and 
opportunities comparable to those enjoyed by the present 
generation. 30 Others argue that the present generation does not 
have a fiduciary duty to maximize the assets of or to preserve all 
resources for future generations, but does have a duty to act 
responsibly and not to impose undue burdens on future 
generations. 31 This article adopts a pragmatic approach, suggesting 
that we should protect future generations but only to the extent 
that doing so can be justified based on our ability to predict the 
future. There are persuasive arguments for the present generation 
to consider the interests of future generations for at least the next 
one hundred years, because we have some reasonable ability to 
estimate conditions for that period of time. 32 For example, the 
30. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 203 (\980) 
(arguing that people alive today should have no priority over the unborn because "all 
citizens are at least as good as one another regardless of their date of birth") ;jOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 284-93 (1971) (arguing that each generation should set aside some 
capital for future generations until just institutions are firmly established and suggesting that 
the temporal priority of people alive today yields them no moral priority); MARK SAGOFF, 
THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMEl'.'T 63 (1988) (citation 
omitted) ("Our obligation to provide future individuals with an environment consistent with 
ideals we know to be good is an obligation not necessarily to those individuals but to the 
ideals themselves."); Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 448 (summarizing arguments 
for protecting future generations). 
31. Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, 
Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 267, 294-95 (1993); Mank, Futllre 
Generations, supra note 3, at 450. 
32. See generally jeffrey Gaba, Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to Flltllre 
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United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) has made detailed estimates and projections concerning 
climate change through the year 2100. 33 Where it is feasible to 
estimate the impacts of our activities on future generations, the 
present generation should take reasonable steps to avoid actions 
that are likely to cause serious harms to future generations because 
we would have wanted past generations to do the same for us and 
we would likely want the present generation to help us if we knew 
that we would live in the future instead of now. 34 
Philosophers have questioned whether the present generation 
has a moral duty to help future generations: first, the present 
generation cannot know the moral and non-moral value 
preferences of future generations because they cannot 
communicate with us; second, we cannot quantify the impact of 
our actions on future generations; and third, we are uncertain 
about which intervening events or future inventions will affect the 
physical conditions in which future generations will live, especially 
those potentially living in the distant future. 35 But this 
epistemological objection is less convincing when we limit our 
concern for future generations to the impacts on those living one 
or two generations into the future. 36 Furthermore, some 
Generations: Future Rights and Present Virtue, 24 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 249, 253-54 (1999) 
("Several factors suggest that there is a sharp distinction in our moral relationship to people 
who will exist within the next few generations and those that will exist in the more distant 
future."); Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 448-50; see also Farber, supra note 1, at 
294 ("It would be a tremendous advance if our society took seriously the impacts of our 
actions over the next several centuries, even if we leave the truly distant future to fend for 
itself.") . 
33. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CUMATE CHANGE, FOURTH AsSESSMENT REpORT: 
CUMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REpORT SUMMARY FOR POUCY MAKERS, 30 (Nov. 17, 2007) 
("[wlarming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of 
increases in global average air aIjd ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, 
and rising global average sea level"), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
34. Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 448. 
35. Gaba, supra note 32, at 255-65 (questioning the ability of current generation to know 
preferences of distant future generations, predict the impact of our actions on them, or 
predict how intervening events or inventions will affect future generations); Christopher D. 
Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against Global Warming, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 445, 447-48 (1992) 
(questioning ability of climate science to predict changes in climate); Mank, Future 
Generations, supra note 3, at 448-49 (discussing epistemological objection to helping future 
generations). 
36. Gaba, supra note 32, at 253-55 (arguing that present generation has a sufficient 
connection to the next two generations after us to sufficiently estimate some of their value 
preferences and therefore that the present generation has some moral obligation to protect 
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fundamental values such as preserving human health, species 
diversity, and natural beauty are unlikely to change in the near 
future. 37 
Professor Buchanan differentiates among "four roughly discrete 
groups of people: today's adults, today's children, people not yet 
born but who will have been born before those living today have 
died, and those people who will be born after everyone living today 
has passed on.,,38 Today's adults can vote for themselves and make 
choices for their future. Although today's children cannot yet vote, 
society has a significant amount of information about today's 
children because we have an emotional connection with them, and 
children's values are at least partly shaped by their parents' values 
during their childhood, even if later experiences may change their 
views somewhat. 39 We also have enough information about people 
not yet born but who will have been born before those living today 
have died, or, in other words, people born within approximately 
the next one hundred years. We can estimate to some extent the 
preferences and values of our unborn grandchildren and even 
great-grandchildren. 40 Our actions affect the values of near future 
generations. 41 Many people who are young adults today between 
the ages of eighteen to thirty will still be living and voting fifty or 
at least the next two generations); Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 448-49 (rejecting 
epistemological objection to helping near future generations). 
37. [d. at 449; Jeffrey Spear, Comment, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA and Our 
Responsibilities to Future Generations, 2 N.Y.V. ENVTL. LJ. 117, 124, 129-30 (l993)("Certain 
fundamental interests exist such that no passage of time could conceivably be said to lessen 
their importance for sustaining the basic qualities of human life. These fundamental 
interests at a minimum would comprise interests in food, shelter, health, and, in the 
environmental context, interests in clean air, water and land."). But see Gaba, supra note 32, 
at 261-63 ("Recognition of an interest in preserving humanity as a whole, however, is of little 
practical value in addressing most environmental issues .... Different societies have, over 
time, placed different values on the sanctity or worth of life and the relationship of the 
individual to society as a whole. A universal and timeless belief in the value of life becomes 
even more problematic when the issue involves not the certainty, but the risk, of death or 
injury. The willingness, as a matter of personal choice or preference, to incur health risks 
certainly seems to be variable .... [Wje can be sure that the preferences and values of future 
generations will be different from our own."). 
38. Buchanan, supra note 1, at 13. 
39. Gaba, supra note 32, at 253-54 ("[Wje can and do have a direct emotional connection 
to our children and grandchildren, and even to our great-,grandchildren."). _ 
40. [d. at 254-55 ("[Wje are also capable of imagining the preferences and values of 
people who will exist within the immediate future .... [Cjurrent humans who have an 
immediate emotional tie to their grandchildren's well-being and who understand the 
preferences of those grandchildren now can, and do, speak on their behalf."). 
41. [d. at 264 (arguing "Present Actions Shape and Alter Future Preferences"). 
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even up to seventy-five years into the future, and many children 
today will live to see the year 2100, as life expectancy is likely to 
increase in coming decades. 42 Today's adults usually have enough 
of a connection with their children and grandchildren to care 
about how they will live in the next fifty or one hundred years. 43 
Conversely, for people who will be born after everyone living today 
has passed on, roughly those born more than a hundred years from 
now, there are greater uncertainties about both future conditions 
and the value preferences of future generations. 44 
The second philosophical objection to helping future 
generations is ontological. We cannot know the identity of future 
humans, if any, and therefore we owe no obligations to nameless, 
contingent persons. 45 Furthermore, the present generation cannot 
be legally or morally obligated to act on their behalf, because our 
actions in choosing one policy rather than another determines the 
composition of any future generation, and thus it is pointless to act 
for any future generations' benefit. 46 A counterargument to the 
42. FELICITIE C. BELL & MICHAEL L. MILLER, LIFE TABLES FOR THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL 
SECURl1Y AREA 1900-2100, ACTUARIAL STUDY No. 116, TABLE 14 & passim (estimating 
American life expectancy will increase significantly through 2100), available at 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/NOTES/asI16/asI16TOC.htm\. 
43. See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 16 ("People who have had children must have done so 
because they wanted to be parents (with obvious exceptions), so if they want their children 
to be happy, they will want their children to experience the happiness of parenting. This 
makes the original parents care about their grandchildren indirectly ... ."). 
44. Gaba, supra note 32, at 255 ("[Plredictions of impacts in the more distant future 
involve greater and distinctive levels of uncertainty associated with the greater likelihood of 
unanticipated intervening events."), 263-64 (questioning ability of current generation to 
know preferences of distant future generations), 268 ("[Hlistory suggests that we cannot 
predict the marginal utility of resources one hundred years from now."). 
45. [d. at 257-58 (discussing non-identity problem regarding future generations); Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, Note, Justice Unconceived: How Posterity Has Rights, 14 Yale J.L. & Human. 
393,393-97 (2002) (same). 
46. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-55 (1984) (summarizing the ontological 
argument that current generation's choices affect the very composition of future 
generations); Anthony D'Amato, Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global 
Environment?, 84 Am. J. Int'\. L. 190, 190-92 (1990) (making the ontological objection that 
society does not owe a duty to the future, because our very act of discharging that duty 
determines the very individuals to whom we allegedly owed that duty); Buchanan, supra note 
1, at 17 ("After everyone currently alive has died, however, the content of future generations 
will be determined by the combination of factors that determine the path of human 
existence. That is, every choice and non-choice brings into existence one possible universe 
while destroying other possible universes. Each choice determines, in one way or another 
through path dependence (or what is in essence the familiar butterfly effect), which of an 
infinite number of potential future human beings will actually come into existence."); Gaba, 
supra note 32, at 260 ("Our actions may have consequences on humans who will live one 
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ontological argument is that we can benefit a future generation 
regardless of which specific individuals are members by improving 
and preserving the environment in general, improving the 
conditions in which they will live. 47 Human beings appear to care 
about the future, even though they cannot predict who will live in 
that future. 48 
At a minimum, we have a duty to help future generations live in 
dignity and avoid misery.49 We have a greater duty to persons living 
one or two generations into the future because we have more 
information about how our actions will affect them and have a 
stronger basis for predicting their value preferences. 50 This Article 
concludes that the present generation owes greater obligations to 
our children and grandchildren, but should also take reasonably 
cost-effective steps to protect more distant generations, including 
our great-grandchildren to the degree that present society can 
reasonably make estimates, perhaps as much as 100 years into the 
hundred, five hundred, or a thousand years hence, and there is no single set of preferences 
held by 'the future.'"), 264-65 (arguing present actions shape and alter future preferences); 
Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 449 (summarizing the ontological objection); Ruth 
Macklin, Can Future Generations Properly Be Said to Have Rights?, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE 
GENERATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, 151 (Ernest Partridge ed., 1980) (arguing future 
generations have no rights because they are not sentient persons); Spear, supra note 37, at 
124-26 (summarizing the ontological objection); Bruhl, supra note 45, at 393-97 (same). 
47. Buchanan, supra note 1, at 18-19; Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 449; 
Spear, supra note 37, at 125-30 ("Certain fundamental interests exist such that no passage of 
time could conceivably be said to lessen their importance for sustaining the basic qualities of 
human life. These fundamental interests at a minimum would comprise interests in food, 
shelter, health, and, in the environmental context, interests in clean air, water and land."); 
Bruhl, supra note 45, at 413-17 (arguing moral duty exists to prevent obvious harms such as 
planting bomb even if we do not know identity of victims; Meyer, Lukas, Intergenerational 
Justice, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 
2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ sum2003 / entries/justice-intergenerational/ (last 
visited November 13, 2008). See also D'Arnato, supra note 46, at 194-98 (acknowledging that 
it is possible to avoid the ontologie al argument if we owe a duty to act responsibly not to our 
descendants, but to all species and the environment in general); but see Gaba, supra note 32, 
at 261-63 ("Recognition of an interest in preserving humanity as a whole, however, is of little 
practical value in addressing most environmental issues .... Different societies have, over 
time, placed different values on the sanctity or worth of life and the relationship of the 
individual to society as a whole. A universal and timeless belief in the value of life becomes 
even more problematic when the issue involves not the certainty, but the risk, of death or 
injury. The willingness, as a matter of personal choice or preference, to incur health risks 
certainly seems to be variable .... [W]e can be sure that the preferences and values of future 
generations will be different from our own"). 
48. !d. at 258-59. 
49. See Buchanan, supra note I, at 18-19. 
50. Id. at 16; Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 450. 
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future. 51 
Related to the question of whether society should protect future 
generations is the complicated issue of quantifying and comparing 
present and future costs and benefits, which presents difficult 
questions about whether it is appropriate to discount future costs 
and benefits. 52 Because there are potentially an infinite number of 
future generations, one could argue that the present generation 
should sacrifice to ensure a better future for infinite future 
generations, but that same argument could be applied to every 
single generation in the future. 53 Professor Farber argues that 
some form of discounting of future benefits is necessary because 
the assumption that we owe a duty to an infinite number of future 
generations would result in the paradoxical result that each 
generation should indefinitely postpone enjoying environmental 
benefits so that future generations can enjoy greater benefits at 
some distant time that never arrives. 54 Accordingly, he argues that 
51. Gaba, supra note 32, at 253-55; Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 450. 
52. See generallyJohnJ. Donohue III, ~y We Should Discount the Views of Those ~o Discount 
Discounting, 108 Yale LJ. 1901, 1905 (1999) ("While human lives are priceless from a 
philosophical or religious perspective, the resources that can be used to save lives are 
limited. If we fail to recognize this economic reality as we go about the process of choosing 
regulations, we will expend resources in a way that prevents us from saving as many lives as 
possible. It is not the idea that future lives are less valuable in any moral or ethical sense that 
leads to the process of discounting at a current rate of interest. Rather, discounting is 
appropriate in that, if invested, our resources are expected to grow at that rate, so that if we 
forego spending and invest the money instead, we can save more lives in the future with the 
amount foregone today."); Farber, supra note I (arguing in favor of discounting future costs 
and benefits); Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 31 (discussing appropriate discount rate 
for future and suggesting low discount rate); Gaba, supra note 33, at 268-70 (discussing 
appropriate discount rate for future costs and benefits); Richard Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941, 
987-10 17 (1999) ("With respect to harms to future generations, the Article shows that the 
use of discounting is ethically unjustified. It privileges the interests of the current generation 
without a defensible foundation."); Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting 
Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 171 (2007) 
(discussing whether society should discount benefits to future generations, and arguing that 
it is appropriate to discount future benefits of money invested for health and environmental 
benefits). 
53. Farber, supra note I, at 293, 303-04; Gaba, supra note 32, at 268-69 ("If we attempt to 
maximize the utility experienced by all future humans, we run into the inescapable fact that 
there are simply more of them then there are of us .... This leads to the conclusion that 
each generation should sacrifice its present interests, at least beyond consumption to ensure 
minimal survival, to provide benefits to the future. Since this logic applies equally to each 
generation, we are led to a world of perpetual denial for the sake of a future that never 
arrives.") . 
54. Farber, supra note I, at 293, 303-04, 308-18 ("A second normative argument is that 
2009] Standing and Future Generations 15 
some form of discounting of future benefits is necessary, as society 
cannot allocate finite resources equally over an infinite number of 
future time periods. 55 However, a discount rate that is too high and 
favors present benefits over future benefits would lead us to reject 
small expenditures now that could save large numbers of lives a few 
'6 
hundred years from now." 
Another reasonable argument for discounting our investment in 
protecting future generations stems from the idea that it is usually 
more difficult to predict the impact of our actions on distant future 
generations than on the near future. 57 Even if future lives are as 
valuable as present lives, we are less certain about the impact of our 
actions on distant future generations. 58 For generations living in 
the twenty-second century and beyond, society probably lacks 
sufficient information about future environmental issues or the 
failure to discount benefits will lead to indefinite postponement of environmental benefits. 
Investment returns provide an argument for postponing environmental benefits, perhaps 
even indefinitely ... By the same logic, we can save even more lives if we further postpone our 
action and continue allowing the investment to grow, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, without 
discounting, we will continually put off the realization of the environmental benefit."); see 
also Gaba, supra note 32, at 268-69 ("[I]f we compare the benefits of present consumption 
enjoyed by the finite class of existing humans with the costs imposed by that consumption on 
the potentially infinite class of future humans, existing humans lose. \Nhatever costs, however 
small, that would be experienced by all future humans, will overwhelm whatever benefit, 
however great, to present humans."). 
55. Farber, supra note 1, at 293,303-04 ("A second normative argument is that failure to 
discount benefits will lead to indefinite postponement of environmental benefits. Investment 
returns provide an argument for postponing environmental benefits, perhaps even 
indefinitely ... By the same logic, we can save even more lives if we further postpone our 
action and continue allowing the investment to grow, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, without 
discounting, we will continually put off the realization of the environmental benefit."), 308-
18; see also Gaba, supra note 32, at 268-69 ("[I]f we compare the benefits of present 
consumption enjoyed by the finite class of existing humans with the costs imposed by that 
consumption on the potentially infinite class of future humans, existing humans lose. 
\Nhatever costs, however small, that would be experienced by all future humans, will 
overwhelm whatever benefit, however great, to present humans."). 
56. [d. at 269-70 ("Discounting of future benefits is perverse and paradoxical since, for 
example, it can lead to a conclusion that one life saved today is of greater benefit than 
billions of lives saved hundreds of years from now. For example, with a five percent discount 
rate, one life today would have the same value as more than 3 billion lives in four hundred 
fifty years."); Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 52, at 172-76 (same). 
57. Gaba, supra note 32, at 272-74 (arguing uncertainties of our impact on future 
generations justifies discounting future benefits); see also Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra 
note 31, at 290 n.93 (same); but see Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 
Yale LJ. 1981, 2044-46 (1998) (criticizing future uncertainty rationale for discounting 
benefits to future generations because uncertainties can result in either greater or less 
benefits than predicted). 
58. Gaba, supra note 32, at 272-74. 
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future societies to make wise choices, although we should try to 
avoid decisions that have long-term irreversible adverse 
consequences. 59 For example, a pollutant that causes cancer today 
may not be a threat in the future if science develops a cure for 
cancer or a process to contain or eliminate the pollutant. 60 
Furthermore, future societies are likely to be substantially richer 
than today's society and thus better able to address problems than 
our society, in which case our generation should not make 
substantial sacrifices that mayor may not improve the lives of 
distant future generations. 61 Because of these uncertainties, the 
current generation has a moral duty to avoid creating only those 
risks of irreversible environmental harm that could lead to 
catastrophic changes in human life or ecosystems. 62 Even with our 
limited knowledge of future events and the preferences of future 
generations, society can avoid obvious long-range harms such as 
nuclear war or drastic climate change that are likely to negatively 
affect distant generations. 63 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAw AND FOREIGN LAw RECOGNIZES THE RIGHTS 
OF FUTURE GENERATIONS 
International law has recognized that nations and human beings 
in general have a moral and legal obligation to protect the rights of 
59. Id. at 253-54 (" [AJlthough all predictions of the future are uncertain, the likelihood 
that we can accurately predict events that will occur several generations in the future is 
small."); Bruhl, supra note 45, at 437-38 (same); Lukas, supra note 47 (arguing that our 
knowledge of the future is limited, especially with respect to "the specific identities of 
persons in the further future"). 
60. Gaba, supra note 32, at 272-73. 
61. Buchanan, supra note 1, at 35 ("If future generations will almost certainly be 
significantly richer than current generations, why must current generations make still more 
sacrifices to prevent any erosion at all in the (much higher) living standards of future 
generations?"); Donohue, supra note 52, at 1910 (arguing remote future generations are 
likely to have more resources than our generation). 
62. Buchanan, supra note 1, at 24-25 (arguing that catastrophic environmental harms are 
cause for greater concern than economic harms because of their irreversibility); Farber & 
Hemmersbaugh, supra note 31, at 299-300, 303 (same); Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, 
Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U CHI. L. REv. 79, 117 
(2007) ("It may be that due to the increasing marginal harm caused by certain forms of 
environmental degradation, the existence of irreversibilities, and certain forms of 
uncertainty, efficiency requires that a great deal of investment be made to preserve the 
environment."); Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 450 (arguing that society "should 
try to avoid creating substantial risks of future disaster."). 
63. !d. at 450. 
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future generations. 64 The 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment declares 
that, "man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and 
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that 
permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present 
and future generations.,,65 In addition to the Stockholm 
Declaration, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES),65 the 1972 Convention Concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,57 the 
1982 United Nations World Charter for Nature,fi8 and the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity69 include language supporting 
the preservation of the environment for future generations. 70 
Additionally, the preamble of the 1993 North American Agreement 
on Environmental Cooperation, joined by the United States, 
Canada and Mexico, emphasizes the importance of "cooperation 
[on environmental issues] in achieving sustainable development 
for the well-being of present and future generations.,,71 None of 
64. Allen, supra note 9, at 719-22; Raymond A. Just, Comment, Intergenerational Standing 
under the Endangered Species Act: Giving Back the Right to Biodiversity after Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 71 TuL. L. REv. 597, 612-14 (1996). 
65. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 
(1972). Section 6 of the Stockholm Declaration's preamble states, "To defend and improve 
the environment for present and future generations has become an imperative goal for 
mankind." Principle 2 provides, "The natural resources of this earth, including the air, 
water, land, flora and fauna ... must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future 
generations. '" Id. Finally, Principle 5 provides, "The non-renewable resources of the earth 
must be employed in such a way as to guard against the danger of their future exhaustion 
and to ensure that benefits from such employment are shared by all mankind." See Allen, 
supra note 9, at 719 n.29;Just, supra note 64, at 612 n.79. 
66. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Mar. 6, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, available at 
http://www.cites.org/ eng/ disc/text.shtml. 
67. United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 
U.S.T. 37, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C./lO. 
68. World Charter for Nature, Oct. 28, 1982, G.A.Res. 37/7, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
51) at 17, U.N.Doc. A/37/51, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm. 
69. Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP, June 5, 1992, preamble, 311.L.M 818, 823 
(stating that the parties to the agreement are " [dletermined to conserve and sustainably use 
biolOgical diversity for the benefit of present and future generations."). 
70. See Allen, supra note 9, at 720-21; Bruhl, supra note 45, at 428-29; Just, supra note 64, 
at 613-14. 
71. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, 
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these international agreements, however, specifically requires 
American courts to give standing rights to plaintiffs who seek to 
represent future generations. 
Several laws and decisions of foreign nations at least indirectly 
support the protection of future generations. The laws or 
constitutions of several nations impose on the people a general 
duty to conserve natural resources or the environment, which at 
least indirectly confers some implied protection for future 
generations, and a few foreign laws and constitutional provisions 
more specifically address the interests of future generations. 72 The 
United States Supreme Court is increasingly open to considering 
foreign law as helpful guidance in considering the difficult policy 
choices that are at the heart of modern constitutional decision 
making, although Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have vigorously 
opposed this trend. 73 
preamble, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1482, available at 
http://www.cec.org/pubs_infoJesources/law_treacagree/naaec/naaecOl.cfm?varlan=engli 
sh. 
72. Const. of the Argentine Nation § 41 (1998) (granting "[a]ll inhabitants ... the right 
to a healthy and balanced environment fit for human development in order that productive 
activities shall meet present needs without endangering those of future generations" and 
committing the Argentine federal government to "provide for the protection of this right, 
the rational use of natural resources, the preservation of the [nation's] natural and cultural 
heritage and of [its] biological diversity"); Braz. Const. art. 225 (1988) ("All persons are 
entitled to an ecologically balanced environment, which is an asset for the people's common 
use and is essential to healthy life, it being the duty of the Government and of the 
community to defend and preserve it for present and future generations."); Const. of India, 
art. 48A (1950) ("The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to 
safeguard the forests and wild life of the country."); Environment Act, No. 127 (1986) (N.Z.) 
("An Act to ... [e]nsure that, in the management of natural and physical resources, full and 
balanced account is taken of ... [t]he needs of future generations"); Const. of the Rep. of 
Poland, art. 74(1), (3) (1997) (providing that "[p]ublic authorities shall pursue policies 
ensuring the ecological security of current and future generations" and granting 
"[e]veryone ... the right to be informed of the quality of the environment and its 
protection"); EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 107 & app. B 
(1989) (listing and excerpting foreign constitutions that impose on the people a general 
duty to conserve natural resources or the environment); Kristian Skagen Ekeli, Green 
Constitutionalism: The Constitutional Protection of Future Generations, 20 RATIO JURIS 378, 381 n.2 
(2007) (listing the constitutions of Norway, Poland and South Mrica as addressing the 
interests of future generations to natural resources or a healthy environment); Bruhl, supra 
note 45, at 431;Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 
89 IOWA L. REv. 495, 516 n.142 (2004); Dan L. Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A Constitutional 
Amendment to Empower Congress to Preserve, Protect, and Promote the Environment, 32 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 821, 849 n.195 (2005). 
73. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003) (relying in part on 
decisions of British Parliament, the European Court of Human Rights and other nations for 
the principle that homosexual adults have a right to engage in intimate, consensual sexual 
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In particular, one foreign decision has clearly addressed the 
problem of standing for future generations. In Minors Oposa v. 
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the 
Supreme Court of the Philippines in 1994 held that a group of 
schoolchildren had standing to challenge timber leasing of old 
growth forests "for themselves, for others of their generation and 
for the succeeding generations.,,74 The Supreme Court of the 
Philippines recognized that the present generation has 
responsibility for future generations, stating: 
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to 
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a 
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' 
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the 
same time, the performance of their obligation, to ensure the 
protection of that right for the generations to come.
70 
Although it relied in part on the Constitution of the Philippines 
and national law, the Oposa decision emphasized the universal 
natural law principle that the right to a healthy environment 
"concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation. . . the advancement of which may even be said to 
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, 
conduct); but see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's 
consideration of foreign law); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari) ("this Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should 
not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."); see generally The Relevance of 
Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia 
and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L.519 (2005) (transcribing debate between 
Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia about whether Supreme Court should consider foreign law 
in making constitutional decisions). 
74. The Philippines: S. Ct. Decision in Minors Oposa v. Sec. of DENR, 33 I.L.M. 173, 185 
(1994); Allen, supra note 9, at 714-18 (discussing Dposa); Just, supra note 64, at 617-21 
(same); Owens, supra note 1, at 366-68 (same). The Indian Supreme Court has also 
emphasized the importance of protecting forests for future generations. State of Himachal 
Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products, AIR 1996 SC 149, 163 (the Indian Supreme Court 
recognized the importance of inter-generational equity in protecting forests, holding a 
government forest plan was invalid because "it is contrary to public interest involved in 
preserving forest wealth, maintenance of environment and ecology and considerations of 
sustainable growth and inter-generational equity. After all, the present generation has no 
right to deplete all the existing forests and leave nothing for the next and future 
generations.") . 
75. Dposa, 331.L.M. at 185; Allen, supra note 9, at 717-18 (discussing Dposa's recognition 
of standing for future generations) ; Just, supra note 64, at 619-21 (same); Owens, supra note 
1, at 366-68 (same). 
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these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for 
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.,,76 The 
Oposa decision's broad natural law philosophy of standing is 
inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's requirement, 
laid out in Sierra Club, that a plaintiffs standing depends on 
whether she has suffered an injury and its rejection of the Sierra 
Club's claim that it had standing as a representative of future 
• 77 
generatIOns. 
III. UNITED STATES FEDERAL LAw AND FUTURE GENERATIONS 
Several federal statutes refer to the interests of future 
generations. These provisions are often vague and leave broad 
discretion to government agencies in how the agencies address the 
interests of future generations. In some cases, NEPA78 requires that 
agencies examine the long-term environmental impacts of their 
projects, but it is a purely procedural statute that does not mandate 
the protection of future generations. 79 Part III will focus on federal 
law relating to future generations; Part VII will address state laws 
that are concerned with future generations. 
The United States Constitution's preamble describes a broad 
intergenerational goal to "secure the blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity .... "so That general goal, however, is 
76. Dposa, 33 I.L.M. at 187; Allen, supra note 9, at 717-18 (discussing Oposa decision's use 
of Philippines' law and natural law); Just, supra note 64, at 619-21 (emphasizing Dposa 
decision's use of natural law). 
77. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972). One district court case decided 
before Sierra Club allowed an environmental public interest group to represent unborn 
generations. Cape May County Chapter, Inc., Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Machia, 329 F. 
Supp. 504, 510-17 (D.NJ. 1971); Bruhl, supra note 45, at 432 n.l04. In his dissenting 
opinion in Sierra Club, Justice Blackmun cited Cape May among a number of lower court 
decisions that had taken a broader view of standing than adopted by the Sierra Club majority 
opinion. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 759-60 n.l (Blackmun, j., dissenting). It is likely that the 
Cape May decision is no longer good law in light of the Sierra Club decision's requirement 
that an organization demonstrate that its members suffer a concrete injury. Sierra Club, 405 
U.S. at 734-40. 
78. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006). In 
particular, NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental assessment of 
proposed federal actions that addresses "the environmental impact of the proposed action." 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (i); see generally infra notes 92, 94-96, 171-73, 282, 284-312 and 
accompanying text (discussing to what extent federal agencies must address environmental 
impacts pursuant to NEPA). 
79. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
80. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; Allen, supra note 9, at 723; Just, supra note 64, at 615. At least one 
commentator has argued that the framers of the Constitution intended to protect the rights 
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not specifically enforceable. None of the Constitution's specific 
provisions or amendments mention future generations. 
The preambles or opening policy statements of several federal 
environmental laws recognize the importance of protecting future 
generations,81 but these laws leave it to the discretion of the current 
presidential administration and its agencies to enforce that goa1. 82 
These laws include the Coastal Zone Management Act,83 the acid 
rain provisions of the Clean Air Act,84 the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act,85 and the National Park Service Act. 86 
Most importantly, the NEPA requires federal agencies, including 
their surrogates in some cases, to assess environmental impacts 
before they take any major action. 87 NEPA specifically states that "it 
is the continuing responsibility of the Federal government to use 
all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations 
of national policy, to [ensure] ... that the Nation may ... fulfill the 
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment 
for succeeding generations.,,88 NEPA also states that the 
government, in its environmental statements, should address "the 
relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
of future generations. Jim Gardner, Discrimination Against Future Generations: The Possibility of 
Constitutional Limitation, 9 ENVfL. L. 29, 35-38 (1978); see also Owens, supra note 1, at 340. 
81. Allen, supra note 9, at 724-25; Just, supra note 64, at 615. 
82. Mank, Future Generations, supra note 4, at 453-65 (discussing failure of Congress, 
President and agencies to address the goal of protecting future generations contained in 
several federal environmental statutes). 
83. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (2006) (proclaiming in § 1452(1) a policy "to presenoe, 
protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation's 
coastal zone for this and succeeding generations"). 
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2006) (stating in § 7651 (a)(5) that "current and future 
generations of Americans will be adversely affected by delaying measures to remedy the [acid 
rain] problem."). 
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-10,270 (2006) (stating in § 10,131 (a)(7) that "appropriate 
precautions must be taken to ensure that [high-level radioactive] waste and spent [nuclear] 
fuel do not adversely affect the public health and safety and the environment for this or 
future generations"). 
86. 16 U.S.C. § I (2006) (establishing the National Park Service). Section 1 states: "The 
service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as 
national parks, monuments, and resenoations ... by such means and measures as confonn to 
the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reservations, which purpose is 
to consenoe the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to 
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them 
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 
87. See supra note 78 and accompanying text 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b)(I); Allen, supra note 9, at 723-24; Just, supra note 64, at 616. 
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productivity."S9 This provision could include the impacts of present 
projects on future generations. Furthermore, NEPA recognizes 
"the worldwide and long-range character of environmental 
problems.,,9o Although NEPA lacks a citizen suit provision, 
environmental groups can use the Administrative Procedure Act to 
challenge a government agency's finding that a project does not 
have significant environmental impacts (a finding which allows the 
agency to prepare a shorter environmental assessment instead of a 
full environmental impact assessment) or to challenge the adequacy 
of the assessment. 91 As is discussed in Part IV, standing 
requirements for NEPA plaintiffs are relaxed compared to others, 
and therefore it may be easier for NEPA plaintiffs to obtain 
standing for future generations than in other lawsuits. 92 Because 
NEPA is a purely procedural statute, however, courts lack any 
substantive power to protect the rights of future generations. 93 
The United States Supreme Court has held that NEPA 
requirements apply only when the government actively proposes to 
build a project, not when the government merely contemplates the 
possibility of doing so III the future. 94 The Council on 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (iv). 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F); Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L REv. 203, 203-05, 236-39 (1998) 
(arguing NEPA has an "orientation towards the future"). 
91. 5 U.S.c. § 702 (2006) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof."); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 47; Allen, supra 
note 9, at 723-24; Matthew William Nelson, Comment, NEPA and Standing: Halting the Spread 
of "Slash-and-Burn"Jurisprudence, 31 U.c. DAVISL REv. 253, 256 n.lO (1997). 
92. See infra notes 165-81 and accompanying text. 
93. See generally Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) 
("NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary 
process."); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) 
(citation omitted) ("Once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural 
requirements, the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has considered the 
environmental consequences; it cannot 'inteIject itself within the area of discretion of the 
executive as to the choice of the action to be taken. '''); William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of 
NEPA s Promise: The Rnle of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 
IND. LJ. 205, 243-45 (1989) (discussing cases holding that NEPA is only procedural - but 
also discussing cases holding that NEPA has a very narrow form of substantive review); Mank, 
Global Warming, supra note 2, at 47; Philip Weinberg, Its Time to Put NEPA Back on Course, 3 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 99 (1994) (discussing cases holding NEPA is only procedural and arguing 
Congress intended NEPA to have substantive consequences); Nelson, supra note 91, at 257 
("Therefore, while environmental groups can challenge the procedural adequacy of an EIS, 
they cannot use the courts to impose or require any particular result."), 279-80. 
94. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405-06 (1976). 
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Environmental Quality's (CEQ) regulations define a "proposal" 
requiring NEPA review as one where a federal agency has a "goal 
and is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more 
alternative means of accomplishing that goal and the effects can be 
meaningfully evaluated.,,95 Thus, a plaintiff likely cannot get the 
government to address the impacts of what might happen if the 
government is considering the possibility of building projects that 
may increase GHGs in the future, but has not yet committed to 
building them. 96 
IV. STANDING AND FUTURE GENERATIONS 
A major obstacle for plaintiffs who wish to sue on behalf of future 
generations, as was permitted in the Oposa decision in the 
Philippines, is the federal Article III standing doctrine, which 
requires that a plaintiff have suffered concrete and actual or 
imminent lllJuries from the defendant's actions. A non-
government plaintiff cannot usually sue on behalf of third parties 
and, therefore, likely cannot sue directly on behalf of future 
generations. 97 There is also a serious issue whether a non-
government plaintiff can sue to address generalized injuries that 
affect everyone, such as climate change caused by greenhouse 
95. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (2007). 
96. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 405-06 (holding NEPA requires agency to address only the impacts 
of actually proposed projects). 
97. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) ("There 
are good and sufficient reasons for this prudential limitation on standing when rights of 
third parties are implicated-the avoidance of the adjudication of rights which those not 
before the Court may not wish to assert, and the assurance that the most effective advocate of 
the rights at issue is present to champion them.") (case involving non-government plaintiffs); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (same) (case involving non-government plaintiffs). 
Pursuant to the parens patriae doctrine, however, the government ih some circumstances may 
sue to protect third parties who lack the legal capacity to protect themselves, such as minors 
or the mentally incompetent, to protect its quasi-sovereign interest in the health or welfare 
of its citizens, or to protect its quasi-sovereign interest in its natural resources or 
environment for its citizens. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454-
55 (2007) (holding states are entitled to more lenient standing criteria when they sue as 
parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign interests of citizens); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico ex reL Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-10 (1982) (reviewing history and rationale for 
role of states in suing as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign interests of its citizens); 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (recognizing right of state to 
protect its quasi-sovereign interest in the health and safety of its citizens); Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1727-28, 1756-68 (discussing parens patriae doctrine and standing 
rights of states). 
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On the other hand, some aspects of the Article III standing 
doctrine are somewhat favorable to or at least not hostile to 
plaintiffs who may suffer harms in the future. Except for tax cases, 
which impose a nexus requirement, a plaintiff who is suffering 
some i~uries at the present time because of a defendant's conduct 
can also sue to address at least some injuries that may occur in the 
future. 99 The Supreme Court has relaxed the immediacy and 
redressability requirements in procedural cases and recognized 
that plaintiffs may sue in some circumstances if procedural 
violations of the law by the government may cause future harms. 100 
In some cases, courts have allowed plaintiffs to sue where there is a 
statistical probability of future injury from a defendant's action 
even though no actual injury has yet occurred, although a recent 
D.C. Circuit decision has questioned the constitutionality of 
probabilistic standing. 101 The Eighth Circuit, however, has 
suggested that a non-government plaintiff must show that a 
probabilistic injury is likely to occur during his lifetime and may 
not sue to address harms more likely to occur after his death. 102 A 
non-government plaintiff may sometimes have standing to sue to 
address harms that may affect him in the future, but it is more 
questionable whether he can sue to protect future generations that 
live beyond his lifetime. 
A. Constitutional Standing 
Standing addresses whether a party to a law suit is a proper party 
to sue, and does not address whether the asserted claim is 
appropriate. 103 Standing is one factor in determining whether a 
suit is legitimately justiciable in court. 104 All litigants in federal 
Article III courts must meet certain standing requirements to bring 
98. See infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text. 
99. See infra notes 143-164 and accompanying text. 
100. See infra notes 165 -81 and accompanying text. 
101. Public Citizen. Inc. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); See infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text. 
102. Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2004); infra notes 263-75, 279 and 
accompanying text. 
103. Jeremy Gaston, Note, Standing on Its Head: The Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort 
Class Actions, 77 TEX. L. REv. 215, 219 (1998). 
lO4. !d. "Other aspects of justiciability include the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, 
advisory opinions, and political questions." Id. 
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a suit. 105 The federal courts have jurisdiction over a case only if at 
least one plaintiff can prove that he or she has standing for each 
form of relief sought. 106 A federal court must dismiss a case without 
deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to meet the constitutional 
d· 107 stan mg test. 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly require that a 
plaintiff have standing to file suit in federal courts, since 1944 the 
Supreme Court has inferred from Article Ill's limitation of judicial 
decisions to "Cases" and "Controversies" that federal courts must 
utilize standing requirements to guarantee that the plaintiff has a 
genuine interest and stake in a case. lOB Before 1944, the Court had 
relied on common law principles to determine if a litigant had a 
sufficient legal interest to sue. 109 With the development of the 
administrative state, and statutes that protected the interests of vast 
numbers of people, the Court created a formal standing doctrine 
to limit suits to plaintiffs who have an actual injury that a court 
105. Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1709-10; Michael E. Solimine, Recalibrating 
Justiciability in Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 531,533 (2004). 
106. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 351-54 (2006); Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("a plaintiff must demonstrate 
standing separately for each fonn of relief sought."); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 
1710. 
107. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 339-43; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 ("[W]e 
have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset 
of the litigation."); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1710; Mank, Global Warming, supra 
note 2, at 23. 
108. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the 
United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State 
and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Stark v. 
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explicitly the Article III standing requirement in a 
Supreme Court case for the first time); DaimierChrysler, 547 U.S. at 339-43 (explaining why 
Supreme Court infers that Article Ill's case and controversy requirement necessitates 
standing limitations); Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) 
("Article III standing ... enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement."); 
Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1709-10; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 22 
(stating Supreme Court first explicitly referred to standing in 1944 Stark decision); Ryan 
Guilds, Comment, A.Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court 
Access, 74 N.C.L. REv. 1863, 1868 (1996). But see Sunstein, supra note 9, at 168-79, 208 
(arguing framers of the Constitution did not intend that Article III would require standing). 
109. RICHARD H. FALLON,JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 127 (5th ed. 2003); Nash, supra note 24, at 505. 
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could redress if the suit was successful. 110 
Standing requirements promote broader constitutional 
principles. Standing doctrine precludes unconstitutional advisory 
opinions. III Additionally, standing requirements support 
separation of powers principles defining the division of powers 
between the judiciary and political branches of government so that 
the "Federal Judiciary respects 'the proper - and properly limited 
- role of the courts in a democratic society.",1l2 
For standing in an Article III court, the Supreme Court, in its 
1992 decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, required a plaintiff to 
show that: (1) she has "suffered an injury-in-fact," which is (a) 
"concrete and particularized" and (b) "actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) "there must be a causal 
connection between the i~ury and the conduct complained of-the 
injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of 
some third party not before the court"; and (3) "it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision."113 A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all 
three prongs of the standing test. 114 
In Lujan, the Court held that plaintiffs who alleged that they 
intended to visit Egypt and Sri Lanka in the future to observe 
endangered species in those countries did not have standing to 
challenge the United States government's funding of projects that 
might cause the extinction of those species. Plaintiffs had not met 
llO. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (stating that standing's injury requirement "tends to 
assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified 
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic 
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action."); FALLON ET AL., supra note 109, at 127; 
Nash, supra note 24, at 505. 
Ill. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340; FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. ll, 23-24 (1998); Nash, supra 
note 24, at 506. 
112. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 339-41 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 
(1984)); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1710; Nash, supra note 24, at 506; Antonin 
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REv. 881, 881, 896 (1983). 
113. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations and quotation 
marks omitted); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 23-24. 
114. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction 
must "carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article 111."); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
561 (stating also that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must carry the burden of 
establishing standing under Article III); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 24. 
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the first prong of the standing test because they were not suffering 
actual or imminent injuries, but merely speculative injuries 
depending on whether they ever traveled to observe these 
species.1I5 Additionally, the Lujan decision rejected the plaintiffs' 
ecosystem nexus theory that they were harmed by distant events in 
Egypt and Sri Lanka since all nature is interconnected, finding that 
such vague allegations are not concrete and particularized 
injuries. 116 Furthermore, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' animal 
nexus and vocational nexus theories that a sincere interest or 
professional interest in these endangered species was enough to 
establish standing in the absence of any direct concrete contact 
. h h . 117 WIt t ese speCIes. 
Professor Hsu has argued that Lujan's requirement of concrete 
and immediate injuries makes it difficult for plaintiffs to challenge 
diffuse environmental problems that affect large numbers of 
persons or future generations. lIS He contends that standing 
doctrine has an "identifiability bias" in favor of suits that address 
harms to specific individuals, but disfavors suits where the victims 
are less specifically identifiable, such as victims of broad diffuse 
environmental problems that will harm unidentifiable persons in 
the future. 119 He proposes a standing and legal regime that 
recognizes probabilistic environmental harms, such as climate 
change, that will cause future injuries;120 however, his approach to 
standing is contrary to the prevailing Lujan standing framework 
that an injury must be (a) "concrete and particularized" and (b) 
"actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." 121 
In addition to constitutional standing limitations, the courts may 
impose prudential standing limitations. 122 As is discussed below, 
115. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-64; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 30. 
116. 504 U.S. at 565-66; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 31-32. 
117. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566-67; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 31-32. 
118. Hsu, supra note 4, at 466-69. 
119. Id.at436,440-51,466-69. 
120. Id. at 436-37,440-51,466-69,472-73,485-504 (arguing that courts, agencies and 
legislatures should recognize standing and legal liability for probabilistic hanns even if the 
future victims cannot yet be identified). 
12l. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quotation marks omitted). 
122. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) ("Our 
prior cases have, however, acknowledged 'other limits on the class of persons who may 
invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers,' ... which derive from general prudential 
concerns 'about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic 
society.'") (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). 
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the Court, for example, has "declined to grant standing where the 
harm asserted amounts only to a generalized grievance shared by a 
large number of citizens in a substantially equal measure." 123 
Additionally, the Court has generally rejected standing based on 
the legal rights or interests of third parties. 124 In Duke Power, the 
Court explained why it usually rejects third party standing: 
There are good and sufficient reasons for this prudential limitation 
on standing when rights of third parties are implicated-the 
avoidance of the adjudication of rights which those not before the 
Court may not wish to assert, and the assurance that the most 
effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to champion 
them.
125 
The prudential limitation against third party suits likely bars a 
plaintiff from filing suit on behalf of future generations unless the 
plaintiff is likely to be harmed by the same thing that threatens 
future generations. 
B. Generalized Injuries 
The Supreme Court has been cautious about allowing standing 
where a plaintiff asserts generalized injuries that affect many 
people. 126 The Court, however, has in some cases allowed standing 
if the plaintiff can demonstrate concrete injuries rather than 
abstract ones. 127 Because suits seeking to protect future generations 
usually involve generalized injuries, it is important to examine the 
Court's approach to standing in cases involving generalized 
InJunes. 
In cases involving alleged constitutional violations that affect the 
public as a whole, especially in cases involving alleged misuse of 
128 taxpayer funds, the Court has sometimes declared that these 
123. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80; infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
124. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80; Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
125. 438 U.S. at 80. 
126. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text. 
127. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text. 
128. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found. Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (holding 
taxpayers do not have standing to challenge the VI'hite House program on federal aid to 
faith-based organizations and limiting taxpayer challenges under the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause to congressional legislation benefiting religion); DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342-49 (2006) (denying standing in state taxpayer suit in part 
because plaintiffs' alleged injuries were common to the public at large and stating that 
2009] Standing and Future Generations 29 
injuries are more appropriately redressed by the political branches 
than the federal judiciary in light of separation of powers 
principles. 129 In Duke Power, the Supreme Court stated that "we 
have declined to grant standing where the harm asserted amounts 
only to a generalized grievance shared by a large number of 
citizens in a substantially equal measure" because such suits raised 
"general prudential concerns 'about the proper - and properly 
limited - role of the courts in a democratic society. '" 130 In 
Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, the Court explained that the 
generalized grievance doctrine enabled "the judiciary ... to avoid 
deciding questions of broad social import where no individual 
rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts 
to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."l3l 
Additionally, the generalized grievance doctrine assists courts in 
avoiding broader remedies than that "required by the precise facts 
to which the court's ruling would be applied.,,132 
In its 1998 decision Federal Election Commission v. Akins (Akins), 133 
the Court clarified which types of mass or general injuries are 
appropriate for judicial redress. 134 The Court granted standing to 
federal taxpayers generally lack standing unless suit is based on Constitution's Establishment 
Clause}; Mank. States Standing, supra note 18, at 1710-13 (discussing Supreme Court's 
doctrine regarding standing for tax cases and for generalized injuries). But see Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (holding that a federal taxpayer had standing to 
challenge spending allegedly in violation of Constitution's Establishment Clause because 
'''the Establishment Clause . .. specifically limit(s) the taxing and spending power conferred by 
Art. I, § 8."}. 
129. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (l992) (requiring 
"particularized" injury); id. at 573-77 (stating that the Constitution assigns the responsibility 
for addressing grievances affecting the public at large to the political branches of 
government); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 n.l0 
(stating the judicial role of deciding cases involving particularized injuries "[iJ s in sharp 
contrast to the political processes in which the Congress can initiate inquiry and action, 
define issues and objectives, and exercise virtually unlimited power by way of hearings and 
reports, thus making a record for plenary consideration and solutions. The legislative 
function is inherently general rather than particular and is not intended to be responsive to 
adversaries asserting specific claims or interests peculiar to themselves."; Mank, Global 
Warming, supra note 2, at 21-22. 
130. 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975}); Mank, 
States Standing, supra note 18, at 1711. 
131. 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (U.S. 1979); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1711. 
132. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 221-222; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1711. 
133. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
134. [d. at 21-25; David R. Hodas, Standing and Climate Change: Can Anyone Complain About 
the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVfL. L. 451, 471 (2000) (discussing Akins); Mank, Global 
Warming, supra note 2, at 37-40 (same); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1713; Cass R. 
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voters who requested information from the Federal Election 
Commission, even though the plaintiffs were similarly situated to 
other voters, because the statute at issue overcame any prudential 
limitations against generalized grievances. 135 The Court explained 
that it would deny standing for widely shared, generalized injuries 
only if the harm is both widely shared, and additionally, of "an 
abstract and indefinite nature - for example, harm to the 
'common concern for obedience to law."ol36 The Akins Court stated 
that its prior decisions had denied standing only if an alleged injury 
was too abstract, but had approved standing even if many people 
suffered the same injury if the harm was concrete. 137 Justice 
Breyer's majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg, 
observed that "an injury. . . widely shared. . . does not, by itself, 
automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such 
an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an 'injury-in-
fact.",138 The Akins decision stated that a plaintiff who suffers a 
concrete actual injury normally can fulfill the injury-in-fact 
requirement even though many others have suffered similar 
injuries: 
The fact that a political forum may be more readily available where 
an injury is widely shared ... does not, by itself, automatically 
disqualify an interest for Article III purposes .... This conclusion 
seems particularly obvious where (to use a hypothetical example) 
large numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law injury (say, 
a widespread mass tort), or where large numbers of voters suffer 
interference with voting rights conferred by law. We conclude that, 
similarly, the informational injury at issue here, directly related to 
voting, the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and 
specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive 
Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. 
REv. 613, 634-636, 644-645 (1999) [herinafter Sunstein, Informational Standing]. 
135. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13-21; Hodas, supra note 134, at 471; Mank, Global Warming, supra 
note 2, at 37; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1713; Sunstein, Informational Standing, 
supra note 134, at 634-36, 642-45, 671-75 (concluding in Akins that the statute at issue 
overrode any prudential limitations against generalized grievances). 
136. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Hodas, supra note 134, at 471-72; Mank, Global Warming, 
supra note 2, at 37-40 (discussing Akins); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1713; 
Sunstein, Informational Standing, supra note 134, at 634-36 (same). 
137. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 38; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1714; Sunstein, Informational Standing, supra note 134, at 636, 644. 
138. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 38. 
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Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the 
federal courts. 139 
31 
In Pye v. United States, the Fourth Circuit summarized Akins as 
holding that "so long as the plaintiff... has a concrete and 
particularized injury, it does not matter that legions of other 
h h .. ,,140 persons ave t e same lllJUry. 
The Akins decision did not settle all questions about when 
plaintiffs alleging generalized grievances are entitled to standing. 
Akins suggested that the Court's reservations about standing for 
generalized grievances are usually prudential limitations that 
Congress may override in a statute, but the decision did not 
completely eliminate the possibility that Article III in some 
circumstances places constitutional limits on generalized 
grievances. 141 For plaintiffs seeking to represent future generations, 
the Court's concerns about suits involving generalized grievances 
could lead courts to find that the allegations are too generalized to 
warrant standing. Arguably in light of Akins, harms that may occur 
in future generations are abstract and not concrete because they 
have not happened yet and there are many uncertainties about 
what impacts will occur in the future. On the other hand, the 
Massachusetts decision considered computer modeling evidence 
that sea levels would rise significantly between 2007 and 2100 in 
concluding that the Commonwealth had standing. 142 Subpart E will 
examine how courts have addressed when plaintiffs may have 
standing for probabilistic injuries. 
C. No Nexus Requirement Outside of Tax Cases 
The Duke Power decision rejected the need for a nexus between 
the injuries asserted and the constitutional rights asserted, except 
in the special case of suits brought by taxpayers challenging alleged 
139. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; Hodas, supra note 134, at 472; Mank, Global Warming, supra 
note 2, at 38. 
140. 269 F.3d 459, 469 (4th Cir. 2001). 
141. Sunstein, Informational Standing, supra note 135, at 637, 642-645, 671-675; Mank, 
States Standing, supra note 18, at 1714-1715. 
142. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1456 n.20 (2007); but see id. at 
1467-68 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting) (criticizing Massachusetts' use of estimates of sea level 
rise through 2100); see Adler, supra note 21, at 65; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 
1731,1741,1786. 
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constitutional violations. 143 The Court observed that it had only 
applied the nexus requirement in taxpayer cases and had rejected 
it in other types of suits. 144 In citizen suit cases, the Court 
concluded that a plaintiff need satisfy only the Article III standing 
. d d 145 reqUIrements an nee not meet a nexus test. 
In Duke Power, the plaintiffs challenged a $560 million dollar 
liability limit in the Price-Anderson Act that limited the liability of 
nuclear power plant operators in the case of a serious accident. 146 
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs would suffer immediate 
injuries from the two proposed nuclear plants from a '''sharp 
increase' in the temperature of two lakes presently used for 
recreational purposes resulting from the use of the lake waters to 
produce steam and to cool the reactor" and the plants' emission of 
non-natural radiation into the air and water of the plaintiffs 
environment. 147 By finding that the plaintiffs had met the injury 
prong of the standing test based on these immediate injuries, the 
Court avoided the more contentious issue of whether the possibility 
of a future nuclear accident would have constituted a sufficient 
injury for Article III standing. 148 The Court concluded that the 
plaintiffs' injuries were fairly traceable to the enactment of the 
Price-Anderson Act because the district court had found, based on 
the testimony of Duke Power employees, that the utility company 
would not build or operate the two proposed plants but for the 
limited liability provisions in the Act. 149 
Appellant Duke Power argued that "in addition to proof of injury 
and of a causal link between such injury and the challenged 
conduct, appellees must demonstrate a connection between the 
injuries they claim and the constitutional rights being asserted.,,150 
In Flast v. Cohen,151 which addressed whether taxpayers have 
standing to challenge the federal government's alleged misuse of 
appropriations for unconstitutional purposes, the Court had 
imposed a nexus requirement: "The nexus demanded of federal 
143. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978). 
144. ld. at 78-79. 
145. ld. at 79. 
146. ld. at 59, 64. 
147. ld. at 73-74. 
148. ld. 
149. ld. at 74-78. 
150. ld. at 78-79. 
151. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the taxpayer must establish a 
logical link between that status and the type of legislative 
enactment attacked. . .. Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a 
nexus between that status and the precise nature of the 
constitutional infringement alleged." 152 Summarizing Duke 
Power's nexus argument, the Court stated: "Since the 
environmental and health injuries claimed by appellees are not 
directly related to the constitutional attack on the Price-Anderson 
Act, such injuries, the argument continues, cannot supply a 
predicate for standing." 153 In other words, Duke Power argued that 
a plaintiff could challenge the liability provisions only if there was 
an actual accident exceeding the liability limits in the Act. 154 
Both justice Stewart and justice Stevens in their respective 
concurrences argued that the connection between the petitioners' 
present injuries and the possibility that a serious nuclear accident 
at the reactors would exceed the liability limits was too remote to 
justify standing or federal jurisdiction over the case. 155 justice 
Stewart objected: 
The claim under federal law is to be found in the allegation that the 
Act, if enforced, will deprive the appellees of certain property rights, 
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. One 
of those property rights, and perhaps the sole cognizable one, is a 
state-created right to recover full compensation for tort injuries. The 
Act impinges on that right by limiting recovery in major accidents. 
But there never has been such an accident, and it is sheer speculation 
that one will ever occur. For this reason I think there is no present 
justiciable controversy, and that the appellees were without standing 
to initiate this litigation. 156 
Similarly, justice Stevens argued: 
The string of contingencies that supposedly holds this litigation 
together is too delicate for me. We are told that but for the Price-
Anderson Act there would be no financing of nuclear power plants, 
no development of those plants by private parties, and hence no 
152. Id. at 102. 
153. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 78. 
154. Id. at 78 n.23. 
155. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis far Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1123, 1124-
25 (2005) [herinafter Farber, Uncertainty]. 
156. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 94-95 (Stewart,]., concurring). 
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present injury to persons such as appellees; we are then asked to 
remedy an alleged due process violation that may possibly occur at 
some uncertain time in the future, and may possibly injure the 
appellees in a way that has no significant connection with any present 
injury. It is remarkable that such a series of speculations is considered 
sufficient either to make this litigation ripe for decision or to 
bl ' h 11' d' 157 esta IS appe ees stan mg .... 
Quoting from the Act's legislative history, even the majority 
acknowledged that "the likelihood of an accident occurring which 
would result in claims exceeding the sum of the financial 
protection required and the governmental indemnity is 
exceedingly remote, albeit theoretically possible."158 
Some commentators have suggested that the Duke Power court 
deliberately manipulated its standing test to find standing because 
the majority wanted to reach the merits and find the Act 
constitutional so that the nuclear power industry could continue to 
operate. 159 Some lower courts have questioned whether Duke Power 
remains good law, although the Supreme Court has never 
overruled the decision. 160 Professor Farber, however, observes that 
the uncertainty about whether courts would uphold the liability 
limits had real consequences for the nuclear power industry's 
ability to finance and build reactors and argues that the real world 
consequences on the industry to resolve the liability issue should 
have been enough for standing in the case without the Court's 
manipulation of the facts to justify standing. 161 Conversely, Justice 
Stevens acknowledged that "[t]he Court's opinion will serve the 
national interest in removing doubts concerning the 
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act," but nevertheless 
157. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 102-03 (Stevens,]., concurring). 
158. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 85-86 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 89-883, at 6-7 (1965»; Farber, 
Uncertainty, supra note 155, at 1125. 
159. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 82 (3d ed. 1999); Farber, 
Uncertainty, supra note 155, at 1125 ("Scholars have been equally skeptical and have tended 
to view the case as an example of the manipulation of standing doctrine to obtain a desired 
outcome."). 
160. See, e.g., United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. the Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 147 F. 
Supp. 2d 965, 974 n.5 (2000) (observing that "[a) leading treatise criticizes Duke Power's 
standing and justiciability analysis, questioning why the NRC was found to be a proper party 
when it had no enforcement authority over the liability limit statute (citing Moore's Federal 
Practice, § 103.44[2) at 103-71."»; Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 
636 A.2d 892, 904 n.16 (1994) (arguing that Duke Power "ha[s) long been called into 
question, and narrowed to the point of invalidation."). 
161. Farber, Uncertainty, supra note 155, at 1123-26. 
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objected that the case was premature until an event occurred that 
exceeded the liability limits. 162 
The Duke Power decision's rejection of a nexus between the 
injuries asserted and the relief requested can be helpful to 
plaintiffs seeking remedies that will benefit both the plaintiffs and 
future generations. In Duke Power, the Court held that the liability 
provisions did not violate the due process clause or equal 
protection clauses of the Constitution. 163 If the plaintiffs' 
constitutional challenge had succeeded, however, their suit would 
have stopped the construction of the plants to their immediate 
benefit, but also potentially to the benefit of future generations 
who would not be exposed to radiation from a potential accident 
that exceeded the Act's liability limits. Similarly, if it concluded 
that a plaintiff demonstrated injuries from global warming, a court 
might issue a remedy that benefits not just the plaintiffs, but also 
those who might be harmed in the future even though those 
persons could not sue because their future injuries are too 
speculative. Indeed, the benefits to future generations from a 
successful law suit involving climate change might be far larger 
than to present day plaintiffs. 164 
D. Relaxed Standing in Procedural Rights Cases 
Especially in NEPA cases, the Court has relaxed the immediacy 
and redressability standing requirements for procedural rights 
plaintiffs who will likely suffer a concrete injury in the future if the 
government builds a proposed project. 165 In footnote seven of 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Scalia stated that plaintiffs who 
may suffer a concrete injury resulting from a procedural error by 
the government are entitled to a more relaxed application of 
redressability and immediacy standing requirements because there 
is often a significant time lag between when a procedural error 
occurs and when that error could cause concrete injuries to the 
plaintiff. Justice Scalia offered the example of a plaintiff who lives 
162. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 103 (Stevens,]., concurring). 
163. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 82-94. 
164. Owens, supra note I, at 339 n.97 ("For instance, problems such as the accumulation 
of low-level nuclear waste, the gradual destruction of the ozone layer, and global warming 
may have minimal impacts on the present generation but their cumulative effects may have 
much more severe consequences for generations in the future."). 
165. Mank, Global Wanning, supra note 2, at 35. 
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near a proposed dam who seeks an environmental assessment 
under NEPA to study its potential environmental impacts as the 
prototypical example of a procedural injury. 166 He stated: 
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural rights" are 
special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to 
protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all 
the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under 
our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction 
of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing 
agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even 
though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will 
cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam 
will not be completed for many years. 167 
Justice Scalia limited footnote seven standing to plaintiffs who 
would suffer concrete injuries resulting from the government's 
procedural error. Under footnote seven, a plaintiff living near a 
proposed dam has a potential concrete injury that poses a risk 
significant enough to provide standing, but "persons who live (and 
propose to live) at the other end of the country from the dam" do 
not have "concrete interests affected" and do not have standing to 
challenge a procedural violation. 168 
Footnote seven's relaxed approach to standing applies only to 
suits challenging procedural errors by the government. 169 That 
raises the question of which cases are primarily procedural in 
nature and which are substantive in nature. 17D Justice Scalia likely 
chose a NEPA suit as his example in footnote seven because such 
suits are purely procedural in nature. NEPA is a procedural statute 
that requires the government to assess and to report the 
166. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992); Mank, Global Warming, 
supra note 2, at 35-36; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1716. 
167. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Cantrell v. Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 682 (9th Cir. 
2001) (discussing relaxed standing requirements for procedural injuries); Bertagna, supra 
note 18, at 457 (same); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 35-36 & n.240 (same). 
168. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; Id. at 573 n.8 ("we do not hold that an individual cannot 
enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are 
designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his 
standing."); William W. Buzbee, Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st Century: From 
Lujan to Laidlaw and Beyond: Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 Duke Envtl L. & Pol'y F. 
247,257 (2001); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18 at 1716. 
169. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. 
170. Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1716. 
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environmental impacts of its proposed actions, but does not 
contain any substantive rules defining whether an agency may build 
a project. 171 If a NEPA suit is successful, a court will order the 
government to correct any procedural errors in its assessment 
process, including requiring an agency to conduct additional 
studies of the environmental impacts of a proposed project, but a 
court cannot order the government to make any substantive 
changes in the project because the agency has the sole 
policymaking discretion to decide whether the value of the 
proposed action outweighs any environmental consequences. 172 
Accordingly, even if a plaintiff is successful in forcing the 
government to conduct additional studies assessing the 
environmental impacts of a proposed dam, the government has 
sole discretion in decide whether to build or not build the dam. '73 
Without the relaxed standards for redressability and immediacy in 
footnote seven, NEPA plaintiffs generally could not establish 
standing because the government could cancel a proposed project 
for any number of reasons. 174 
A serious flaw concerning footnote seven is that it does not 
clearly explain the degree to which redressability and immediacy 
requirements for standing are waived or relaxed in procedural 
rights cases, the plaintiffs burden of proof to establish standing in 
a procedural rights case, or how to define what is a procedural 
right. 175 For example, in the dam hypothetical, the immediacy 
171. Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split 
Regarding Standing in Procedural Injury-Based Programmatic Challengers, 13 U. BALT.j. ENVfL. L. 
175, 187 (2006); Miriam S. Wolok, Standing for Environmental Groups: Procedural Injury as 
Injury-In-Fact, 32 NAT. RESOURCESj. 163, 182 (1992) ("Generally, the procedural injuries ... 
[alleged under NEPA are the] increased risk that an agency overlooked environmental 
consequences in its decision-making process and the lost opportunity to participate in that 
process."); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1717. 
172. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) ("NEPA itself 
does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process."); Mank, 
Global Warming, supra note 2, at 47; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1717; Matthew 
William Nelson, Comment, NEPA and Standing: Halting the Spread of "Slash-and-Burn" 
Jurisprudence, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 253, 257 (l997) ("Therefore, while environmental groups 
can challenge the procedural adequacy of an E15, they cannot use the courts to impose or 
require any particular results."); Id. at 279-80. 
173. Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1717. 
174. Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 36; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 
1717. 
175. See Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing after Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 11 j. LAND USE & ENVfL. L. 75,92-108 (1995) (criticizing footnote seven in Lujan 
for failing to explain to what extent immediacy and redressability standing requirements are 
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requirement arguably should be eliminated for plaintiffs because 
they have no control over how quickly the government will build 
the dam, but the Court never expressly addresses that issue. 176 Nor 
did footnote seven provide any clear guidelines about to what 
extent courts are to relax or eliminate redressability requirements 
for procedural rights plaintiffs. 177 The simplest solution would be 
to eliminate redressability requirements for procedural rights 
plaintiffs who meet footnote seven requirements rather than 
establish a complicated intermediate redressability test for such 
plaintiffs. 178 This is complicated however, by the fact that it is not 
clear whether Lujan intended to eliminate that requirement. 
The courts of appeals have divided regarding how to apply 
footnote seven to NEPA cases, disagreeing about the burden of 
proof a plaintiff must meet to demonstra.te thatshe is likely to be 
harmed by the agency's actioh. 179 As is discussed below, courts 
relaxed or eliminated for procedural rights plaintiffs); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 
36-37 & n.244 (same and citing commentators); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 
1718-20 (same); Sunstein, What's Standing?, supra note 9, at 208, 225-26 (same); Christopher 
T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 275, 285 (l995) ("Lujan'S procedural injury dicta is not without its problems, 
however. At best, it is vague and provides Httle guidance for prospective plaintiffs and the 
lower courts."); Douglas Sinor, Environmental Law, 75 DENY. U. L. REv. 859, 879-81 (1998) 
(same). 
176. Gatchel, supra note 175, at 93-94,99-100; Sinor, supra note 175, at 880. 
177. Gatchel, supra riote 175, at 100-06, 108; Sinor, supra note 175, at 880; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1719. 
178. Gatchel, supra note 175, at 105-06, 108; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1720. 
179. Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying strict 
four.part test for standing in procedural rights case, including requiring a procedural rights 
plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury, that "a particularized environmental interest 
of theirs that will suffer demonstrably increased risk" and that it is "substantially probable" 
that the agency action will cause the demonstrable injury alleged by the plaintiff); compare 
Citizens for Better Forestry v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 341 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 
2003) (rejecting Florida Audubon s standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and stating 
that such plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable probability of the challenged action's 
threat to [their] concrete interest."'); Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero (Rio 
Hondo), 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (lOth Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with Florida Audubon's 
"substantial probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a test that 
plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse environmental consequences" from the 
alleged failure to follow NEPA); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 45-63 (discussing 
split in circuits about how to apply footnote seven standing test in NEPA cases); Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1720; Bertagna, supra note 18, at 461-64 (discussing split between 
Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on causation portion of standing test); see also Sakas, 
supra note 171, at 192-204 ("The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have held that a plaintiff need 
not have a claim that is site-specific, while the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
created a stricter standing doctrine where a site-specific injury is necessary" in procedural 
injury challenges to programmatic rules). 
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should reject the unduly stringent "substantial probability" test 
used in the D.C. Circuit and instead adopt the "reasonable 
probability" test used in the Ninth Circuit. 180 
Even under footnote seven's relaxed standing requirements, 
there are substantial questions about whether a plaintiff may obtain 
standing on behalf of future generations. Under footnote seven, a 
plaintiff must allege that it would experience concrete harms if the 
government actually builds a proposed project. 181 "What is not clear 
from footnote seven alone is whether a plaintiff could require the 
government to assess the impact on future generations beyond the 
plaintiffs' likely lifespan. 
E. Standing and Threatened Risks 
Footnote seven in the Lujan decision implies that a procedural 
rights plaintiff may obtain standirtg for a threatened risk, such as a 
dam that might be built in the future. 182 Even in ordinary, non-
procedural standing cases, the Court has suggested that a plaintiff 
may obtain standing for a threatened risk. In Babbitt v. United Farm 
Workers Nat'{ Union, the Court stated, "One does not have to await 
the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. 
If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.,,183 The Lujan 
court's three-part test stated that standing was possible for an 
"imminent" injury, which would appear to include injuries that 
have not yet taken place, but not for one that is "conjectural or 
hypothetical." 184 The "imminent" irBury test, however, does not 
clearly explain how probable a risk to a plaintiff must be for the 
litigant to have standing. 
180. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
181. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (stating standing is 
available in NEPA action where plaintiff seeks government to address concrete harms that 
will occur in the future if project is built). 
182. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. 
183. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village 
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling 
Corp, 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can satisfy Article III standing 
requirements. "). 
184. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; see also Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 
230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting "imminent" standing test to include an 
increased risk of harm). 
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In its Laidlaw decision, the Court suggested that a threatened 
injury to a plaintiffs health is enough for standing if the plaintiff 
has "reasonable concerns" about the risk. 185 Subsequently, several 
courts of appeals decisions have recognized standing for 
threatened or probabilistic injuries. 186 Most of these cases have 
involved threatened risks that would occur during the plaintiffs' 
lifetimes. In particular, the Eighth Circuit has rejected standing 
where the alleged risks were likely to occur after the plaintiffs' 
lifetimes. 187 Part V, infra, will examine cases involving future risks 
that might occur beyond the plaintiffs' lifetime. 
1. Laidlaw 
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOe), Inc. 
(Laidlaw) ,188 the Court addressed allegations involving a threatened 
harm that had not yet caused i~ury to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs 
claimed that they had standing to sue a defendant that discharged 
mercury into a river since they avoided swimming or fishing in the 
river because of their fear of potential harms from the mercury, 
although they could not prove that the levels of mercury were high 
enough to harm them or the environment. 189 The Supreme Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had met the test for Article III 
standing because their "reasonable concerns" about recreational 
185. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000). 
186. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir. 2003) ("the courts of appeals have 
generally recognized that threatened harm in the form of an increased risk of future injury 
may serve as injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes."); Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 160 
(concluding that "threats or increased risk constitutes cognizable harm" sufficient to meet 
the injury-in-fact requirement); Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 
947-48 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "the possibility of future injury may be sufficient to 
confer standing on plaintiffs" and concluding that plaintiffs could proceed with their suit 
where they "raised a material question of fact ... [as to) whether they will suffer a substantial 
risk of harm as a result of [the government's) policies"); Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., 259 F.3d 
885, 888 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the "increased risk that a plan participant faces" as a 
result of an ERISA plan administrator's increase in discretionary authority satisfies Article III 
injury-in-fact requirements); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430,434 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning 
that "[a) probabilistic harm, if nontrivial, can support standing"); Mountain States Legal 
Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing that an 
incremental increase in the risk of forest fires caused by the Forest Service's action satisfied 
Article III standing requirements); Craig, supra note 24, at 190-94 (discussing cases). 
187. Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004); see infra notes 263-75, 279 and 
accompanying text. 
188. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
189. [d. at 181-83; Craig, supra note 24, at 181. 
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use of the river were sufficient. 190 The Court stated that, III 
environmental cases, "[t]he relevant showing for purposes of 
Article III standing ... is not injury to the environment but injury 
to the plaintiff."l9l In addressing whether the plaintiffs had 
standing to seek civil penalties that would be paid to the United 
States, the Court determined that plaintiffs had standing to seek 
such penalties because they would deter the defendant from 
committing future violations that could harm the plaintiff. 192 
Accordingly, Laidlaw appears to recognize that if a plaintiff has 
"reasonable concerns" about a present threatened harm, the 
plaintiff may seek injunctive relief or civil penalties to prevent 
future harms to the plaintiff from similar conduct in the future. 193 
The Court's focus on whether the plaintiffs had suffered personal 
injuries arguably ignores whether the environment has suffered 
injuries both present and long-term. 194 
2. Gaston Copper 
Mter the Laidlaw decision, several courts of appeals decisions 
have found standing where the plaintiff has reasonable concerns 
that a defendant's activities pose a probabilistic risk of harm to 
them in the future. In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper 
Recycling Corp., the Fourth Circuit, in an en bane decision, declared: 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened 
rather than actual injury can satisfy Article III standing 
requirements .... 
Threats or increased risk thus constitutes cognizable harm. 
Threatened environmental mJury is by nature 
probabilistic. ... [0] ther circuits have had no trouble understanding 
the injurious nature of risk itself .... 
. . . By producing evidence that Gaston Copper is polluting Shealy's 
nearby water source, CLEAN has shown an increased risk to its 
member's downstream uses. This threatened injury is sufficient to 
provide injury-in-fact. Shealy need not wait until his lake becomes 
barren and sterile or assumes an unpleasant color and smell before 
he can invoke the protections of the Clean Water Act. Such a novel 
190. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181. 
191. [d. at 181; Craig, supra note 24, at 181. 
192. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181. 
193. See id. at 185-93. 
194. Craig, supra note 24, at 181-84. 
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demand would eliminate the claims of those who are directly 
threatened but not yet engulfed by an unlawful qischarge. Article III 
does not bar such concrete disputes from court. 19, 
The court concluded the plaintiff, who alleged that he and his 
family swam and fished in a lake less often because they feared the 
defendant's discharges, "has plainly demonstrated injury-in-fact" 
because" [h) e has produced evidence of actual or threatened injury to 
a waterway in which he has a legally protected interest.,,196 The 
court's reference to threatened injury presumably referred to 
potential future injuries. 197 
3. Ecological Rights Foundation 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that a plaintiff may 
demonstrate an injury-in-fact if the defendant's actions significantly 
increase the plaintiffs risk of future i~ury. In Ecological Rights 
Foundation v. Pacific Lumber Co., the Ninth Circuit interpreted 
Laidlaw as recognizing that: 
[A]n individual can establish 'injury-in-fact' by showing a connection 
to the area of concern sufficient to make credible the contention that 
the person's future life will be less enjoyable-that he or she really 
has or will suffer in his or her degree of aesthetic or recreational 
satisfaction-if the area in question remains or becomes 
environmentally degraded. 198 
In Ecological Rights Foundation, several plaintiffs claimed to use Yager 
Creek for recreational activities such as swimming and fishing, but 
that their use and e~oyment was diminished by the defendant's 
pollution. 199 The Ninth Circuit rejected defendants' assertion that 
the plaintiffs must demonstrate actual harm to the environment. 200 
Citing Laidlaw and Gaston Copper, the Ecological Rights Foundation 
195. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (en bane); accord Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 
1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gaston Copper with approval); Craig, supra note 24, at 191 
(discussing Gaston Copperas recognizing that increased risk is enough to provide standing for 
plaintiff). 
196. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 156. 
197. See id. 
198. &ological Rights Found., 230 F.3d at 1149; Craig, supra note 24, at 191-92. 
199. Ecological Rights Found., 230 F.3d at 1144-45, 1150-53. 
200. [d. at 1151. 
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court stated that a plaintiffs reasonable concerns about an 
increased risk of harm from a defendant's activities is sufficient. 201 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that a plaintiff could obtain standing 
to reduce the risk of future pollution even if no actual harm had 
occurred yet, stating: 
The Clean Water Act ... not only regulates actual water pollution, 
but embodies a range of prophylactic, procedural rules designed to 
reduce the risk of pollution. It is not necessary for a plaintiff 
challenging violations of rules designed to reduce the risk of 
pollution to show the presence of actual pollution in order to obtain 
d. 202 stan mg. 
4. Maine People's Alliance 
The First Circuit has also recognized a plaintiffs standing if a 
defendant's actions pose a reasonable possibility of future harm. In 
Maine People's Alliance and Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Mallinckrodt, the First Circuit concluded that the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act's (RCRA) citizen suit provision 
"allows citizen suits when there is a reasonable prospect that a 
serious, near-term threat to human health or the environment 
. ,,203 Th I' d eXISts. e court exp ame : 
It is the threat that must be close at hand, even if the perceived harm is 
not. For example, if there is a reasonable prospect that a carcinogen 
released into the environment today may cause cancer twenty years 
hence, the threat is near-term even though the perceived harm will 
I . h d' f 204 on y occur m t e Istant uture. 
Rejecting the defendant's assertion that the plaintiffs had failed to 
prove an injury-in-fact because there was no evidence of actual 
environmental harm, the First Circuit determined that 
"probabilistic harms are legally cognizable, and the district court 
made a supportable finding that a sufficient probability of harm 
exists to satisfy the Article III standing inquiry.,,205 Following 
201. [d. at 1151-52. 
202. [d. at 1152 n.12. 
203. 471 F.3d 277, 279 (1st Cir. 2006) (emphasis added), cm. denied, 128 S. Ct. 93 (2007); 
Craig, supra note 25, at 193-94. 
204. Maine People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 279 n.1. 
205. [d. at 283-84. 
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Laidlaw's reasonable concerns standing test for plaintiffs, the First 
Circuit stated that "the plaintiffs must show that Mallinckrodt's 
activities created a significantly increased risk of harm to health or 
the environment so as to make it objectively reasonable for the 
plaintiffs' members to deny themselves aesthetic and recreational 
use of the river.,,206 The court concluded that the plaintiffs had 
standing because they had introduced sufficient evidence of harm 
to the river from the defendant's actions by presenting expert 
testimony that the defendant was the primary source of mercury in 
the Penobscot River and that the mercury was entering "in 
sufficient quantity that it may well present an imminent and 
b . I d th· ,,207 su stantIa anger to e enVIronment. 
5. Baur 
Credible evidence that a plaintiff faces an increased lifetime risk 
of harm caused by a defendant's activities may be sufficient to 
obtain standing. In Baur v. Veneman, the Second Circuit found 
standing where Department of Agriculture regulations permitted 
livestock potentially infected with mad cow disease to enter the 
food chain, thereby increasing the plaintiffs risk of contracting a 
fatal neurological disease. 208 The court determined "that exposure 
to an enhanced risk of disease transmission may qualify as injury-in-
fact in consumer food and drug safety suits .... ,,209 To demonstrate 
an injury-in-fact created by an increased risk of contracting a 
disease due to regulatory action or omission, the court stated that 
the plaintiff "must allege that he faces a direct risk of harm which 
rises above mere conjecture.,,210 The court explained that it would 
consider the seriousness of the disease in assessing whether the 
plaintiff had demonstrated an injury-in-fact: "[b]ecause the 
evaluation of risk is qualitative, the probability of harm which a 
plaintiff must demonstrate in order to allege a cognizable injury-in-
206. [d. at 284. 
207. [d. at 285. 
208. 352 F.3d 625 (2nd Cir. 2003); Craig, supra note 24, at 198-200. Specifically, Baur 
alleged that the Department of Agriculture's inadequate regulations increased "the risk that 
humans will contract a fatal form of TSE [Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy] 
known as Variant Creutzfeldt:Jacob disease ("vCJD") by eating BSE [Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalophy]-contaminated beef products." Baur, 352 F.3d at 628; Craig, supra note 24, at 
199 n.263. 
209. Baur, 352 F.3d at 628; Craig, supra note 24, at 199 n.264. 
210. Baur, 352 F.3d at 636; Craig, supra note 24, at 199 n.266. 
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fact logically varies with the severity of the probable harm.,,211 The 
court concluded that Baur's allegation that he was at increased risk 
of contracting Variant Creutzfeldt:Jakob disease (vCJD) due to 
inadequate government regulation were sufficient to meet standing 
requirements because vCJD is "a deadly disease with no known cure 
or treatment. Thus, even a moderate increase in the risk of disease 
may be sufficient to confer standing.,,212 Because Baur successfully 
alleged a credible threat of harm from downed cattle, the Second 
Circuit rejected the government's argument that he must also 
quantify the extent of the risk, concluding that "the evaluation of 
the amount of tolerable risk is better analyzed as an administrative 
decision governed by the relevant statutes rather than a 
constitutional question governed by Article III." 213 
6. Will the District of Columbia Circuit Continue to Recognize 
Standing in Cases Involving Future Harms? NRDC and 
Public Citizen 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has 
adopted the most difficult test for plaintiffs alleging future injuries 
by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that there is a "substantial 
probability" that a challenged government action will harm them. 214 
The D.C. Circuit's substantial probability test has been criticized by 
other circuits and is arguably more restrictive than the imminence 
and concreteness requirements detailed in Lujan. 215 As a result of 
211. Baur, 352 F.3d at 637; Craig, supra note 24, at 199 n.267. 
212. Baur, 352 F.3d at 637; Craig, supra note 24, at 199 n.268. 
213. Baur, 352 F.3d at 643; see generally id. at 637-43 (discussing Baur's allegations of a 
credible threat of hann). 
214. Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666--72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying a 
restrictive, multipart test for standing in procedural rights cases, requiring that a plaintiff 
demonstrate (1) a particularized environmental injury (2) that is placed at demonstrably 
greater risk by governmental action or omission and (3) that such risk is fairly traceable to 
the agency action or omission); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 45-63 (discussing a 
circuit split over how to apply footnote seven standing test in NEPA cases); Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1720 n.91; Bertagna, supra note 18, at 461-64 (discussing split 
between Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on causation portion of standing test). 
215. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. United States Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972-75 
(9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Florida Audubon's standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and 
stating that such plaintiffs "need only establish the reasonable probability of the challenged 
action's threat to [their] concrete interest."); Cornrn. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 
F.3d 445, 447-52 (10th Cir. 1996) (criticizing Florida Audubon's "substantial probability" test 
and instead requiring that plaintiffs establish an "increased risk of adverse environmental 
consequences" from the alleged failure to follow NEPA); Leiter, supra note 18, (manuscript 
at 15-16) (arguing D.C. Circuit's threshold test of substantial harm in standing cases is more 
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its strict standing test, the D.C. Circuit has recognized standing in 
only a few cases involving probabilistic future injuries. 216 Further, 
in its 2007 and 2008 decisions in Public Citizen v. National Highway 
Traffic Administration, the D.C. Circuit suggested in dicta that the 
court should overrule even those prior cases that had allowed 
standing for probabilistic future injuries. 217 
In 1996, the D.C. Circuit recognized standing for probabilistic 
injuries in Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, where the court 
held that the incremental increase in the risk of future forest fires 
resulting from the government's action was a sufficient injury to 
support constitutional standing for plaintiffs who challenged the 
Forest Service's plan to prohibit logging in a national forest. 218 The 
plaintiffs demonstrated that the plan would increase the probability 
of a catastrophic fire by permitting the accumulation of fuel in the 
form of dead trees and forest debris. 219 In NRDC v. EPA, the D.C. 
Circuit again recognized standing in a case involving probabilistic 
future risk, but also indicated that plaintiffs in such a case would 
have to demonstrate that there was a significant probability of 
serious harm from a challenged government action. 220 In Public 
Citizen,221 the court acknowledged that the Circuit in its Mountain 
States and NRDC decisions had allowed standing in cases involving 
probabilistic future injuries, but strongly questioned whether 
standing in such cases violated separation of powers principles by 
intruding on the role of the political branches and suggested that 
the en banc court should address that issue in a future case. 222 
a. NRDC 
Unlike Baur's qualitative approach to standing, in NRDC v. EPA, 
the D.C. Circuit used a quantitative methodology for assessing 
whether the plaintiffs had standing, although the court 
subsequently reheard the case after deciding that its original 
stringent than Lujan); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 45-63 (suggesting D.C. 
Circuit's standing test is too stringent and that other circuits have appropriately rejected it). 
216. See infra notes 219-21, 230-31 and accompanying text. 
217. 513 F.3d 234, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
218. 92 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
219. Id. 
220. 440 F.3d 476, opinion withdrawn by, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Craig, supra note 24, 
at 200-01. 
221. 489 F.3d 1279, modified on reh'g, 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
222. Public Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1291-98, modified on reh'g, 513 F.3d 234 at 239-41. 
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standing analysis was flawed. 223 The plaintiff NRDC filed a petition 
for review, challenging a final rule issued by the EPA exempting for 
the year 2005 certain "critical uses" of the otherwise banned 
chemical methyl bromide, a chemical that has beneficial uses, but 
also destroys stratospheric ozone.224 The NRDC argued that the 
rule violated the United States' treaty obligations under the 1987 
Montreal Protocol,225 which phases out and eventually bans 
chemicals that destroy stratospheric ozone, and provisions of the 
Clean Air Act that implement the protocol. 226 The NRDC argued 
that it had standing because the exemptions would increase the 
risk to its members of contracting skin cancer or cataracts because 
the methyl bromide would destroy some stratospheric ozone, which 
performs an essential function in preserving life by absorbing most 
dangerous ultraviolet radiation from the Sun so that high levels 
never reach the surface of the Earth. 227 In its initial but later 
withdrawn decision, the court held that the NRDC did not have 
standing to petition the court to review the final rule because the 
annualized risk to members of the NRDC was too remote and 
hypothetical to meet the Lujan standing test. 228 
After the NRDC successfully petitioned for a re-hearing, the D.C. 
Circuit concluded that the NRDC had met standing requirements 
because skin cancer caused by use of methyl bromide posed a 
sufficient lifetime risk to its members. 229 In response to the NRDC's 
claim "that its members faced increased health risks from EPA's 
rule [,]" the court cautiously observed, "[a] lthough this claim does 
not fit comfortably within the Supreme Court's description of what 
constitutes an 'injury-in-fact' sufficient to confer standing ... we 
223. NRDC v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476, opinion withdrawn by, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Craig, 
supra note 24, at 200-01. 
224. NRDC, 440 F.3d at 478--80, opinion withdrawn by, 464 F.3d at 4-5; see EPA, Protection 
of Stratospheric Ozone: Process for Exempting Critical Uses From the Phaseout of Methyl 
Bromide, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 76, 982, 76,990 (2004) (exempting certain "critical uses" 
of methyl bromide for 2005). 
225. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. 
TREAlY DOC. NO. 100-10,1522 V.N.T.S. 29 ("Montreal Protocol"). 
226. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 2399, 2648 
(implementing "Montreal Protocol"), 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(h) (requiring EPA to "promulgate 
rules for reductions in, and terminate the production, importation, and consumption of, 
methyl bromide under a schedule that is in accordance with, but not more stringent than, 
the phaseout schedule of the Montreal Protocol Treaty as in effect on October 21, 1998."). 
227. NRDC, 440 F.3d at 481-82, opinion withdrawn by, 464 F.3d at 6. 
228. NRDC, 440 F.3d at 483-84, opinion withdrawn by, 464 F.3d 1,5-7. 
229. NRDC, 464 F.3d at 5-7; Craig, supra note 24, at 201. 
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have recognized that increases in risk can at times be 'i~uries in 
fact' sufficient to confer standing.,,23o Because of the danger that 
standing based on an increased risk of harm could be stretched to 
include hypothetical injuries, the court stated that it would 
recognize standing in such cases only where there is a '''substantial 
probability' of injury.,,231 The court acknowledged that the courts 
of appeals have disagreed about when an increased risk of harm is 
enough to justify standing, and also whether the plaintiff must 
quantify that risk, but found that it did not have to "answer" those 
difficult questions in this case. 232 The court accepted evidence from 
an EPA expert that the best measure of risk from ozone depletion 
is lifetime risk, not annualized risk, and therefore the court found 
that its prior, withdrawn decision had improperly focused on 
annualized risk to the plaintiffs. 233 The court concluded that 
evidence demonstrating that two to four members of the NRDC's 
nearly half a million members would develop skin cancer during 
their lifetimes as a result of EPA's rule was more than sufficient 
injury for the NRDC to have Article III standing. 234 Because the risk 
of skin cancer was substantially probable, the court did not resolve 
whether a plaintiff must quantify a threatened risk in order to have 
standing. 
The revised NRDC decision's consideration of lifetime health 
risks from ozone depletion is significant in demonstrating that 
concrete injuries do not have to be immediate, but include 
reasonably foreseeable impacts that may not occur until many years 
after the plaintiff's exposure to a harmful substance. Although it 
was willing to consider health impacts to NRDC members many 
years into the future, the decision only recognized harms to 
current members of the NRDC. Courts generally require an 
organization to demonstrate that at least one of its members has a 
concrete injury. 235 The NRDC court might well have rejected 
standing if the plaintiffs had alleged risks that affected only the 
members' unborn children or grandchildren. 
230. NRDC, 464 F.3d at 6; Craig, supra note 24, at 201. 
23l. NRDC, 464 F.3d at 6. 
232. Id. at 6--7; Craig, supra note 24, at 20l. 
233. NRDC, 464 F.3d at 7; Craig, supra note 24, at 201. 
234. NRDC, 464 F.3d at 7; Craig, supra note 24, at 201. 
235. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-40 (1972); supra notes 13-14 and 
accompanying text. 
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b. Public Citizen 
In a 2007 decision, Public Citizen v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), 236 the D.C. Circuit appeared to be less 
inclined to find standing where a public interest organization 
alleged that its members were at a greater risk of future injury from 
an automobile accident because the NHTSA standards for tire 
pressure monitors were less stringent than the alternative 
regulation that the Public Citizen organization supported. 237 In 
2000, Congress enacted the Transportation Recall Enhancement, 
Accountability, and Documentation Act (TREAD Act) to impose 
new tire-safety requirements. 238 The TREAD Act required the 
Secretary of Transportation to promulgate a regulation requiring 
new vehicles to feature a warning system "to indicate to the 
operator when a tire is significantly under inflated."239 In 2005, the 
NHTSA acting on behalf of the Secretary promulgated a final rule 
on this issue, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 138. 240 
Standard 138 requires automakers to install tire pressure 
monitoring systems to warn drivers "when the pressure in the 
vehicle's tires is approaching a level at which permanent tire 
damage could be sustained as a result of heat buildup and tire 
failure is possible.,,241 Public Citizen, four individual tire 
manufacturers, and the Tire Industry Association filed petitions for 
review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
that challenged Standard 138 for four alleged deficiencies: (i) the 
absence of a requirement that pressure monitors be compatible 
with all replacement tires; (ii) the up-to-20-minute delay between 
significant under-inflation and the illumination of the dashboard 
warning light; (iii) the use of the 25-percent-below-placard-pressure 
standard for under-inflation; and (iv) the testing that NHTSA 
. ' 242 reqUIre J.or pressure mOllltors. 
In its initial decision, the D.C. Circuit held that the tire 
236. 489 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
237. Id. at 1291-98. 
238. See Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000). 
239. §13, 114 Stat. at 1806 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30123). 
240. See Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,136 (Apr. 8, 2005) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585), recon. granted in part, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,079 (Sept. 7, 
2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585). 
241. Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. at 18,148. 
242. Public Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
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manufacturers and the trade association lacked standing to 
challenge the safety standard. 243 The court also suggested that 
Public Citizen failed to meet standing requirements, but allowed 
Public Citizen to file supplemental briefs to address whether 
Standard 138 increased the risk that its members would be injured 
in a traffic accident. 244 The court questioned whether the future 
traffic injuries alleged by Public Citizen were "imminent" because 
"no one can say who those several hundred individuals are out of 
the 300 million people in the United States, nor can anyone say 
when such accidents might occur. For any particular individual, 
the odds of such an accident occurring are extremely remote and 
speculative, and the time (if ever) when any such accident would 
occur is entirely uncertain.,,245 In a footnote, the court observed 
that the Massachusetts decision had held that states were entitled to 
"'special solicitude'" in standing analysis, "including analysis of 
imminence," but noted that none of the plaintiffs in the case were 
states. 246 
The D.C. Circuit seemed to be less receptive to claims of future 
harms in Public Citizen than in its NRDC decision. The court stated: 
Public Citizen's injury-in-fact theory flouts these settled principles. 
Public Citizen is attempting to assert remote and speculative claims of 
possible future harm to its members. Allowing a party to assert such 
remote and speculative claims to obtain federal court jurisdiction 
threatens, however, to eviscerate the Supreme Court's standing 
doctrine .... Nor does it help Public Citizen to aggregate a series of 
d I · I' 247 remote an specu alive calms. 
The court suggested that if courts freely granted standing in cases 
involving an alleged increased risk of i~ury claims, then the 
judiciary would likely intrude on the role of the political branches: 
The consequences of allowing standing in these kinds of increased-
risk cases are perhaps obvious, but worth explicating. Much 
government regulation slightly increases a citizen's risk of injury-or 
insufficiently decreases the risk compared to what some citizens 
243. [d. at 1290-91. 
244. [d. at 1291-98. 
245. Id. at 1293-94. 
246. Id. at 1294 n.2 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,127 S. Ct 1438, 1454-55 
(2007)). 
247. Public Citizen, 489 F.3d. at 1294. 
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might prefer. Under Public Citizen's theory of probabilistic injury, 
after an agency takes virtually any action, virtually any citizen-
because of a fractional chance of benefit from alternative action-
would have standing to obtain judicial review of the agency's choice. 
Opening the courthouse to these kinds of increased-risk claims would 
drain the "actual or imminent" requirement of meaning in cases 
involving consumer challenges to an agency's regulation (or lack of 
regulation); would expand the "proper-and properly limited"-
constitutional role of the Judicial Branch beyond deciding actual 
cases or controversies; and would entail the Judiciary exercising some 
part of the Executive's responsibility to take care that the law be 
faithfully executed. 248 
The court explained the dangers of future risk suits to the role of 
the political branches: 
Contrary to Public Citizen's far-reaching theory, the Supreme Court's 
precedents establish that injuries from a car accident become actual 
or imminent only when the accident has occurred or is "certainly 
impending" and "immediate." When harm actually happens, state 
tort law may provide an avenue to recover damages from a party 
unreasonably causing the harm (for example, from the automaker). 
To avoid the standing problem of increased-risk cases, moreover, 
Congress also can presumably create a private cause of action 
enabling consumers to sue private defendants such as automakers, 
for example, and obtain recovery for injuries actually suffered in car 
accidents as a result of federal statutory or regulatory violations by the 
automakers. Cf Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578, 112 S. Ct. 2130; id. at 580, 112 
S.Ct. 2130 (Kennedy, j., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). To the extent Congress is concerned about Executive 
under-regulation or under-enforcement of statutes, it also may 
exercise its oversight role and power of the purse. See Laird v. Tatum, 
408 U.S. 1, 15,92 S. Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972). But all of that is 
far afield from allowing a consumer to sue an agency based solely on 
an event that, for any given individual, is extremely unlikely to occur 
and is not "imminent," "certainly impending," and "immediate." The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disputes about future events 
where the possibility of harm to any given individual is remote and 
speculative are properly left to the policymaking Branches, not the 
Article III courts. 249 
Despite its serious doubts about whether Public Citizen could 
establish standing, the court allowed Public Citizen to file affidavits 
248. Id. at 1295. 
249. Id. 
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demonstrating the specific risks that the NHTSA's rule posed to its 
members. 250 
Mter the parties filed supplemental briefs, the D.C. Circuit in 
2008 held in a per curium opinion that Public Citizen did not have 
standing. 251 The court concluded that Public Citizen's statistical 
analysis was flawed and failed to demonstrate that its members were 
at a higher risk of suffering traffic i~uries in the future from the 
tire safety standards in Standard 138 than they would have been if 
the NHTSA had adopted Public Citizen's alternative safety 
standards. 252 First, the court concluded that Public Citizen had not 
made "any attempt to demonstrate the difference in risk between 
(i) Standard 138 and (ii) Public Citizen's proposal that automakers 
publish a list of compatible tires."253 Additionally, the court 
concluded that Public Citizen had failed to demonstrate an 
increased future risk of traffic accidents due to the NHTSA's use of 
a 20-minute lag time between tire under-inflation and a warning in 
Standard 138, as compared to Public Citizen's one-minute warning 
proposal, and the court also found that Public Citizen failed to 
show that its members were subject to an increased future risk of 
injury from the 25-percent-below-placard pressure adopted by 
Standard 138, as compared to the alternative "Tire & Rim 
Association" proposal for a minimum pressure based on a vehicle's 
maximum load. 254 
The Public Citizen decision implied that it would prefer not to 
recognize standing in any future injury cases. The court stated, "If 
we were deciding this case based solely on the Supreme Court's 
precedents, we would agree with the separate opinion.,,255 In his 
separate opinion, Judge Sentelle agreed with the majority's 
suggestion in its initial decision that any recognition of 
probabilistic future lllJUry leads courts to exceed their 
constitutional role and intrude on the role of the political 
250. [d. at 1296-98. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge 
Sentelle would not have allowed Public Citizen another opportunity to establish standing 
and would have held that the court had no jurisdiction because Public Citizen had not 
demonstrated standing. [d. at 1298-99 (Sentelle, j., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
251. Public Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234, 241 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (per curiam). 
252. See id. at 238-41. 
253. See id. at 238-39. 
254. See id. at 239-40. 
255. [d. at 241. 
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branches: 
As the majority noted in the earlier iteration of this litigation, the. 
probabilistic approach to standing now being applied in increased-
risk cases expands the "'proper-and properly limited'-
constitutional role of the Judicial Branch beyond deciding actual 
cases or controversies; and ... entail [s] the Judiciary exercising some 
part of the Executive's responsibility to take care that the law be 
faithfully executed." Public Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1295 (quoting 
DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 
(2006)) .... 
The majority's discussion today illustrates the ill fit between judicial 
power and that sort of future event and possible harm. The wide-
ranging, near-merits discussion at the standing threshold is the sort of 
thing that congressional committees and executive agencies exist to 
explore. The judicial process is constitutionally designed for cases or 
controversies involving actual or imminent harm to identified 
persons-that is, the persons who have standing. If we do not soon 
abandon this idea of probabilistic harm, we will find ourselves 
looking more and more like legislatures rather than courts. 256 
Nevertheless, because of the Circuit's precedent allowing 
standing in cases involving future harm, the Public Citizen decision 
stated that it was still possible for a plaintiff to obtain standing in 
such a case despite the panel's serious doubts about the 
constitutionality of such standing. Quoting its initial decision, the 
court stated: "As we read our decisions in Mountain States and 
NRDC, however, 'this Court has not closed the door to all 
increased-risk-of-harm cases. ",257 The court suggested that the 
Circuit should resolve the contentious issue of standing based on 
future injury in an en bane decision: "In an appropriate case, the 
en bane Court may have to consider whether or how the Mountain 
States principle should apply to general consumer challenges to 
safety regulations.,,258 Quoting its initial decision, the court 
declared that it would apply a stringent standard of proof in cases 
in which a plaintiff sought standing based upon an increased risk of 
256. Id. at 242 (Sentelle,j., concurring in the judgment). 
257. Id. at 241 (quoting Public Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 
1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007». 
258. Id. at 241. Public Citizen will apparently not seek en bane review because it fears 
that an en bane court might hold that standing may never be based on future injuries. Dawn 
Reeves & Lara Beaven, Key Court Eyes New Bid To Limit Standing In Suits Against t."'PA, Experts 
Say, in INSIDE EPA,jan. 25, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 1340003. 
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harm because "'the constitutional requirement of imminence as 
articulated by the Supreme Court' requires a very strict 
understanding of what increases in risk and overall risk levels' will 
support injury-in-fact.,,259 Although the facts of NRDC and Public 
Citizen are arguably factually distinguishable, the Public Citizen 
decision was far less receptive to the possibility of recognizing 
standing based on future risk allegations. Two of the three judges 
sitting in each case were different; only Judge Randolph sat in both 
260 cases. 
The D.C. Circuit should reject Pubiic Citizen s hostile approach to 
cases involving probabilistic injury because many types of serious 
environmental and health threats are probabilistic in nature since 
we do not know which individuals they will harm in the future even 
though it may be likely that they WIll harm large numbers of 
people. The Mountain States and NRDC decisions appropriately 
allowed standing where there was a significant possibility of future 
injury. Additionally, the D.C. Circuit should abandon its 
substantial probability test for standing because it is more stringent 
than required by Lujan and should instead adopt the reasonable 
probability test used in the Ninth Circuit. 261 
259. Public Citizen, 513 F.3d at 241 (quoting Public Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1296). 
260. The judges in NRDC were Randolph, Edwards and Henderson. See NRDC v. EPA, 
464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The judges in Public Citizen were Kavanaugh, Randolph and 
Sentelle. See 489 F.3d 1279. 
261. Compare Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(applying strict four-part test for standing in procedural rights case, including requiring a 
procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury, that "a particularized 
environmental interest of theirs ... will suffer demonstrably increased risk," and that it is 
"substantially probable" that the agency action will cause the demonstrable injury alleged by 
the plaintiff) with Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972-75 
(9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Flurida Audubon's standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and 
stating that such plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable probability of the challenged 
action's threat to (their] concrete interest."') (citation omitted); and Comm. to Save the Rio 
Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (lOth Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with Rorida Audubon's 
"substantial probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a test that 
plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse environmental consequences" from the 
alleged failure to follow NEPA); and Mank, Global Warming, supra note 2, at 45-63 (discussing 
split in circuits about how to apply footnote seven standing test in NEPA cases); and Mank, 
States Standing, supra note 18, at 1720 (same); and Bertagna, supra note 18, at 461-64 
(discussing split between Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on causation portion of 
standing test); see also Sakas, supra note 171, at 192-204 ("The Ninth and Seventh Circuits 
have held that a plaintiff need not have a claim that is site-specific, while the D.C., Eighth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have created a stricter standing doctrine where a site-specific injury is 
necessary" in procedural injury challenges to programmatic rules). 
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F. Shain - The Eighth Circuit Rejects a 100 Year Flood Risk 
In Shain v. Veneman,262 the Eighth Circuit rejected standing in a 
case alleging increased risk of harm from a government decision 
because of the significant possibility that the risk would not occur 
during the plaintiffs' lifetimes or ownership of the property at 
issue. The plaintiffs alleged that by financing the building of a 
sewage-treatment plant on a 100-year flood plain near the property 
they owned or rented the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) would violate federal law. 263 The district court dismissed 
the case for lack of standing because it concluded that the risk of a 
100-year flood is not "imminent" and "is by definition speculative 
and unpredictable.,,264 Mfirming the district court's decision, the 
Eighth Circuit agreed that the possibility of a 100-year flood was not 
an imminent injury: 
If the possibility of a 100-year flood is remote in the abstract, the 
possibility the flood will occur while [the plaintiffs] own or occupy the land 
becomes a matter of sheer speculation. Indeed, one wonders whether any 
of the parties (or the court) in this case will be alive the next time a 100-
year flood occurs upon the land. 265 
Characterizing the risk of the flood as "remote and improbable," 
the court stated, "[ t] 0 whatever extent the lagoons increase the 
theoretical risk of flooding on the plaintiffs' property, they will do 
so only if the remote risk of a 100-year flood first materializes while 
the plaintiffs have a property interest in the land.,,266 
The Eighth Circuit tried to distinguish the Seventh Circuit's 
arguably contrary decision in Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans,267 
which had found standing where the plaintiffs alleged that the 
construction of a radio tower on a flood plain would limit the 
creek's drainage area and increase the risk of flooding. 268 The Elk 
Grove Village decision stated in dicta that "even a small probability of 
injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy-to take a suit out 
of the category of the hypothetical-provided of course that the 
262. 376 F.3d S15 (Sth Cir. 2004). 
263. [d. at S16. 
264. [d.atS16.S1S. 
265. [d. at SlS. 
266. [d. at 819. 
267. 997 F.2d 32S (7th Cir. 1993). 
26S. [d. at 32S-32. 
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relief sought would, if granted, reduce the probability.,,269 The 
Eighth Circuit attempted to distinguish the facts in Shain from 
those in Elk Grove Village: 
In our mind, Elk Grove is easily distinguishable from this case. There, 
the flood plain was a common flood area, which continually imposed 
sandbagging and other flood-control costs on the Village of Elk 
Grove. Thus, the Village had a direct stake in ensuring the 
defendant's conduct did not aggravate a known and predictable 
danger, even if the marginal increase in risk defied calculation. Here, 
in contrast, the danger of the flood itself is remote and improbable. 
To whatever extent the lagoons increase the theoretical risk of 
flooding on the plaintiffs' property, they will do so only if the remote 
risk of a IOO-year flood first materializes while the plaintiffs have a 
.. hI d 270 property Illterest III t e an . 
Because the plaintiffs in Elk Grove never quantified the increased 
risk resulting from the construction of the radio tower, however, it 
is not clear whether the risk in Elk Grove was significantly different 
from the risk in Shain. 
The Shain decision also sought to distinguish the D.C. Circuit's 
decision in Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman,271 which held 
that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because the government's 
actions had increased the risk of serious harm. 272 The Eighth 
Circuit sought to distinguish Glickman by arguing that there was a 
distinction between direct and intervening factors in determining 
whether there was sufficient injury to satisfY standing requirements. 
The Court reasoned: 
The analogy between Glickman and the instant case, of course, is 
flawed. There, the defendant's conduct directly and measurably 
increased the chances a fire would start; the defendant's conduct was 
not merely an intervening factor that could aggravate an 
independently occurring natural disaster. For this case to become 
truly analogous to Glickman, the la&oons would have to increase the 
probability of a IOO-year flood itself. 73 
The Shain Court's distinction between its case and Glickman is 
269. Id. at 329. 
270. Shain, 376 F.3d at 819. 
271. 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
272. Id. at 1234-35. 
273. Shain, 376 F.3d at 819. 
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questionable because the Forest Service plan at issue in Mountain 
States could also be seen as aggravating the "independently 
occurring natural disaster" of fire by permitting the accumulation 
of more fuel much as the lagoons in Shain increased the 
harmfulness of the natural disaster of flooding. A possibly better 
argument in Shain would be that the lagoons have such a small and 
theoretical impact on the risk of flooding that their impact is too 
hypothetical to warrant standing; it is not clear from the decision 
how great a risk the lagoons posed. 
Although it reached a different result by denying standing, the 
Eighth Circuit's implication that the harm must occur during the 
lifetime or ownership of the plaintiffs is arguably consistent with 
the other court of appeals decisions addressing a plaintiffs' 
increased risk of disease or harm. 274 For example, in NRDC, the 
D.C. Circuit explicitly focused on lifetime risk. 275 Similarly, the 
Baur decision addressed the risk that the plaintiff would contract 
mad cow disease during his lifetime. 276 Arguably, the result in Shain 
was appropriately different because it was the only case in which 
there was a significant possibility that the harm would occur after 
the lifetime or ownership of the plaintiffs. 
The Shain decision is consistent with Laidlaw's framework that 
courts should focus on whether there has been an injury to the 
plaintiff rather than the environment. 277 It is likely that a lOO-year 
flood will occur someday near the property belonging to the 
plaintiffs in Shain. But, as the Eighth Circuit stated, it was 
uncertain whether a flood would take place while the plaintiffs 
d h 
. 278 
owne t e propertIes. 
Pursuant to the Shain decision's reasoning, a private plaintiff 
cannot sue for risks that will probably occur after her lifetime. The 
NRDC and Baur decisions discussed above appeared to assume that 
a risk must occur during the plaintiffs lifetime. 279 All of these court 
of appeals decisions involved private persons or non-governmental 
organizations. In Massachusetts v. EPA, however, where the only 
plaintiff recognized to have standing was the Commonwealth of 
274. {d. at SIS. 
275. NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
276. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628-37 (2d Cir. 2003); 
277. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 52S U.S. 167, lSI 
(2000).-
278. Shain, 376 F.3d at SI8-19. 
279. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text. 
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Massachusetts, the Supreme Court announced that it would apply 
more liberal standing rules to states and considered the impacts of 
climate change on the Massachusetts' coastline through the year 
2100. 280 By considering impacts through the year 2100, the 
Massachusetts Court may have implicitly assumed that a government 
has a quasi-sovereign right to protect its natural resources for not 
only its current citizens, but also for its future citizens. 281 
V. SUITS By NON-GOVERNMENT PARTIES ON BEHALF OF FUTURE 
GENERATIONS 
In procedural rights cases, a plaintiff that has suffered an injury-
in-fact may be able to require the government to consider the long-
term impacts of a proposed project. In two NEPA decisions, D.C. 
Circuit held that the government has a duty to consider the 
reasonably foreseeable future impacts of its projects. 282 More 
controversially, the D.C. Circuit has held that the government has 
to evaluate the long-term impacts of nuclear waste disposal at Yucca 
Mountain for the next million years. 283 It is not clear that this 
decision is consistent with Shain. 
A. NEPA Suits 
In some circumstances, a NEPA plaintiff may require the 
government to address the reasonably foreseeable impacts of a 
project on future generations. If the government has actually 
proposed to build a project, the CEQ regulations require the 
government to consider all direct and indirect environmental 
consequences of the project and any "irreversible and irretrievable 
commitment of resources.,,284 The agency must also consider the 
cumulative impacts of "reasonably foreseeable future actions.,,285 
280. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453-58 & n.20 (2007); see also 
id. at 1467-68 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting) (criticizing Massachusetts use of estimates of sea 
level rise through 2100). 
281. See Massachusetts. 549 U.S. at 1453-58 & n.20 (stating that states have a quasi-
sovereign interest in their citizens and natural resources and considering long-term impacts 
of global warming on Massachusetts' coastline through 2100). 
282. See infra notes 292-312 and accompanying text. 
283. See infra notes 313-330 and accompanying text. 
284. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (2007). 
285. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2007) ("Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment 
which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, 
and reasonably foreseeable future actions .... "); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) (2) (2006) 
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Furthermore, NEPA explicitly states that "it is the continuing 
responsibility of the Federal government to use all practicable 
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national 
policy, to [ensure]... that the Nation may... fulfill the 
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment 
for succeeding generations .... ,,286 NEPA also states that the 
government, in its environmental statements, should address "the 
relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity,,,287 which could include the impacts of present 
projects on future generations. 288 Moreover, NEPA recognizes "the 
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems.,,289 
Accordingly, NEPA requires agencies to consider a proposed 
project's reasonably foreseeable future environmental impacts, 
including its cumulative impacts in conjunction with existing or 
proposed government projects. 290 Thus, a plaintiff may arguably 
require the government to assess a project's impacts on future 
generations as long as the plaintiff in his or her lifetime would 
("Cumulative actions, which when viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively 
significant impacts and should therefore be discussed in the same impact statement."). 
286. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b) (1) (2000); Allen, supra note 9, at 723-24; Just, supra note 65, at 
616. 
287. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (iv) (2000). 
288. See generally George]. Skelly, Note, PsychologjcalEffects at NEPA:S Threshold, 83 COLUM. 
L. REv. 336, 376 (1983) ("A recurrent theme in NEPA's legislative history is that the potential 
benefits of preventing long-term harm from environmental actions outweigh the short term 
price of anticipating that harm."). 
289. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(F) (2000); Caldwell, supra note 90, at 203-05, 23&,.39 (arguing 
NEPA has "orientation towards the future"). 
290. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b)(l) ("[i]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal 
government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of 
national policy, to [ensure] ... that the Nation may ... fulfill the responsibilities of each 
generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations."); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(f) 
(2007) ("[The agency should] [u]se all practicable means, consistent with the requirements 
of the Act and other essential considerations of national policy, to restore and enhance the 
quality of the human environment and avoid or minimize any possible adverse effects of 
their actions upon the quality of the human environment."); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2007) 
("[Agencies] shall provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts ... 
"); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2007) ("Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which 
results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future actions ... "); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (2007) ("[Agencies 
must consider c]cumulative actions, which when \~ewed with other proposed actions have 
cumulatively significant impacts and should therefore be discussed in the same impact 
statement."); see also Lluan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (stating that 
standing is available in a NEPA action where plaintiff seeks government to address concrete 
harms that will occur in the future if project is built). 
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sustain enough concrete injury to meet standing requirements and 
the impacts on future generations are reasonably foreseeable. 
In two NEPA cases, federal courts have recognized that agencies 
have a duty to consider a proposed project's reasonably foreseeable 
long-term environmental impacts. 291 Both cases recognized that 
federal agencies have a duty to examine reasonably foreseeable 
impacts on future generations. These two decisions are helpful 
precedent for plaintiffs who are concerned about long-term 
environmental impacts that could reasonably affect future 
generations. 
1. Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld 
In Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld,292 the appellants argued 
that the Navy, in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
addressing the construction of a Trident submarine base at Bangor, 
failed to consider the impacts of the Trident program beyond the 
year 1981, which was the target date for the initial operation of the 
Trident. 293 The court concluded that 1981 was not a reasonable 
cutoff date because the Navy acknowledged that it could have 
predicted the impacts of the program for at least some time period 
beyond 1981. 294 The court determined that the environmental 
impacts of the program after the Navy finished construction in 
1981 might be different from the construction impacts that were 
the focus of the EIS.295 The court ordered the Navy to assess the 
environmental impacts of operating the proposed base after the 
1981 EIS cutoff date: 'Just as the EIS for a proposed highway may 
not analyze only the environmental effects of the construction stage 
of the new road, but must also look to the noise, pollution, etc. 
which it will bring to the community when it is completed, so too 
must the Final EIS here examine the impacts generated by the 
Trident base once it is in operation.,,296 
The Court explicitly stated that the Navy had a duty to consider a 
291. Timothy Patrick Brady, Comment, "But Most of it Belongs to Those Yet to be Born:" The 
Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFr. L. REv. 621, 643-44 
(1990) (discussing Concerned About Trident and Potomac Alliance decisions); see infra notes 292-
312 and accompanying text (same). 
292. 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
293. [d. at 827,829. 
294. [d. at 829-30. 
295. [d. at 830. 
296. [d. 
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longer time period because NEPA requires a federal agency to 
consider impacts on future generations. The Court stated, 
"Furthermore, absent an agency's inability to predict any farther 
into the future, a forecasting of only 7 years of the impacts from 
such a major facility as the Trident Support Site, fails to ensure that 
the environment will be preserved and enhanced for the present 
generation, much less for our descendants."297 This portion of the 
opinion is clearly supportive for plaintiffs seeking to require 
agencies to address the impacts of their proposed projects on 
future generations. 
The Trident court acknowledged that the Navy's duty to address 
future impacts was limited to impacts that it could reasonably 
foresee, but that it had to a duty to examine all environmental 
impacts that were reasonably foreseeable. The court stated, "[The 
Navy] need not, and indeed, may not be able to forecast the effects 
of Trident after 1981 in the same detail or with the same degree of 
accuracy as it has done for the period prior to 1981, but it is 
imperative that it make a reasonable effort to discern what the 
effects of Trident's future operation will be."298 The court 
remanded the case so that the Navy could examine the operation 
impacts of the program beyond 1981.299 
Trident is a very strong decision for plaintiffs who seek to require 
federal agencies to explain whether their projects affect future 
generations. Pursuant to the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review in NEPA cases,300 a court would probably give a federal 
agency some deference if the agency argued that it could not 
reasonably estimate impacts beyond a certain time period. 
Nevertheless, Trident clearly places a burden on an agency to 
consider any reasonably foreseeable future environmental impacts. 
2. Potomac Alliance v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 




300. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376 (1989) (holding arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review is appropriate in NEPA cases); Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 
261, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("These challenges are reviewed under the Administrative 
Procedure Act's ("APA") arbitrary and capricious standard. This standard is applied to 
review compliance with NEPA and to determine the adequacy of an EIS."). 
301. 682 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
concluded that a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) order 
violated NEPA by failing to evaluate the long-range impacts of 
granting an amendment to a reactor's license. 302 The NRC had 
amended an operating license to allow Virginia Electric Power 
Company to increase the capacity of the spent fuel pool at its North 
Anna Nuclear Power Station. 303 In granting the amendment, the 
NRC considered environmental impacts only through the year 
2011, which is the date of the plant's permanent closing. 304 The 
petitioner argued that the NRC violated NEPA by "failing to 
consider, prior to granting the requested amendment, the long-
range future effects of permitting the increased storage capacity, 
including the situation as it will exist on the date of the plant's 
permanent closing in 2011.,,305 
The court observed that in a prior case involving similar facts it 
found a NEPA violation because the NRC had failed to examine 
"the dangers presented by the continuing existence of the storage 
pool after the final closing date of the plant.,,306 In response to the 
prior decision, the NRC initiated a rule making proceeding to 
reassess the long-term safety of nuclear waste disposal methods, but 
the Commission indicated that it might take a year or more for it to 
reach a decision on that issue. 307 In light of the NRC's lengthy 
delays in addressing the disposal issue, the court remanded the 
case to the Commission with the understanding that the court 
might revoke the expanded authority in the order if the 
Commission did not address the long term safety issues by June 30, 
1983, about eleven months after the court's decision. 30B 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Bazelon observed that the NRC 
should have assessed whether it was "reasonably foreseeable" that 
the spent fuel would remain in the North Anna beyond the year 
2011 or instead be relocated off-site. 309 He stated that the NRC 
could 'justify truncating its environmental assessment at the year 
2011 only if it has found that no reasonably foreseeable 
302. Id. at 103l. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 1031,1033 (Bazeion,j., concurring). 
305. [d. at 103l. 
306. Id. (discussing Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
307. Id. at 1031-32. 
308. [d. at 1032. 
309. Id. at 1035-37 (Bazeion,j., concurring). 
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contingency exists under which the spent fuel assemblies will 
remain in the pool beyond that time.,,310 He concluded, "Because 
the agency has not even attempted to make such a showing, we can 
only conclude that the approval of VEPCO's amendment violated 
NEPA.,,311 He then quoted language in Trident that the failure of 
the agency to consider foreseeable long-term effects "fails to ensure 
that the environment will be preserved and enhanced for the 
. hid d ,,312 present generatIOn, muc ess our escen ants. 
Because of the long-term risks of nuclear waste, the Potomac 
Alliance court concluded that a study that examined risks for 
approximately thirty years into the future may have been 
inadequate. Even more than Trident, the Potomac Alliance decision 
suggests that an agency may need to examine the impacts of a 
decision beyond the current generation. It is supportive precedent 
for plaintiffs seeking to protect future generations. 
B. Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA 
In Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA, the court of appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit held that the EPA's use of a 10,000-
year compliance period for predicting the safe storage of high-level 
radioactive waste at the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada 
repository violated section 801 of the Energy Policy Act (EnPA) 
because its approach was inconsistent with the findings and 
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, which 
suggested the need for a protective period on the order of a 
million years. 313 Section 801 of EnPA requires that the EPA 
establish site-specific standards for Yucca Mountain, including 
selecting a compliance period, "based upon and consistent with" 
the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. 314 
Subsequently, the EPA promulgated 40 C.F.R. part 197, which set 
forth health and safety standards requiring the Department of 
Energy (DOE) to limit radiation releases from the repository for 
10,000 years so that "the reasonably maximally exposed individual 
310. Id. at 1036. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. (quoting Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfe1d, 555 F.2d 81 i, 830 (D.C. Cir. 
19ii)). 
313. 3i3 F.3d 1251, 125i, 1266--i3 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
314. Id. at 1260, 1262 (citing Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801, 106 Stat. 2ii6, 2921-23 (1992) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10141 note (2000)). 
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receives no more than an annual committed effective dose 
equivalent of 150 microsieverts (15 millirems) from releases from 
the undisturbed Yucca Mountain disposal system.,,315 
The court determined that at least one member of the 
petitioners had standing. 316 Ed Goedhart stated that he lived and 
worked in Amargosa Valley, Nevada, eighteen miles from Yucca 
Mountain. 317 He alleged that "[the] EPA's failure to adopt more 
stringent radiation-protection standards will permit hazardous 
radionuclides from the buried waste to contaminate his 
community's ground-water supplies, causing adverse health 
effects.,,318 The court observed: "These allegations are more than 
sufficient to give Goedhart standing to sue in his own right. The 
claimed injury to his ground-water supply is neither hypothetical 
. 1 ,,319 nor conJectura . 
The court concluded that Goedhart had standing to sue even 
though the radionuclides might not contaminate the community's 
groundwater for thousands of years. The court found that his 
allegations met the three-part standing test: 
Although radionuclides escaping from the Yucca repository may not 
reach Goedhart's community for thousands of years, his injury is 
"actual or imminent," for he lives adjacent to the land where the 
Government plans to bury 70,000 metric tons of radioactive waste -
a sufficient harm in and of itself. See La. Envtl. Action Network v. United 
States EPA, 335 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 172 F.3d 65, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (holding that an environmental group established 
constitutional standing where its members lived near a landfill into 
which an EPA regulation allegedly would permit certain hazardous 
wastes to be deposited). In addition, this harm is "fairly traceable," 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted), to EPA's 
allegedly lax radiation-protection standards, and favorable relief, i.e., 
requiring EPA to make more stringent each aspect of the rule that 
petitioners challenge, would likely redress his harm. 320 
Because only one petitioner needs to have standing to decide the 
315. [d. at 1260, 1262-63 (quoting Public Health and Environmental Radiation 
Protection Standards [or Yucca Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,074 (June 13,2001) (codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 197 (2004»). 
316. [d. at 1265-66. 
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case on the merits, the court did not examine whether the other 
petitioners, including the State of Nevada, had standing. 321 
The court found that Goedhart would be exposed to sufficient 
harm from the proposed project to give him standing, although it 
might have been more accurate for the court to characterize the 
government's actions as creating a sufficiently serious risk of 
potential harm. 322 Once it decided that the petitioners had 
standing, the court examined whether the EPA's 10,000 year plan 
was sufficiently protective even though none of the petitioners 
would be harmed by events more than 10,000 years in the future. 
The court concluded that the EPA's selection of a ten thousand 
year period was unreasonable and inconsistent with the statute's 
requirement that the period be "based upon and consistent with" 
the NAS's recommendations, which were for a far longer one 
million year protective period. 323 The NAS had found that the 
greatest risks of radioactive contamination were not likely to take 
place "until tens to hundreds of thousands of years after 
disposal." 324 The NAS "found it scientifically possible to predict 
repository performance for approximately one million years.,,325 
The NAS explicitly rejected using a 10,000-year time limit for 
protecting human beings. 326 The court concluded that the EPA's 
10,000-year time limit was unreasonable in light of the NAS' 
contrary findings and was not entitled to deference under the 
Chevron doctrine. 327 "In sum, because EPA's chosen compliance 
period sharply differs from NAS's findings and recommendations, 
it represents an unreasonable construction of section 801 (a) of the 
E P 1· A ,,328 nergy 0 lCy ct. 
The court implied that the federal government has a duty to 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. at 1266-73. 
324. Id. at 1267 (Citing COMM. ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS, 
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS 2 (1995». 
325. Nuclear Energy Institute, 373 F.3d at 1268 (Citing COMM. ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR 
YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA 
MOUNTAIN STANDARDS 6 (1995) ) . 
326. Nuclear Energy Institute, 373 F.3d at 1271. 
327. Id. at 1269-73 (concluding that EPA's interpretation was unreasonable and 
therefore not entitled to deference under the second step of the Chevron doctrine); See 
Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (stating that if a statute is ambiguous under 
the first step of its test then courts should determine as a second step of the test whether an 
agency's interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of the statute."). 
328. Nuclear Energy Institute, 373 F.3d at 1273. 
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protect future generations from radioactive harms, but the court 
did not need to judicially impose such a duty. The NAS had already 
done so in recommending that the EPA adopt a million-year 
protective period, and EnPA required the EPA to adopt a period 
"based upon and consistent with" the NAS' recommendations. 329 
The court did not discuss language in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
that explicitly states that "appropriate precautions must be taken to 
ensure that [high-level radioactive] waste and spent [nuclear] fuel 
do not adversely affect the public health and safety and the 
environment for this or future generations.,,330 
Some judges might not agree with the standing analysis of the 
Nuclear Energy Institute court. For instance, the judges in the Shain 
decision might have found that the risk was too speculative because 
it may not occur for thousands of years. 331 Conversely, perhaps the 
Shain court would have found that the risk of living near an 
enormous amount of high-level radioactive waste was a sufficient 
injury for standing because the potential harms to Goedhart are far 
greater than the risk of a lOO-year flood. Pursuant to Laidlaw's 
analysis, Goedhart arguably had "reasonable concerns" about living 
I d · 332 near a nuc ear waste eposltory. 
In the Louisiana Environmental Action Network decision cited by the 
Nuclear Energy Institute court, the risks posed by the hazardous waste 
landfill to three plaintiffs who lived near the landfill were uncertain 
and were contingent in part on which variances the EPA might 
grant in the future, but a majority of the Louisiana Environmental 
Action Network court found those allegations sufficient for standing 
because of the risks that similar landfills in Louisiana had posed to 
the public and the fact that the EPA typically granted some 
variances to comparable landfills. 333 In a dissenting opinion, Judge 
Sentelle in Louisiana Environmental Action Network argued that it was 
speculative whether the EPA would grant variances in the future 
and therefore that the plaintiffs could not meet standing 
requirements. 334 The radioactive risks in Nuclear Energy Institute 
329. [d. at 1266-73. 
330. 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(7) (2006). 
331. Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2004); supra notes 262-74, 278 and 
accompanying text. 
332. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 
(2000). 
333. 172 F.3d 65, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
334. [d. at 71-72 (Sentelle,j., dissenting). 
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were arguably more certain than those in Louisiana. Environmental 
Action Network because they did not depend on whether the EPA 
would grant a variance in the future. 
Because the standing test requires judges to make difficult 
judgment calls about whether a risk is concrete or merely 
speculative, it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court might 
have decided the standing issue in Nuclear Energy Institute. In his 
dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, Chief Justice Roberts 
acknowledged that whether an event is "'fairly' traceable" to an 
alleged cause or whether the petitioners' alleged harms are "'likely' 
to be redressed" by judicial action "is subject to some debate.,,335 It 
is possible that the Court might find that the connection between 
the harms to Goedhart and those living in the distant future are too 
hypothetical and remote. The Duke Power decision, however, 
concluded that plaintiffs who had standing based on present 
injuries from proposed nuclear plants could address the possibility 
of future accidents that might exceed statutory liability limits 
without proving a specific nexus between their injuries and their 
336 constitutional challenge.' 
The Nuclear Energy Institute court concluded that the petitioners' 
challenge to the DOE's Final Environmental Impact Statement 
(FEIS) was not ripe for review because "[ w] e do not yet know 
whether or to what extent NRC will adopt DOE's FEIS in support of 
any decision to authorize construction or license the operation of a 
repository at Yucca.,,337 The NRC had stated that "it may require 
that DOE supplement the FEIS, or it may itself supplement the 
FEIS.,,338 Because it was uncertain whether the NRC would approve 
or modify the FEIS, the court concluded that the issue was not yet 
ripe for judicial review. 339 As a result, we do not know whether 
NEPA independently requires the agencies to address impacts at 
Yucca Mountain beyond the 10,000 years examined in the initial 
decision. 
335. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1470 (2007) (Roberts, CJ., 
dissenting) . 
336. See supra notes 143-63 and accompanying text. 
337. Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1312-13 (2004). 
338. Id. at 1313. 
339. Id. at 1313-14. 
68 COLUMBIAjOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw [Vol. 34:1 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES 
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court for the first time concluded 
that states have greater s~anding rights than other litigants 
pursuant to the parens patriae doctrine. 310 Justice Stevens' majority 
opinion implicitly suggested that states have the authority to 
protect future generations of their citizens by relying on evidence 
from computer models that climate change would raise sea levels 
and harm Massachusetts' coastline through the year 2100, although 
the court also relied on evidence that global warming was already 
harming the Commonwealth's coastline. 34 ! Chief Justice Roberts' 
dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority's use of the parens 
patriae doctrine to expand the standing rights of states. 342 
Additionally, he argued that the computer models projecting 
future harms to Massachusetts' coastline were too unreliable to give 
rise to standing. 343 His broader argument was that separation of 
powers principles forbid courts to recognize standing for social 
problems that affect all citizens because, as he argues, it is the role 
of the political branches to address generalized grievances. 344 
A. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion on Standing 
1. Congress May Broadly Define What Constitutes an Injury 
Because global warming affects everyone in the world, some 
judges, including Chief Justice Roberts and three other dissenting 
justices in Massachusetts, and commentators have argued that 
generalized injuries resulting from climate change are too non-
specific to justifY individual standing rights and are better 
addressed through the political process. 345 Justice Stevens in his 
340. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453-55. 
341. Id. at 1456-58, n.20 (recognizing present and future injury to Massachusetts' 
coastline through the year 2100); see supra notes 24-25, 280-81, and infra notes 376-78 and 
488-89 and accompanying text. 
342. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1465-66 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting). 
343. Id. at 1467-68 (criticizing majority opinion's use of estimates of sea level rise 
through 2100). 
344. Id. at 1463-64,1470-71. 
345. See, e.g., id. at 1463-71 (2007) (Roberts, Cl, dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing because global warming causes generalized injuries better suited to 
resolution by the political branches); Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (Sentelle, j., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment) (same), rev'd, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007); Bertagna, supra note 18, at 444-46 (arguing that plaintiffs asserting global 
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Massachusetts majority opinion, however, implied that Congress has 
the authority to allow global warming challenges if it carefully 
provides for such suits in an appropriate statute. 346 He quoted 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan for the principle 
that "'Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where 
none existed before'" provided that Congress "'identif[ies] the 
injury it seeks to vindicate and relate[s] the injury to the class of 
persons entitled to bring suit.",347 Justice Kennedy's deferential 
approach to congressional intent would arguably allow Congress to 
confer standing on certain persons to act as representatives of 
future generations as long as the statute was clear and the plaintiffs 
had suffered injuries that also threatened future generations. 
2. The Special Standing Rights of States 
The Massachusetts Court used the parens patriae doctrine as a 
justification for giving greater standing rights to states than other 
litigants. 348 Justice Stevens stated that "the special position and 
interest of Massachusetts" was important in determining 
standing. 349 He declared that" [i] t is of considerable relevance that 
the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was 
in Lujan, a private individuaL" 350 Citing Justice Holmes' 1907 
Tennessee Copper opinion, which authorized Georgia to sue on 
behalf of its citizens to protect them from air pollution from 
outside its borders because of the state's quasi-sovereign interest in 
the state's natural resources and the health of its citizens, the 
Massachusetts decision observed that the Court had long ago 
"recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of 
invoking federal jurisdiction.,,351 Justice Stevens concluded, "m ust 
as Georgia's 'independent interest ... in all the earth and air 
within its domain' supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so 
wanning claims fail to meet standing requirements). 
346. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1725-26. 
347. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555,580 (1992) (Kennedy,]., concurring in part and concurring injudgment)); Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1726. 
348. Id. at 1706-08, 1727-29; Stevenson, supra note 21, at 5 n.17. 
349. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453-54; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1727. 
350. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1727. 
35l. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230, 
237 (1907)); Mank, States Standing, supra note \8, at 1727-28. 
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too does Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its 
sovereign territory today. ,,352 Additionally, the Court stated, "[ t] hat 
Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the 'territory alleged 
to be affected' only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the 
outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise 
of federal judicial power. ,,353 
Justice Stevens explained that states had standing to protect their 
quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their citizens 
because they had surrendered three crucial sovereign powers to the 
federal government: (1) states may no longer use military force; (2) 
the Constitution prohibits states from negotiating treaties with 
foreign governments; and (3) federal laws may in some 
circumstances preempt states laws. 354 The federal government now 
possesses those sovereign prerogatives. 355 Because states had 
surrendered these three sovereign powers to the federal 
government, the Court preserved a role for the states in a federal 
system of government by recognizing that states can file suit in 
federal court to protect theIr quasi-sovereign interest in the health, 
welfare and natural resources of their citizens. 356 Additionally, the 
Court stated that Congress had required the EPA to use the federal 
government's sovereign powers to protect states, among others, 
from vehicle emissions "whith in [the Administrator's] judgment 
cause, or contribute to, air poliution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.,,357 Furthermore, 
Congress has "recognized a concomitant procedural right to 
challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and 
capricious.,,358 Justice Stevens concluded, "[g]iven that procedural 
352. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237); Mank, 
States Standing, supra note 18, at 1728. 
353. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237); Mank, 
States Standing, supra note 18, at 1728. 
354. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 ("Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China 
or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state 
motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted."); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 
1728; Stevenson, supra note 21, at 5-8. 
355. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1728. 
356. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1728-29; 
supra notes 354-55 and accompanying text. 
357. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (1»; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1729. 
358. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1»; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1729. 
2009] Standing and Future Generations 71 
right and Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign 
interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in Our 
standing analysis.,,359 He implied that the federal government owed 
states greater standing rights because states had surrendered 
sovereign powers to the federal government. 360 
3. Massachusetts Meets the Tests for Injury, Causation and 
Redressabili ty 
The Court considered the potential risk of global warming to 
Massachusetts' coastline in concluding that the Commonwealth 
had met the Article III standing test. Addressing the injury portion 
of the standing test, Justice Stevens concluded that "EPA's steadfast 
refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm 
to Massachusetts that is both 'actual' and 'imminent.",361 The "risk 
of harm" analysis is arguably comparable to the court of appeals 
decisions addressing an increased risk of harm as providing a 
sufficient injury for standing, although the Court also stated that 
standing was based in part on current injuries to Massachusetts' 
coastline. 362 The Court cited two "probability of injury" courts of 
appeals decisions with approval. 363 Regarding redressability, the 
Court also applied a risk-based approach in determining that there 
is "a 'substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested' will 
prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that risk.,,364 
As to the injury part of the standing test, the Court addressed 
both the harm that climate change had already caused to 
Massachusetts' coastline and the potentially more severe harms that 
could occur in the future. 365 Rejecting the Chief Justice Roberts' 
359. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1729. 
360. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1729. 
361. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) (emphasis added); 
Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1730. 
362. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455-58; Craig, supra note 24, at 195-96. 
363. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458 n.23 (citing Mountain States Legal Foundation v. 
Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The more drastic the injury that 
government action makes more likely, the lesser the increment in probability to establish 
standing"); Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[Elven a 
small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy-to take a suit out of 
the category of the hypothetical-provided of course that the relief sought would, if granted, 
reduce the probability"); Craig, supra note 24, at 195 n.241. 
364. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental 
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978» (emphasis added); Mank, States Standing, supra 
note 18, at 1730. 
365. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455-58; Craig, supra note 24, at 195-96. 
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assertion that the risks of global warming were uncertain, the Court 
concluded that "[t]he harms associated with climate change are 
serious and well recognized.,,366 Rejecting the premise that no one 
has standing to challenge a generalized grievance,367 Justice Stevens 
stated, "[t]hat these climate-change risks are 'widely shared' does 
not minimize Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this 
litigation.,,368 The Court found that Massachusetts had already 
suffered loss of its coastline because of evidence in "petitioners' 
unchallenged affidavits" that "global sea levels rose somewhere 
between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of 
global warming" and as a consequence "[t]hese rising seas have 
already begun to swallow Massachusetts' coastal land."s69 Because 
Massachusetts "'owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal 
property, '" the majority opinion found that "it has alleged a 
particularized Injury in its capacity as a landowner.,,37o 
Furthermore, the Court found that" [t] he severity of that injury will 
only increase over the course of the next century" as sea levels 
continue to rise and that "[r] emediation costs alone, petitioners 
allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars.,,37! 
Thus, the Court found that there was both ongoing injury and a 
strong probability of even more severe injuries in the future: "In 
sum-at least according to petitioners' uncontested affidavits-the 
rise in sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed 
and will continue to harm Massachusetts.,,372 
The Court emphasized that the EPA had a duty to reduce future 
harms to Massachusetts even if it could prevent all such harms: 
"While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will 
not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we 
lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to 
slow or reduce it."m Rejecting the argument that the EPA's 
366. Massachusetts, 127 s. Ct. at 1455; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1731. 
367. See supra notes 123, 12~1 and accompanying text. 
368. Massachusetts, 127 s. Ct. at 1456 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 
U.S. 11,24 (1998) ("[WJhere a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found 
'injury-in-fact"')); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1731. 
369. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1731. 
370. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 (quoting Declaration of Karst R. Hoogeboom, P4); 
Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1731. 
371. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1731. 
372. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458; Craig, supra note 25, at 195-96; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1733. 
373. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1732. 
2009] Standing and Future Generations 73 
regulation of GHG emissions from new vehicles would have little 
impact because of increasing emissions from developing countries 
such as China and India, the Court stated: "A reduction in 
domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions 
increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.,,374 Furthermore, the 
Court suggested that the EPA had a duty to prevent catastrophic 
harms to future generations: "The risk of catastrophic harm, 
though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to 
some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek. We 
therefore hold that petitioners have standing to challenge the 
EPA's denial of their rulemaking petition.,,375 
Although it considered both ongoing and future risks to 
Massachusetts' coastline,376 the Massachusetts decision potentially 
allows states to serve as representatives for future generations. The 
Court recognized that states are entitled to a more lenient standing 
test when they act as parens patriae to protect the state's quasi-
sovereign interest in the health, well-being and natural resources of 
its citizens.3ii It may be that the Court would still be troubled by a 
suit in which there are no current injuries but only future harms. 
For example, a hypothetical suit to force the government to take 
action to prevent an asteroid from striking the Earth in the year 
2200 would only involve future harms. As a practical matter, 
virtually all cases involving environmental pollution involve both 
present and future harms. The Massachusetts decision considered 
not only present harms but harms through the year 2100 in 
determining that the Commonwealth had standing. 378 The 
374. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1732. 
375. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1733. 
376. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458; Craig, supra note 24, at 195-96; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1731, 1786. 
377. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (holding states are entitled to more lenient 
standing criteria when they sue as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign interests of 
citizens); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-10 
(1982) (reviewing history and rationale for role of states in suing as parens patriae to protect 
quasi-sovereign interests of its citizens); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 
(1907) (recognizing right of state to protect its quasi-sovereign interest in the health and 
safety of its citizens); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1727-28. 
378. "The severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next century: If 
sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official believes that a significant 
fraction of coastal property will be 'either permanently lost through inundation or 
temporarily lost through periodic storm surge and flooding events.' Remediation costs 
alone, petitioners allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars." 
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 (citation omitted); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 
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approach of the Massachusetts Court could allow states to bring suit 
on behalf of future generations whenever there are some present 
injuries and the threat of future harm is reasonably possible. 
B. Chief Justice Roberts' Dissenting Opinion 
1. The Future Harms of Global Warming Are Too Speculative 
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts took an approach 
to standing that would make it difficult for states to sue on behalf 
of future generations. He applied a strict evidentiary approach in 
arguing that Massachusetts' evidence for future harms was too 
uncertain. He argued that the petitioners' evidence that rising sea 
levels was insufficient to establish that the injury is "'actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical'" because the computer 
modeling program relied upon by the plaintiffs had a significant 
range of uncertainty. 379 Justice Roberts also argued that even if the 
models were correct about the loss of coastline, that the i~ury was 
not immediate if its full effects would not be felt until 2100. 3S0 He 
stated, "accepting a century-long time horizon and a series of 
compounded estimates renders requirements of imminence and 
immediacy utterly toothless.,,3s1 Thus, it is likely that he and the 
other three dissenting justices would likely be skeptical of any case 
in which a state emphasizes long-term future harms. Because 
computer models of the future will likely contain some 
uncertainties, it is questionable whether any such model would 
satisfy Justice Roberts and the three other dissenting justices in 
Massachusetts. 
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts argued that" [r] edressability is 
1731,1786. 
379. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1467-68 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Ll~an v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); accord Bertagna, supra note 18, at 444-46 
("Global warming plaintiffs cannot take their imminent injury claims out of the speculative 
category, because their claims are based entirely on conjectural, complex systems of climate 
modeling."). But see Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1741. In a footnote, the majority 
responded that the petitioners did not have to prove the amount of loss with exactitude, but 
merely had to demonstrate that it was likely that rising sea levels would result in the loss of 
some of Massachusetts' coastline. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 n.21; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 174l. 
380. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1468 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting); Adler, supra note 21, at 
67-68; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 174l. 
381. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1468 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting); see Adler, supra note 22, at 
67-68; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 174l. 
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even more problematic" because of the "tenuous link between 
petitioners' alleged injury and the indeterminate fractional 
domestic emissions at issue here" and the additional problem that 
the "petitioners cannot meaningfully predict what will come of the 
80 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions that originate 
outside the United States.,,382 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the 
majority'S conclusion that "any decrease in domestic emissions will 
'slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what 
happens elsewhere. ",383 The Chief Justice argued that the Court's 
reasoning failed to satisfy the three-part standing test's requirement 
that a court find that it is "likely" that a remedy will redress the 
"particular injury-in-fact" at issue. 384 He complained that "even if 
regulation does reduce emissions - to some indeterminate degree, 
given events elsewhere in the world - the Court never explains 
why that makes it likely that the injury-in-fact - the loss of land -
will be redressed. ,,385 By contrast, the Court concluded that the 
petitioners met the redressability and other standing requirements 
because reducing domestic emissions would reduce or slow the loss 
of land and the risk of catastrophic harm. 386 Implicitly, Chief 
Justice Roberts appeared to demand that the petitioners quantify at 
least to some extent how much land might be saved by the EPA's 
regulation of emissions from new vehicles and new engines to 
establish standing. The majority, however, was satisfied that the 
petitioners had shown that such regulation should reduce the risk 
to the Massachusetts coastline from rising sea levels resulting from 
GHGs and higher temperatures, despite the uncertainties about 
how much land the EPA's regulation of new vehicles would save. 
In light of Justice Rober~s' demand that plaintiffs provide clear and 
perhaps quantitative evidence specifying how a suit would redress a 
generalized or future harm, it is doubtful that any suit involving 
climate change would satisfy his demanding evidentiary standards. 
Especially for a suit seeking to address harms up to one hundred 
382. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1469 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting); Mank, States Standing, 
supra note 18, at 1742. 
383. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1458); 
Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1742. 
384. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting); Mank, States Standing, 
supra note 18, at 1742-43. 
385. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting); Mank, States Standing, 
supra note 18, at 1743. 
386. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1732-33; 
supra notes 373-74 and accompanying text. 
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years in the future, Justice Roberts is unlikely to be satisfied that 
plaintiffs alleging such harms have standing. 
2. Chief Justice Roberts Accuses the Majority of Intruding 
Upon the Role of the Political Branches 
Even assuming that global warming is a serious problem, Chief 
Justice Roberts in his dissenting opinion, argued that it was a 
non justiciable general grievance that should be decided by the 
political branches rather than by the federal courts. 387 Chief Justice 
Roberts first asserted that the petitioners' injuries from global 
warming failed to meet Lujan's requirement that the alleged injury 
be "particularized" because they were common to the public at 
large. 388 Even more importantly, he maintained that the Court's 
loose application of standing principles in this case failed to 
consider separation of power principles limiting the judiciary to 
"concrete cases.,,389 He argued that the majority's recognition of 
standing in a case involving broad policy issues resulted in the 
Court intruding upon policy decisions appropriately within the 
purview of the political branches of government. 390 Chief Justice 
Roberts implied that the right of citizens to elect representatives to 
Congress and a President was an adequate answer to any sovereign 
rights that states had lost without expanding the rights of states to 
have standing in the federal courts. 391 
Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion clearly argued that the 
political branches should decide issues involving generalized harms 
such as climate change. Because most issues concerning future 
generations involve generalized harms, it is likely that he would 
believe that the political branches should address those issues 
rather than the courts. An unanswered issue is how Justice Roberts 
and the three other dissenting justices would have addressed a case 
where the statute was much clearer in giving citizens or states the 
387. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463-64 (Roberts, C]" dissenting); Mank, States Standing, 
supra note 18, at. 
388. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1467 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting); Mank, States Standing, 
supra note 18, at 1741. 
389. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting); Mank, States Standing, 
supra note 18, at 1743. 
390. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting); Mank, States Standing, 
supra note 18, at 1743-46. 
391. See generally Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1464--71 (Roberts, Cj., dissenting) (arguing 
the majority had usurped the authority of political branches by unduly expanding standing 
rights of states); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1744. 
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right to challenge climate change or some other generalized 
harms. In that hypothetical case, if Congress had specifically 
authorized the suit it would be more difficult to argue that the 
courts were usurping the place of the political branches. 
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia has argued that congressionally 
authorized citizen suits can intrude on the President's authority to 
"take care" that the laws of the United States are faithfully 
executed. 392 
VII. STATE SUITS ON BEHALF OF FUTURE GENERATIONS 
Because both federal and state law recognizes the important role 
of states in protecting natural resources for future generations, 
federal courts should apply a liberal approach to standing issues 
when states bring parens patriae or public trust suits to protect those 
resources for the state's future citizens. Under the parens patriae 
doctrine, states have a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the 
health and safety interests of their citizens. 393 There is a good 
argument that states have a quasi-sovereign interest in not just their 
current citizens but also their future citizens. 394 Furthermore, the 
modern public trust doctrine and several state laws recognize that 
states have a duty to protect natural resources for future 
• 395 generatlons. 
392. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992) (stating that citizen suits 
can interfere with President's Article II authority, "To pennit Congress to convert the 
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 
'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the 
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'Take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' Art. II, § 3."); Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation 
of Powers Challenges "Take Care" of Environmental Citizen Suits? Article II, Injury-in-Fact, Private 
"Enforcers," and Lessonsfrom Qui Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 93, 98--99 & passim (2001) 
(arguing citizen suit provisions generally do not violate "Take Care" Clause of Article II); 
Stephen M. Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental Citizen Suits, 49 
U. KAN. L. REv. 383, 418 & passim (2001) (arguing citizen suit provisions generally do not 
violate "Take Care" Clause of Article II). See also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197 (2000) (Kennedy,]., concurring) (observing that Article II may 
limit Congress' authority to authorize citizen suits, but not deciding question because the 
issue was not raised by the parties to the case). 
393. lV1assachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 
237 (1907); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1728. 
394. See supra notes 351-56, 359-60, 376-78 and infra notes 398--408 and accompanying 
text. 
395. See infra notes 419, 463-69 and accompanying text. 
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A. Parens Patriae Suits for Natural Resources and the Public 
Interest 
The parens patriae doctrine originally concerned the authority of 
the English King to protect incompetent persons including minors, 
the mentally ill and mentally limited persons. 396 Since the early 
twentieth century, courts have recognized that states may sue as 
parens patriae to protect their quasi-sovereign interests in the health, 
welfare and natural resources of their citizens. 397 In its 1901 
decision in Missouri v. Illinois, the Court held that Missouri could 
request injunctive relief to enjoin Illinois from discharging sewage 
that polluted the Mississippi River in Missouri. 398 The Missouri 
Court declared that a state could sue to protect the health of its 
citizens, stating: "It is true that no question of boundary is involved, 
nor of direct property rights belonging to the complainant state. 
But it must surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of 
the inhabitants of a state are threatened, the state is the proper 
party to represent and defend them.,,399 The Missouri Court "relied 
upon an analogy to independent countries in order to delineate 
those interests that a State could pursue in federal court as parens 
patriae, apart from its sovereign and proprietary interests.,,4oo The 
Court stated: 
If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must admit 
that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, by 
force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been 
surrendered to the general government, it was to be expected that 
upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy 
and that remedy, we think, is found in the constitutional provisions 
396. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982); 
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 
229 F.3d 332, 335-36 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1756-57. 
397. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55; Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1757-59. 
398. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 
1759-60. In a subsequent case, the Court denied Missouri's request for an injunction 
without prejudice because it was unclear whether the typhoid bacillus in the sewage smvived 
the journey from Illinois to Missouri and there was evidence of possible infection in other 
sewage sources, including towns in Missouri, but the Court left it open to Missouri to submit 
additional evidence addressing whether Illinois was the source of the alleged disease. 
Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200 U.S. 496, 521-26 (1906). 
399. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1760. 
400. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1760. 
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In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, the Court in a 1907 decision 
followed Missouri's approach of justifying state parens patriae suits 
for quasi-sovereign interests as a substitute for the sovereign 
interests states surrender when they join the United States. 402 
Additionally, Tennessee Copper expanded the scope of quasi-
sovereign interests protected by parens patriae suits from protecting 
not only the health of their citizens from public nuisances to 
safeguarding their land, air and natural resources. 403 The Tennessee 
Copper Court stated: 
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-
sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of 
and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be 
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air .... 
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of 
outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to 
submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the 
possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still 
remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a 
suit in this court. 404 
Thus, even though Georgia owned very little of the affected land, it 
still had a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the land and 
natural resources within its borders, as well as the health of its 
citizens. 405 The Court stated that the evidence of harm to the 
401. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1760. 
402. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55; Snapp, 458 U.S. at 604; Mank, States Standing, 
supra note 18, at 1760. 
403. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Ricard Ieyoub & 
Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of 
Parens Patriae, 74 TuL. L. REv. 1859, 1867 (2000) ("In Tennessee Copper, a state's quasi-
sovereign interest was extended beyond the general concepts of the health and comfort of its 
citizens to specifically include interests in the land on which they reside and in the air that 
they breathe."); Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney 
General as the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVfL. L. & POL'yF. 57,107-08 
(2005) ("The Supreme Court, observing that the state owned very little of the property 
alleged to be damaged, recast the state's claim as a suit for injury to resources owned by 
Georgia in its capacity of 'quasi-sovereign .. "); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1761. 
404. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237 (citing Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241); Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1761. 
405. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 238-39; Kanner, supra note 403, at 107; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1761. 
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state's natural resources alone was sufficient to require injunctive 
relief to protect the state's quasi-sovereign interests: "we are 
satisfied, by a preponderance of evidence, that the sulphurous 
fumes cause and threaten damage on so considerable a scale to the 
forests and vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff state, 
as to make out a case within the requirements of Missouri.,,406 
Subsequent federal decisions have recognized that states have a 
quasi-sovereign interest in protecting their coastline. 407 
A state's parens patriae interests arguably include the protection of 
future generations. In granting injunctive relief, the Missouri Court 
considered not just the actual harms from the sewage, but also the 
potential risks: 
The health and comfort of the large communities inhabiting those 
parts of the State situated on the Mississippi River are not alone 
concerned, but contagious and typhoidal diseases introduced in the 
river communities may spread themselves throughout the territory of 
the State. Moreover, substantial impairment of the health and 
prosperity of the towns and cities of the State situated on the 
Mississippi River, including its commercial metropolis, would 
injuriously affect the entire State. 408 
The reasoning in Missouri arguably extends to risks that are likely to 
occur to future generations, such as harms from climate change. 
Conversely, one might argue that the Missouri decision was 
concerned with only the near-term risk of sewage spreading 
contagious and typhoidal diseases and not any long-term risks to 
citizens of Missouri. 
An important issue is how states should exercise their parens 
patriae authority. In charitable trust law, the state attorney general 
as parens patriae serves as the protector of the public for whom the 
406. Tennessee Capper, 206 U.S. at 238-39; Kanner, supra note 403, at 107; Mank, States 
Standing, supra note 18, at 1761. 
407. See Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097,1100 (D. Maine 1973) (holding state 
has quasi-sovereign interest in coastal resources); Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. 
Supp. 1060, 1065-67 (D. Md. 1972) (allowing state to file parens patriae suit to recover 
damages to coastal waters from oil spill); State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 
750,758 (N]. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) ( allowing state to file parens patriae suit to recover 
damages for fish kill), rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N]. 1976); Ieyoub & Eisenberg, 
supra note 403, at 1869 & n.56 (discussing quasi-sovereign interest in natural resources, 
including coastal resources); Kanner, supra note 403, at 107-09 (same). 
408. Missouri, v. Illinois 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 
1775-76. 
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trust was established. 409 By analogy, a public official could 
represent or appoint a trustee or guardian ad litem to represent 
future generations in courts. 410 Although charitable trusts are often 
perpetual in nature, scholars have disagreed as to whether trust law 
provides an adequate analogy for the complex questions 
surrounding the protection of future generations. 411 
Most commonly, the state attorney general files suit directly as 
parens patriae. 412 Because state attorneys general are generally 
elective positions, there is the danger that parens patriae suits could 
be politicized. 413 The elective nature of state attorneys general 
could hurt future generations because politicians typically focus on 
short-run issues that affect their ability to win the next election. 414 
Nevertheless, there are examples where state attorneys general 
have cited the protection of future generations as a goal of their 
litigation. 415 
B. State Law and Future Generations 
Under the common law, states had a duty to protect navigational 
and fishing rights for the public at large, although the common law 
public trust doctrine was apparently only concerned with the rights 
409. Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endawments and the Democratization oj Dynasty, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 
873,879-81 (1997); Robert Mahealani M. Seto & Lynne Marie Kohm, OJ Princesses, Charities, 
Trustees, and Fairy tales: A Lesson oJ the Simple Wishes oj Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, 21 U. HAw. 
L. REV. 393, 394 (1999); Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 496; Edith Brown Weiss, 
The Planetary Trust: Conseroation and Inter generational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 566 (1984). 
As a practical matter, however, state attorney generals often lack the resources needed to 
monitor closely whether charitable trusts are fulfilling their obligations. Evelyn Brody, The 
Limits oj Charitable Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REv. 1400, 1500 (1998); Seto & Kohm, supra, at 
410-11. 
410. Mank, Future Generations, supra note 3, at 496; Weiss, supra note 409, at 502-40, 565-
66 (proposing intergenerational planetary trust modeled after the common law charitable 
trust). 
411. Compare Davidson, supra note 3, at 204-08 (arguing that trust law offers relevant 
analogies and precedent to guide courts in addressing suits involving future generations) 
with Gaba, supra note 32, at 282 n.82 (arguing that trust law with its focus on the fulfillment 
of narrow objectives is inadequate to tackle broad issues affecting future generations). 
412. Kanner, supra note 403, at 57; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1780-81; 
Stevenson, supra note 21, at 37-40. 
413. Mank, Slates Standing, supra note 18, at 1783-84; Stevenson, supra note 22, at 42-50. 
414. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
415. Weiss, supra note 409 at 565 n.311 (after filing suit to enjoin a government pipeline 
project, the Iowa Attorney General stated that his aim was "to protect the river for future 
generations." quoting Three States Sue U.S. on Missouri River Coal Pipeline Project, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 19, 1982, at A4; Bruhl, supra note 45, at 431. 
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of the present generation. 416 In many jurisdictions, by common 
law, statute or constitutional amendment, the modern public trust 
doctrine imposes a fiduciary duty on a sovereign state to preserve 
public navigational and fishing rights to waterways and coastal land 
and sometimes to preserve other natural resources such as 
wildlife. 417 The public trust doctrine usually requires states to 
I £ f . 418 preserve natura resources or uture generatIOns. 
The modern parens patriae doctrine and the modern public trust 
doctrine now overlap in authorizing states to protect natural 
resources for the public good. 419 Historically, the parens patriae and 
public trust doctrines developed separately. The parens patriae 
doctrine originally concerned the protection of minors and the 
mentally disabled. 420 By contrast, in ancient Roman law and 
subsequently in the English common law, the public trust doctrine 
was concerned with the protection of natural resources for the 
public. 421 Today, however, both doctrines are sometimes invoked 
416. Brady, supra note 291, at 634 n.104-05. 
417. See infra notes 442-446, 455-56, 461-69 and accompanying text. 
418. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896) (stating that "the ownership of the 
sovereign authority is in trust for all the people of the State; and hence, by implication, it is 
the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and 
secure its beneficial use in the future to the people of the State."), overruled on other grounds by 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. 
Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) ("The beneficiaries of the public trust are 
not just present generations but those to come. The check and balance of judicial review 
provides a level of protection against improvident dissipation of an irreplaceable res."); JAN 
G. LAITOS, SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MARy C. WOOD, & DAN H. COLE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAw 
623 (2006) ("The premise of the public trust doctrine is simple: some natural resources are 
so important to the public's well-being that they should not be destroyed by the present 
generation, but should instead be retained in 'trust' by the sovereign for the continued 
welfare of future generations .... The sovereign government has special trustee duties to 
preserve the natural trust."); Deborah G. Musiker et aI., The Public Trust Parens Patriae 
Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 87, 96 (1995) 
("The state, as trustee, must prevent substantial impairment of the wildlife resource so as to 
preserve it for the beneficiaries-current and future generations."); see also id. at 109 ("The 
public trust doctrine protects natural resources, and therefore the public, from the failure of 
legislatures, state agencies, and administrative personnel to recognize the state's duty to 
protect the corpus of the wildlife trust for future generations."); Mary Christina Wood, Essay, 
Nature's Trust: Reclaiming an Environmental Discourse, 25 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 243, 261-62 (2007) 
("The beneficiaries of this [public] trust are all generations of citizens-past, present, and 
future."). 
419. See Musiker et a!., supra note 418, at 107-08. 
420. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex reI. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982); 
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 
229 F.3d 332,335-36 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1756-57. 
421. Brady, supra note 291, at 624-26; Kanner, supra note 403, at 62-66. 
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simultaneously when states seek to protect natural resources. 422 
There are still some distinctions between the two doctrines 
because the public trust doctrine imposes affirmative fiduciary 
duties on a sovereign state that are probably not part of the more 
discretionary parens patriae doctrine. 423 Pursuant to the public trust 
doctrine, the state as sovereign holds natural resources in trust for 
the benefit of the people and has an affirmative duty to protect 
those resources. 424 While states have broad discretion 
implementing duties imposed by the public trust, courts treat states 
as a fiduciary that may not alienate or extinguish the trust. 425 
1. History of the Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine has its roots in ancient Roman law and 
perhaps even earlier. 426 The Institutes of Justinian, which codified 
Roman civil law, recognized that certain types of property were 
communal property for the benefit of the general public: "The 
following things are by natural law common to all - the air, 
running water, the sea, and consequently the sea-shore. No one 
therefore is forbidden access to the sea-shore.,,427 The concept of 
public trust land was more of an ideal than a reality in Roman 
law. 428 
In the mid-13th century, the English legal scholar Bracton 
endorsed the Roman concept of common ownership of certain 
resources including the shores of the sea, but his views were not 
immediately adopted by the English courts. 429 Because the public 
trust doctrine was potentially financially valuable to the English 
Crown, the English courts eventually adopted the Roman principle 
of things "common to all" and developed this idea into the 
422. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980); State v. Jersey Cent. 
Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, 674 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973), affd, 336 A.2d 750 
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rtro'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (NJ. 1976); Musiker et 
aI., supra note 418, at 107-08. 
423. Kanner, supra note 403, at 75-76; Musiker et aI., supra note 418, at 89. 
424. Kanner, supra note 403, at 75-76; Musiker et ai., supra note 418, at 89. 
425. Kanner, supra note 403, at 76. 
426. Kanner, supra note 403, at 62; Brady, supra note 291, at 624. 
427. Kanner, supra note 403, at 62-63 (quoting]. Inst. 35 §2.1.1 U. B. Moyle trans., 5th 
ed. 1913)); Richard]. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural 
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 633-34 (1986); Brady, 
supra note 291, at 624-25. 
428. Lazarus, supra note 427, at 634; Brady, supra note 291, at 625. 
429. Lazarus, supra note 427, at 635; Brady, supra note 291, at 625. 
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doctrine of jus publicum, which gave the Crown possession on 
behalf of the public of the sea, the rivers, and the land underlying 
the waters seaward of the high water mark. 430 The Crown could 
convey title to the foreshore to private individuals, but the public 
retained a trust interest in navigation rights that the Crown had a 
theoretical duty to maintain. 431 Thus the English common law 
concept of the public trust was based more on the sovereign rights 
of the Crown than on the public interest. 432 The English crown also 
had the authority to designate forest land as "royal forests," where 
hunting of wild life was restricted to preserve the wildlife, but the 
hunting restrictions were typically applied in a biased way so that 
the nobility alone could hunt and the common people were not 
allowed to hunt. 433 
During the 19'h century, American courts recognized the concept 
of jus publicum in determining that the public had certain rights 
regarding navigable waters and submerged lands crucial to 
navigation. 434 Because of our federalist system, the United States 
Supreme Court had to determine the respective roles of the states 
and federal government over the nation's waters. 435 In Gibbons v. 
Ogden, the Court in 1824 recognized that the Commerce Clause 
established a "federal navigation servitude" over commerce in 
interstate waters that takes precedence over state interests in such 
waters. 436 Nevertheless, states retain an important role in owning or 
regulating water resources. In 1842, the Court held that the 
original thirteen independent states that formed the United States 
inherited from the English crown the ownership and title of 
submerged lands under tidal waters, as well as the ownership of the 
beds and banks of "navigable waters.,,437 In 1845, the Court held 
430. Lazarus, supra note 427, at 635; Brady, supra note 291, at 625-26. 
431. Lazarus, supra note 427, at 635; Brady, supra note 291, at 626. 
432. Lazarus, supra note 427, at 635. 
433. Kanner, supra note 403, at 64-66. 
434. Lazarus, supra note 427, at 63~0. 
435. Lazarus, supra note 427, at 636-37. 
436. 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Lazarus, supra note 427, at 637. 
437. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 416-17 (1842); see Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. J, 57 
(1894); Robin Kundis Craig & Sarah Miller, Ocean Discharge Criteria and Marine Protected Areas: 
Ocean Water Quality Protection under the Clean Water Act, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1,8 (2001); 
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: l¥hat 
Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 799,828 (2004); Alexandra B. Klass, 
Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards; 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. 699, 703 (2006). 
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that under the "equal footing" doctrine, states subsequently 
admitted to the United States were entitled to the same rights to 
submerged lands under tidal waters and ownership of the beds and 
banks of "navigable waters" as the original thirteen states. 438 
In 1821, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Arnold v. Mundy was 
the first American court to recognize the public trust doctrine, and 
held that any grant of submerged land by the former English crown 
or the state, in this case an oyster bed in a bay, was subject to the 
right of the people to navigate and fish because government holds 
such land as a trustee and cannot convey away an absolute right of 
ownership.439 In the 1850s, a subsequent decision by the New Jersey 
courts allowed the legislature to enact inconsistent legislation that 
effectively overruled the Arnold decision until the public trust 
doctrine was revived by New Jersey in 1972. 440 Nevertheless, the 
United States Supreme Court would later cite the Arnold decision 
with approval when it adopted the public trust doctrine. 441 
In 1892, the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. 
Illinois adopted the public trust doctrine, citing Arnold. 442 The 
Court held that the Illinois legislature could enact a statute 
repealing an earlier statute that had granted a large area of 
submerged shorefront lands in Lake Michigan that covered a 
significant portion of the waterfront area of the City of Chicago to 
the Illinois Central Railroad. 443 The Court concluded that the 
original grant of land was invalid because it violated the state's 
public trust to preserve navigational, commercial and fishing rights 
in all submerged lands for the public. 444 The state could convey 
438. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 229 (1845) (holding that the statehood clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1, required that new states enter the Union 
on grounds of full political equality with the other states); Craig & Miller, supra note 437, at 
8; Klass, supra note 437, at 703; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 437, at 823-33 
(discussing history of state ownership oflands under tidal and navigable-in-fact waters). 
439. 6 NJ.L. 1, 76-78 (1821); Brady, supra note 291, at 626-27 (stating that Arnold v. 
Mundy "appears to have been the first American case to consider the public tmst doctrine's 
applicability in the United States."). 
440. Gough v. Bell, 22 NJ.L. 441, 458-60, aff'd, 23 NJ.L. 624 (NJ. 1852); Lazams, supra 
note 427, at 637 n.28; Brady, supra note 291, at 627 n.46. In 1972, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court once again recognized the public trust doctrine. Neptune City v. Burough of Avon-Iry-the-
Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (NJ. 1972); Brady, supra note 291, at 627 n.46. 
441. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892) (citing Arnold with 
approval); see also Waddell, 41 U.S. at 417-18 (citing Arnold). 
442. 146 U.S. 387,456 (1892). 
443. Id. at 410-11,452-55; Kanner, supra note 403, at 70; Brady, supra note 291, at 628. 
444. Tllinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 452 (stating that submerged lands subject to a public tmst 
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such land to a private party, but any grant was limited by the state's 
fiduciary duty to protect the public's right to use the property for 
those purposes. 445 Numerous state constitutions, statutes and 
judicial decisions have adopted the public trust rationale in Illinois 
Central. 446 
Subsequent decisions have expanded the public trust doctrine 
beyond the area of navigable waters and submerged lands. In Geer 
v. Connecticut,447 the United States Supreme Court in 1896 held that 
the State of Connecticut did not violate the Commerce Clause in 
forbidding interstate transportation of wildlife taken within its 
borders because its export restriction preserved "a valuable food 
supply" for the state's citizens, who had a common ownership 
interest in the state's wildlife;448 The Supreme Court determined 
that under the common law each state has sovereign ownership of 
the wildlife within its jurisdiction and exercises a public trust over 
wildlife for the benefit of all citizens of that state. 449 The Geer 
decision stated: 
While the fundamental printiples upon which the common property 
are "different in character from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale ... It is 
a title held in trust for the people of the State, that they may enjoy the navigation of the 
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the 
obstruction or interference of private parties."); Kanner, supra note 403, at 70; Brady, supra 
note 291, at 628. 
445. Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 453-54 ("The trust devolving upon the state for the public, 
and which can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the 
public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of 
the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used 
in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substarltial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining ... So with 
trusts connected with public property, or property of a special character, like lands under 
navigable waters; they cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the 
state."); Kanner, supra note 403, at 71; Brady, supra note 291, at 628 
446. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 3; La. Const. art. IX §§1, 7; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§113-
133.1 (2007); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 211-12 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (applying public trust doctrine to fish); Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E. 2d 
1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (applying public trust doctrine to wildlife); Kanner, supra note 403, 
at 71-72; Lazarus, supra note 427, at 640. 
447. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), rev'd on other grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 
(1979). . 
448. Id. at 522; Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: 
The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 Envl. L. 673, 699-700 (2005); 
Kanner, supra note 403, at 72. 
449. Geer, 161 U.S. at 527-30; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 448, at 699-700; Kanner, supra 
note 403, at 72-73; Musiker, supra note 418, at 92-93. 
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in game rest have undergone no change, the development of free 
institutions had led to the recognition of the fact that the power or 
control lodged in the State, resulting from this common ownership, is 
to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the 
benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of 
the government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of 
private individuals as distinguished from the public good. 450 
In 1979, the Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma451 overruled Geers 
commerce clause analysis and held that states could not prohibit 
the interstate shipment of wildlife taken within its borders. 452 The 
Hughes decision rejected Geer's view that states literally "own" 
wildlife, but recognized their broad sovereign authority to protect 
wildlife for the benefit of their citizens: "The whole ownership 
theory, in fact, is ... but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of 
the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve 
and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.,,453 The 
Hughes decision emphasized that "the overruling of Geer does not 
leave the States powerless to protect and conserve wild animal life 
within their borders,,454 and that "the general rule we adopt in this 
case makes ample allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent 
with the Commerce Clause, the legitimate state concerns for 
conservation and protection of wild animals.,,455 Mter Hughes, states 
may still exercise a public trust over wildlife for the benefit of their 
• • 456 CItIzens. 
2. The Modern Public Trust Doctrine Protects Future 
Generations 
In an influential 1970 article, Professor Sax argued that the 
public trust doctrine should be expanded so that states and the 
450. Geer, 161 U.S. at 529. 
451. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
452. [d. at 334; Kanner, supra note 403, at 73-74; Musiker, supra note 418, at 93. 
453. Geer, 161 U.S. at 334 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948»; Kanner, 
supra note 403, at 73-74; Musiker, supra note 418, at 93-94. 
454. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 338; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 448, at 706. 
455. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-36; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 448, at 706. 
456. See, e.g., CIa jon Produce Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Wyo. 1994) 
(concluding that, after Hughes, the state's role in governing and conserving wildlife remains 
unchanged); State v. Fertterer, 841 P.2d 467, 470 (Mont. 1992) (holding that state holds 
wildlife "in its sovereign capacity for the use and benefit of the people generally"), rev'd on 
other wounds by State v. Catts, 928 P.2d 114 (Mont. 1996); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 448, 
at 706-08; Kanner, supra note 403, at 72; Musiker, supra note 418, at 93-94. 
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federal government have an affirmative duty to protect a wide 
range of natural resources, not just waterways and public parks. 457 
He argued that "public trust problems are found whenever 
government regulation comes into question, and they occur in a 
wide range of situations in which diffuse public interests need 
protection against tightly organized groups with clear and 
immediate goals.,,458 He contended that the public trust doctrine 
was necessary to protect the public interest from the 
"insufficiencies of the democratic process. ,,459 He offered the 
following test for when courts should intervene to protect natural 
resources from questionable governmental decisions: "When a state 
holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general 
public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any 
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that 
resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-
interest of private parties.,,46o Although courts have not fully 
adopted Professor Sax's views, a number of subsequent state court 
decisions, statutes and constitutional provisions have adopted an 
expansive approach to the public trust doctrine. 461 In Phillips 
457. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970); see also Kanner, supra note 403, at 72 (discussing Sax 
article); Lazarus, supra note 427, at 632 ("Professor Joseph Sax reconstructed how the mostly 
dormant doctrine had historically functioned in the United States to safeguard public rights 
in navigable waterways, and he predicted that the doctrine could expand to embrace 
broader environmental concerns."), 641-43 (discussing Sax article); Carol M. Rose, Takings, 
Public Trust, Unhappy Truths, and Helpless Giants: A Review of Professor Joseph Sax's Defense of the 
Environment Through Academic Scholarship: Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 
ECOLOGYL.Q. 351, 351-52 (1998) (arguing Sax's article influenced courts to broaden public 
trust doctrine beyond waterways to issues involving land resources). 
458. Sax, supra note 457, at 556; see also Kanner, supra note 403, at 72 (discussing Sax 
article) . 
459. Sax, supra note 457, at 521; see also Kanner, supra note 403, at 77 (discussing Sax 
article). 
460. Sax, supra note 457, at 490 (emphasis omitted); see also Kanner, supra note 403, at 77 
(discussing Sax article) . 
461. See, e.g., Larman v. State, 552 N.W. 2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996) (stating that the public 
trust doctrine encompasses recreational uses); Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E. 2d 1025, 1027-29 
(III. App. Ct. 1984) (recognizing that wildlife is part of the Illinois public trust); Nat'l 
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (court applied 
public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 
1971); United Plainsman Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n., 247 N.W. 2d 457, 
462-63 (N.D. 1976); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 
54-55 (NJ. 1972); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E. 2d 114, 121 (Mass. 
1966) (court held that rural park lands were part of the public trust); Kanner, supra note 
403, at 74-75 nn.119-20, 80-81 nn.155-61. 
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Petroleum Co. v. MississiPPi, the Supreme Court held that states have 
the broad authority to define the scope of their public trust 
doctrine. 462 
The modern public trust doctrine and similar doctrines in several 
states have evolved to include an interest in protecting natural 
resources for future generations. 463 In cases involving the public 
trust doctrine, courts have sometimes implicitly or explicitly 
referred to a state's interest in protecting natural resources for 
future generations. 464 The constitutions of Hawaii, Illinois, 
462. 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) ("But it has been long established that the individual States 
have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize 
private rights in such lands as they see fit."); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,26 (1894); Kanner, 
supra note 403, at 72 n.l0l. 
463. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Alaska 1999) (concluding state constitution 
"requires that natural resources be managed for the benefit of all people, under the 
assumption that both development and preservation may be necessary to provide for future 
generations, and that income generation is not the sole purpose of the trust relationship."); 
Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) 
("The beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present generations but those to come. 
The check and balance of judicial review provides a level of protection against improvident 
dissipation of an irreplaceable res."); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 716 (considering 
impact of water diversions on Mono Lake for the next fifty to one hundred years); In re 
Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 694 (Haw. 2004); In re Water Use Permit 
Applications,9 P.3d 409, 453 (Haw. 2000); Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1045 
(III. 1999) (denying standing in suit seeking to use public trust doctrine to protect 
threatened species for future generations, but recognizing duty under state constitution to 
protect health of future generations); Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1110-12 & n.3 (La. 
2004) (Weimar,]., concurring) (arguing state coastal restoration project that interfered with 
private oyster leases was not an unconstitutional taking because state was obligated to protect 
its coastline resources for present and future generations under the state constitution and 
the public trust doctrine); United Plainsman Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation 
Comm'n, 247 N.W. 2d 457, 462-63 (N.D. 1976) (stating that state agencies when allocating 
public water resources must consider future water needs of state); WJ.F. Realty Corp. v. 
State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 10ll-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (rejecting takings claim in part 
because of need to conserve drinking water for future generations); Palmer v. 
Commonwealth Marine Resources Comm'n, 628 S.E.2d 84, 89-90 (Va. App. 2006) (stating 
Virginia Marine Resources Commission must ensure the preservation and protection of all 
current and future uses of the state-owned bottomlands); Brady, supra note 291, at 634 n. 
104; Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications 
of States, Propnty Rights, and State Summaries 68 (2007), at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article;1000&context=robin_craig; Klass, 
supra note 437, at 711, 715, 717, 730, 733, 735-36; Musiker et aI., supra note 418, at 96, 109. 
464. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 533 (1896) ("it is within the police power of the 
State ... to make such laws as will best preserve such game, and secure its beneficial use in 
the future to the citizens, and to that end it may adopt any reasonable regulations.") 
(quoting State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 400 (1894) rev'd on other grounds by Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979»; Illinois Cent. Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 
(1892); Musiker, supra note 418, at 96, llO, ll3. 
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Montana, and Pennsylvania explicitly declare that the state has a 
duty to preserve the environment for future generations. 465 
Furthermore, several other states, including Connecticut, Indiana, 
Kentucky, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia have statutes that 
mention the state's duty to preserve natural resources for future 
• 466 generatIOns. 
California's public trust doctrine has been used to protect the 
interests of future generations. In its 1983 decision, Nat'l Audubon 
Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County (Mono Lake), the California 
Supreme Court held that an environmental organization and 
others could challenge the Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power's (DWP) diversion of waters from Mono Lake to a city 
aqueduct and that the state had a public trust duty to insure such 
diversions did not harm water levels in the lake. 467 In Mono Lake, 
465. Haw. Const. art. XI, § 1 ("For the benefit of present and future generations, the 
State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all 
natural resources .... "); Ill. Const. art. XI, § 1 ("The public policy of the State and the duty 
of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and 
future generations."); Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1 ("The state and each person shall maintain 
and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future 
generations."); Pa. Const. art. 1, § 27 ("The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and 
to the preservation of natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment. 
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the people, 
including generations yet to come."); Allen, supra note 10, at 725 nn. 69-72;Just, supra note 
65, at 616. Additionally, Alabama's Constitution provides for the acquisition, maintenance, 
and protection of unique land and water areas "to protect the natural heritage of Alabama 
for the benefit of present and future generations," and establishes the Forever Wild Trust 
"with full recognition that this generation is a trustee of the environment for succeeding 
generations." Alabama Constit. art. XI, § 219.07; Craig, Public Trust, supra note 463, at 22. 
466. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-l (West 2007); Ind. Code Ann. § 14-31-1-1 (West 2007); 
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 146.220 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481:1 ("[TJhe water of New 
Hampshire whether located above or below ground constitutes a limited and, therefore, 
precious and invaluable public resource which should be protected, conserved and managed 
in the interest of present and future generations. The state as trustee of this resource for the 
public benefit declares that it has the authority and responsibility to provide careful 
stewardship over all the waters lying within its boundaries."); N.Y. Envtl. Conservation Law § 
15-1601 ("All the waters of the state are valuable public natural resources held in trust by this 
state, and this state has a duty as trustee to manage its waters effectively for the use and 
enjoyment of present and future residents and for the protection of the environment .... "); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-3 (2007); Ohio Rev. Code § 1517.06 (Baldwin 2007); Tenn. Code. 
Ann. § II-I3-103 (2007); Wash Rev. Code Ann. § 79.70.010 (West 2007); W. VA. CODE § 22-1-
1 (b); Allen, supra note 9, at 725-26 n.75 (listing statutes). 
467. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d 709, 711-33 (Cal. 1983); Michael C. Blumm & Thea 
Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 701, 703-08 
(1995) (discussing Mono Lake decision). 
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the court considered conflicting evidence about the impact of the 
water diversions on the lake for the next fifty to one hundred 
years. 468 The court suggested that the DWP had a procedural duty 
under the public trust doctrine to consider the impacts of water 
diversions on foreseeable future generations, but that the state 
could decide after such consideration that current water needs 
justified harm to its trust ~nterest in future preservation. 469 Thus, a 
California court might someday address the impacts of greenhouse 
gases on future water conditions in the state, but perhaps not a 
more speculative suit concerning highly uncertain future events. 
3. Who Has Standing to Bring Public Trust Suits? 
There is a split among states about when citizens have standing to 
sue if a state allegedly fails to maintain its public trust duties. In 
California, any member of the public can sue the state for failing to 
perform its public trust duties, even if the plaintiff is not personally 
harmed by such failure. 470 By contrast, the Michigan Supreme 
Court in 2007 held that citizens Can sue to enforce the state's 
public trust duties only if they suffer personal harm. 471 Because 
Michigan explicitly follows the United States Supreme Court's 
standing test for Article III courts,472 it is likely that federal courts 
468. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 715 ("the parties hotly dispute the projected effects 
of future diversions on the lake itself, as well as the indirect effects of past, present and 
future diversions on the Mono Basin environment."). 
469. "The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the 
planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever 
feasible. Just as the history of this state shows that appropriation may be necessary for 
efficient use of water despite unavoidable harm to public trust values, it demonstrates that an 
appropriative water rights system administered without consideration of the public trust may 
cause unnecessary and unjustified harm to trust interests. . .. As a matter of practical 
necessity the state may have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public 
trust uses. In so doing, however, the state must bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider 
the effect of the taking on the public trust and to preserve, so far as consistent with the 
public interest, the uses protected by the trust." [d. at 728 (citations and footnote omitted). 
Because the suit sought injunctive relief for present injuries caused by the DPW diverting 
water from Mono Lake, it is not clear whether the court would have recognized standing for 
the plaintiffs to bring suit exclusively on behalf offuture generations. See id. at 711-12, 714-
18. 
470. [d. at 716 n.11; Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 381-82 (Cal. 1971); Blumm & 
Schwartz, supra note 467, at 712-13 (stating that California courts implicitly grant universal 
public standing to enforce public trust doctrine). 
471. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am. Inc., 737 N.W.2d 
447,453-459 (Mich. 2007). 
472. See id. 
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would adopt the same approach to standing as the Michigan 
Supreme Court in public trust cases involving private parties. 
Laidlaw suggests that in federal courts and state courts that follow 
Article III standing, such as Michigan, a plaintiff could probably 
sue on behalf of future generations only if that plaintiff had a 
reasonable probability of suffering a concrete injury from a 




Following Massachusetts, Tennessee Copper, and numerous state 
decisions, a state, unlike a private plaintiff, need not demonstrate 
personal harm when bringing a parens patriae suit to protect its 
quasi-sovereign interest in natural resources or when bringing a 
public trust suit. 474 The Tennessee Copper and Missouri suits were 
essentially public nuisance actions with the state acting as parens 
patriae. 475 The traditional rule in public nuisance cases is that the 
state has automatic standing as sovereign in its own state courts. 476 
Some commentators have argued that states should not have 
special standing rights in federal courts and should be treated the 
same as private plaintiffs. 477 The Tennessee Copper and Missouri 
decisions, however, implied that states had special rights in federal 
courts when they sue in a parens patriae capacity to protect their 
quasi-sovereign interest. 478 The Massachusetts decision clearly held 
473. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. (Laidlaw), 528 U.S. 
167, 181 (2000) (stating that standing is based to harm to the plaintiff, not harm to the 
environment). 
474. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1764-65. 
475. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (air pollution); Missouri v. 
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 240-41, 244 (1901) (sewage discharge); Mank, States Standing, supra 
note 18, at 1759-61. 
476. See, e.g., David A. Grossman, Wanning Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. ]. ENVTL. L. 1, 55 (2003); David Kairys, The Governmental 
Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REv. 
1175, 1177 n.9 (2000); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1764-65; Matthew F. Pawa & 
Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 407, 469-70 (2005). 
477. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Global Wanning as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM.]. ENVTL. 
L. 293, 300-06 (2005); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 
387, 390-97, 432-33, 445-46, 482-86, 502-20 (1995); Kathryn A. Watts & Amy]. 
Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other Than Global Wanning, 
102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1029, 1033-39 (Special Issue 2008) (questioning use of state's quasi-
sovereign interests as basis for special standing rights in federal courts, questioning standing 
analysis in Massachusetts v. PYA, but also stating that states should have standing in federal 
courts to challenge whether a federal law preempts a state law). 
478. Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1759-62, 1764-68; Merrill, supra note 477, at 
304-06 (acknowledging despite his contrary view that "[tlhere is no suggestion from the 
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that states are entitled to a more lenient standing test in federal 
courts, at least when they file parens patriae suits to protect their 
quasi-sovereign interests in the health and welfare of their citizens 
and the state's natural resources. 479 
Although the public trust doctrine is primarily a principle of state 
law and for state courts, federal courts should recognize state 
public trust doctrine as defining the scope of a state's interest in 
protecting its lands and citizens in interstate nuisance actions 
under federal common law, such as Tennessee Copper. Following the 
rationale of Tennessee Copper, a state should be able to protect its 
public trust lands in an interstate nuisance action by asserting its 
parens patriae interests in both the public welfare of its citizens and 
its lands, including public trust lands. Additionally, in federal 
statutory actions, courts should allow states to sue the federal 
government to force a federal agency to protect its public trust 
lands. If Massachusetts can sue the EPA to protect its coastal lands, 
it should also be able to sue to protect tidal and freshwater 
resources that it has a public trust duty to protect. Accordingly, 
states should have standing when they sue as parens patriae or in a 
public trust capacity to protect their environment for present and 
future generations even if private citizens could not sue. 
CONCLUSION: MASSACHUSE1TS v.l!.J1A: A MODEL FOR STATE SUITS TO 
PROTECT FUTURE GENERATIONS? 
Ideally from the perspective of future generations, the Supreme 
Court should eliminate the "actual and imminent" requirement for 
Article III standing because it is inherently biased against suits that 
seek to prevent future harm. 480 The Court likely did not consider 
the interests of future generations when it established the "actual 
and imminent" requirement for standing. Nevertheless, the Court 
is unlikely to change its standing test in the near future since the 
Massachusetts decision employed the three-part standing test 
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction cases adjudicating transboundary nuisance disputes-
the paradigm for the modern parens patriae action-that the States bringing these suits were 
required to meet any particular standing burden in order to maintain the action," but also 
stating that "the issue has never been squarely decided" by the Court as of 2005, before the 
lHassachusetts decision in 2007); Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 477, at 446-47 (citing 
Missouri, ISO U.S. at 240-41). 
479. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55; Mank, States Standing, 
supra note IS, at 1706-{)S, 1727-29. 
4S0. Hsu, supra note 4, at 466-69. 
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discussed III Part N.A, although the Court relaxed the 
requirements of the test for state litigants. 481 Accordingly, those 
who seek to protect future generations must find ways to do so 
within the confines of existing standing doctrine. 
In some circumstances, non-government parties can bring 
procedural suits on behalf of future generations. Pursuant to 
NEPA, a plaintiff who is harmed by a proposed government project 
can request a court· to order the government to study both the 
project's likely short-term and long-term impacts. 482 In Shain, 
however, the Eighth Circuit denied standing where the impacts of a 
proposed government action were likely to occur after the 
plaintiffs' lifetimes. 483 It is not clear to what extent non-government 
parties can obtain substantive relief for future harms. 
Courts should reject Public Citizen's hostile approach to cases 
involving probabilistic injury. 484 Several decisions in various courts 
of appeal have allowed standing where there was a significant 
possibility of future injury.485 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit should 
abandon its substantial probability test for standing because it is 
more stringent than required by Lujan and should instead adopt 
the reasonable probability test used in the Ninth Circuit. 486 
481. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453-58; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1727-
34; supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
482. See supra notes 165-81 and accompanying text. 
483. See supra notes 262-74, 278-79 and accompanying text. 
484. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. The author will address this issue and 
related issues in more depth in a forthcoming article, Bradford C. Mank, Standing and 
Statistical Persons: Should Large Public Interest Organizations Have Greater Standing Rights than 
Individuals?, ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2009) [herinafter Mank, Standing and Statistical 
Persons], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1277269. 
485. See Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 484; supra notes 188-213 and 
accompanying text. 
486. Compare Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(applying strict four-part test for standing in procedural rights case, including requiring a 
procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury, that "a particularized 
environmental interest of theirs that will suffer demonstrably increased risk" and that it is 
"substantially probable" that the agency action will cause the demonstrable injury alleged by 
the plaintiff) with Citizens for Better Forestry v. United States Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 
972-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Florida Audubon's standing test for procedural rights 
plaintiffs and stating that such plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable probability of 
the challenged action's threat to [their] concrete interest.'" (citation omitted)); Comm. to 
Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero (Rio Hondo), 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(disagreeing with Florida Audubon's "substantial probability" test for procedural rights 
plaintiffs and instead adopting a test that plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse 
environmental consequences" from the alleged failure to follow NEPA); Mank, Global 
Warming, supra note 2, at 45-63 (discussing split in circuits about how to apply footnote seven 
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Until the Supreme Court resolves the differences among the 
courts of appeal about suits involving future injuries, suits by states 
represent the best opportunity to protect the interests of future 
generations. The Massachusetts decision recognized that states have 
broader standing rights than private parties and potentially allows 
states to serve as representatives for future generations. 487 The 
Massachusetts decision considered both ongoing and future risks to 
Massachusetts' coastline through the year 2100 in determining that 
the Commonwealth had standing. 488 The Massachusetts decision 
considered computer modeling evidence that sea levels would rise 
significantly between 2007 and 2100 in concluding that the 
Commonwealth had standing. 489 The Court did not require 
Massachusetts to demonstrate that a judicial remedy would solve all 
future harms, but merely that it lessen those harms. 49o Additionally, 
the Missouri Court's consideration of potential harms from raw 
sewage supports the Massachusetts Court's consideration of the 
future harms of global warming. 491 
Beyond the Massachusetts decision, both common law doctrine 
and statutory law support giving states a special role in protecting 
future generations. The common law "public trust" doctrine 
recognizes that states have a duty to preserve certain natural 
resources for future generations. 492 The modern parens patriae 
standing test in NEPA cases); Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1720 n.91; Bertagna, 
supra note 18, at 461-64 (discussing split between Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on 
causation portion of standing test); see also Sakas, supra note 171, at 192-204 ("The Ninth 
and Seventh Circuits have held that a plaintiff need not have a claim that is site-specific, 
while the D.C., Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have created a stricter standing doctrine where 
a site-specific injury is necessary" in procedural injury challenges to programmatic rules). 
487. See supra notes 24, 280-81, 376-78 and infra notes 490-91 and accompanying text. 
488. "The severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next century: If 
sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official believes that a significant 
fraction of coastal property will be 'either permanently lost through inundation or 
temporarily lost through periodic stonn surge and flooding events.' ... Remediation costs 
alone, petitioners allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars." 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1458 (2007) (citation omitted); Craig, 
supra note 24, at 195-96. 
489. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 n.20; but see id. at 1467-68 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) 
(criticizing Massachusetts use of estimates of sea level rise through 2100); see Adler, supra 
note 21, at 65; Mank, States Standing, supra note 18, at 1731,1741,1786. 
490. iVlassachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458 ("A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the 
pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere."). 
491. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); supra note 408 and accompanying 
text. 
492. See supra notes 395, 418, 463-69 and accompanying text. 
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doctrine and the modern public trust doctrine now overlap in 
giving states the authority to protect natural resources for the 
public good. 493 The Comprehensive Environmental Compensation 
Liability Act (CERCLA) 494 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990495 both 
recognize the role of states in acting as trustees for their natural 
resources. Thus, states have a strong argument for acting as the 
representative of future generations. Because both federal and 
state law recognizes the important role of states in protecting 
natural resources for future generations, federal courts should 
apply a liberal approach to standing issues when states bring parens 
patriae or public trust suits to protect those resources for the state's 
future citizens. 
The Court may still be troubled by a suit in which there are no 
current injuries but only future harms, even if a state is the 
plaintiff. For instance, the Court might balk at standing if a state 
asserts that its natural resources could be affected in the distant 
future, but there is no actual harm in the present or near future. 
Yet the D.C. Circuit in Nuclear Energy Institute allowed a private 
plaintiff to sue concerning the potentially distant harms of the 
proposed nuclear repository at Yucca Mountain because of the 
possibility that the site might contaminate the plaintiffs 
groundwater, although the court did conclude that that the NEPA 
claim was not yet ripe for judicial decision. 496 The lenient state 
standing test in Massachusetts should allow states to bring suit on 
behalf of future generations whenever there are some present 
injuries and the threat of future harm is reasonably possible. 
Additionally, some cases like Baur suggest that a reasonable threat 
of serious harm is enough for standing, although some D.C. Circuit 
decisions have required a substantial probability that there will be 
harm. 497 Accordingly, in many, but not all cases involving serious 
risks of future harm, states can file suit to protect their future 
citizens from the likely future harms of climate change and other 
present environmental pollution that has long-lasting 
493. See Musiker et aI., supra note 418, at 107-08; supra notes 419-22 and accompanying 
text. 
494. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f) (1), (2)(B) (1986) (defining role of state trustees in protecting 
natural resources under act). 
495. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2706(a)(2), (b)(3), (c) (2) (1990) (defining role of state trustees in 
protecting natural resources under act). 
496. See supra notes 313-330 and accompanying text. 
497. See supra notes 208--61 and accompanying text. 
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consequences. 

